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Moral Luck in Medical Ethics and Practical Politics 
Abstract . : v;
Typically we maintain two incompatible standards towards right action 
and good character, and the tension between these polarities creates the 
paradox of moral luck. In practice we regard actions as right or wrong, and 
character as good or bad, partly according to what happens as a result of 
the agent's decision. Yet we also think that people should not be held 
responsible for matters beyond their control.
This split underpins Kant's assertion that only the good will is 
securely good, that its goodness is impervious to outcome ill-luck. Some 
commentators, such as Martha Nussbaum and to some extent Bernard Williams, 
think that this simply writes off the paradox. Williams asserts that the 
paradox is insoluble, and that its inescapability threatens the notion of 
agent responsibility. In contrast Thomas Nagel argues that agents' most 
cherished projects may be indeed be subject to luck, but that does not 
mean that their deepest motivations are moral. This, I suggest, is one of 
several means whereby we might limit the effect of the paradox without 
denying that the tension exists. But I also argue that it is wrong to 
accuse Kant of ignoring the paradox.
Ethical consequentialists, on the other hand, appear to have no 
problem with moral luck, because the paradox depends on a dichotomy 
between the outside world and the locus of moral worth in the individual 
agent. But this turns out not to be true. The problem of moral luck is not 
some strange Kantian fixation, but a general dilemma: a variant on what
Nagel terms "the problem of excess objectivity" which cuts across all of 
ethics and metaphysics.
Retaining a broadly Kantian notion of agent-responsibility, but 
limiting \diat agents are responsible for, requires us to delineate the 
realm of ethics more narrowly than has been done by those who believe that 
the rational and/or prudential are coterminous with the ethical. This 
strategy for minimising the paradox's impact is explored in two areas from 
medical ethics, the allocation of scarce medical resources and informed 
consent, and two from public policy, secrecy and nuclear deterrence. 
Throughout, the analysis seeks to test Nagel's maxim that the best we can 
hope for is to act in such a manner that we would not have to revise our 
opinion of how we should have acted once the consequences of our actions 
become apparent. . ;
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Chapter One 
Ethics : versus Luck?
Is "moral" incompatible with "luck"? The attempt to shore up the 
ethically right against the tidal waves of ill chance is generally thought 
central to the Kantian moral enterprise. But if that effort is hopelessly 
quixotic, or even misguided, is Kantianism in danger? More broadly, is 
ethics, as a idiole somehow at risk?
Typically, we maintain two incompatible standards towards right 
actions . and good character, and the tension between these polarities 
creates the paradox of moral luck. In practice we regard actions as right
or wrong, and moral character as good or bad, partly according to what
happens as a result of the. agent's decision. That is, we make 
responsibility hinge to some extent on things outside the agent's control. 
Yet at the same time we think that people should not be held responsible 
for matters beyond their control.
This tension underpins Kant's famous assertion that only the good will
is securely good, and that its goodness is impervious to ill-luck in how
things actually turn out.
Even if it should happen that by a particularly unfortunate fate or by 
the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will should be 
vÆiolly lacking in power to accomplish its purpose, if even the 
greatest effort should not avail it to achieve anything of its end, 
and if there remained only the good will (not as a mere wish, but as
the summoning of all the means in our power), it would sparkle like a
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jewel in its own right, as something that had its full worth in
itself.1
But is moral luck only a problem for a .Kantian? Martha Graven Nussbaum has 
claimed that not only Kant but also Plato was motivated by a concern to 
minimise the effects of chance on moral character and the rightness of 
ethical choices.*^  And though ethical consequentialism appears not to have a 
problem with moral luck, in fact it does so, as I shall argue in chapter 
three. But most particularly, I want to see whether the concept of moral 
luck can cast any light on problems in medical ethics and practical 
politics— and conversely, how grounding the concept in practical ethics 
might help us to better understand and perhaps resolve the paradox.
This moral luck debate, begun by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in 
1976,^ has become reasonably familiar to many ethicists. And its 
application has been extended to theories outside the original scope of the 
debate, most notably in Nussbaum* s work— vhich stretches the concept to fit 
classical tragedy as well as philosophy. But it has not yet been applied to 
practical ethics, and this is what I intend to do in chapters five through 
eight. The areas which I discuss— the allocation of scarce medical 
resources, informed consent, secrecy in politics, and nuclear deterrence—  
can be fruitfully explored, I argue, in terms of the simple question 
arising from a concern with moral luck; \diat happens if things go wrong? 
This practical ethics section occupies slightly more than half of the 
dissertation. In it I conclude that a modified Kantian approach can handle 
the moral luck problem as it surfaces in these areas of medical ethics and 
practical politics.
Page 2 Moral Luck in Medical Ethics and Practical Politics
Ethics versus Luck?/Chapter 1
In the first four chapters I erect the theoretical framework for \diat 
I hope will be a more sophisticated discussion than might be suggested by 
the basic question of what happens when things beyond an agent’s control go 
wrong. I begin in this chapter with a systematic exposition of the moral 
luck debate between Williams and Nagel, considering also the ramifications 
of the debate in further articles on the same subject by other writers^. 
(It has also surfaced in such unexpected areas as feminism.^) I end with 
Williams’s own further reflections on the significant debate which he set 
in train.^
The second chapter analyses the Kantian sources of the claim that 
ethics cannot allow itself to be undermined by chance, and deals at some 
length with Nussbaum’s stimulating critique of what she presents as Kant’s 
view as well as Plato’s.^ It asks vdiether Kant’s approach to the moral luck 
paradox is essentially sound, despite Nussbaum’s criticisms, and concludes 
in part that Nussbaum has misrepresented Kant’s solution, which is closer 
to her own than she acknowledges. In chapter three I turn from deontology 
to consequentialism, and particularly to utilitarianism. Here I explore the 
threat from moral luck, which I argue a threat even to
consequentialists, in terms of actual and potential consequences, with the 
associated concept of probability also entering in. In the course of 
chapter three I suggest that the best way to resolve the paradox turns out 
to be retaining a broadly Kantian conception of agency, with considerable 
strictness about responsibility, but limiting severely what agents are 
responsible for. This requires an equally strict delineation of \diere the 
ethical ends and the merely prudential begins, and this I attempt to do in
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chapter four, which also considers rationality. Thus each of chapters two 
through four also introduces a new but associated topic arising from moral 
luck: risk in chapter two, probability in chapter three, and rationality in 
chapter four.
In this chapter I summarise the Williams-Nagel debate and ask whether 
the moral luck paradox is real. But first I need to provide the first of 
many qualifying statements about luck and ethics. Not all "luck" is 
"moral", but more of the ethical is open to the operations of chance than 
we think, or perhaps want to think. If I give ten pounds to Oxfam as an 
expression of my belief that it is ethically correct to feed the hungry, I 
do not regard my decision as having been proved unethical by a flash flood 
which stops the supplies that I have donated from getting through.^ But I 
am, of course, lucly to have ten pounds to give, and my generosity is 
somehow slightly less than my own: it is partly a matter of my good fortune 
in living in a comparatively wealthy country and in being in work. (Of 
course, many others also live in a First World country and hold paid 
employment, but ,do not contribute to charity— so my generosity is partly my 
own.) In a further sense, I am lucky to live under a very watered-down 
version of Christianity which no longer enjoins me to sell all I have and 
give my goods to the poor. I can be accounted generous only because the 
moral standards set by my society are actually rather lax in the matter of 
financial altruism, and in this sense I am again lucky to live in this 
society.
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These last two points are applications of what Nagel calls luck in 
one’s antecedent circumstances and luck in the problems which have to be 
faced.^ More commonly, moral luck is considered in relation to luck in 
outcomes, and this is the sense in which I (and Williams) use it most of 
the time. A recurring theme in this dissertation is that the extent of 
outcome luck has been underestimated. Ethicists have often failed to 
consider all the possible outcomes or have even assumed that the desired 
outcome is automatic. Thus, to take the most hackneyed example, the old saw 
about whether it is ethically justifiable to kill one person in order to 
save one hundred almost always presumes that the hundred will be saved by 
the death of the one. Even Williams himself can be accused of
underestimating the number of possible outcomes in his well-known
hypothetical case of Pedro and Jim.^®
In this example a traveller, Jim, happens into a South American market 
square: \diere a captain, Pedro, is about to execute twenty Indians. Pedro 
offers Jim a chance to save all the Indians but one, whom Jim must kill 
with his own hand. If Jim refuses, Pedro says that all the executions will 
proceed; if he assents, Pedro promises that the other nineteen Indians will 
go free. Williams concludes rather grudgingly that the utilitarian 
prescription— that Jim should kill the Indian— is right in this case, 
though not for conventional utilitarian reasons: ’’....[T]he utilitarian is 
probably right in this case [but] that is not to be found out just by 
asking the utilitarian’s questions.Why Williams comes down in favour of 
Jim’s killing the Indian is not a concern of my argument; I merely wish to 
point out that he has not fully considered what happens if things go wrong.
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It is all too easy— the stuff of B-grade movies— to imagine Jim turning 
trembling to Pedro, smoking revolver in hand, and the camera panning onto 
Pedro’s delighted grin as he takes the gun and shoots the first of the 
nineteen other Indians vhom he meant to kill all along.
Does this ’’unlucky’’ outcome make Jim’s decision w r o n g ? A  Kantian 
would assert that it was wrong all along, regardless of the outcome. More 
importantly, a Kantian could assert that its rightness or wrongness is 
independent of the outcome. Now possibly some consequentialists would argue 
that no additional diminution of welfare results from Jim’s decision, since 
the worst would happen anyway; all twenty Indians would have died in any 
case. But having failed to consider all the consequences should be a cause 
of self-mortification for any utilitarian strategy which incorporates 
probability assessments. (This would include expected-value strategy, the 
most common decision-theoretic model, which advises the agent to choose 
among courses of action by multiplying the probability that an action will 
produce a desired outcome times the utility of that outcome.) But if the 
total number of consequences is not identified correctly, none of the 
probability assessments attached to any particular outcome can be valid. 
And this particular ill outcome should give pause to any utilitarian who 
sets a negative value on giving additional pleasure to a psychopath like 
Pedro. In that sense, Jim does make something worse happen by shooting the 
Indian. Certainly this unaccounted-for outcome should trouble Williams, 
since he sets a non-utilitarian, independent value on Jim’s integrity, 
which has now been shattered ’’for nothing.’’
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In fact there are four possible outcomes in the Jim and Pedro example; 
1) Jim refuses to shoot the single Indian, and Pedro shoots all twenty; 2) 
Jim refuses to shoot the Indian, and Pedro, impressed by Jim’s 
steadfastness and embarrassed by his own bloodthirstiness, changes his mind 
about shooting the others ; 3) Jim shoots the Indian, and Pedro liberates 
the nineteen others; and 4) Jim shoots the Indian, and Pedro executes the 
others as well— the outcome I mention above. (There are of course other 
possible outcomes, such as the cavalry- rolling up in the nick of time, but 
these really are extraneous to the agents concerned, Jim and Pedro.
If outcome two occurs— and something similar has sometimes happened in 
cases of terrorists taking hostages^^— the common response would be to 
admire Jim and rejoice in the happy outcome.
This casts doubts on whether Jim should abandon his integrity. But is 
the common response correct? Intuition allows the actual outcome to make a 
difference to how we assess the agent’s choice; but intuition also holds 
that moral choice is somehow impervious to how things turn out. We commonly 
admire steadfastness, and this is the virtue which Jim would be said to 
display if the outcome turned out favourably, with Pedro backing down. But 
would we call Jim mule-headed or callous if Pedro did not back down? How 
can, the character of the agent depend on the outcome? Thus the common 
response is incoherent insofar as it exemplifies the paradox of moral luck, 
and we have already seen that the paradox of moral luck threatens the 
notion of responsible agency. Yet- the very virtue of steadfastness which 
would commonly be admired if Jim held out and Pedro backed down implies
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that there is a wholeness to the agent which cannot be diminished by ill- 
luck in outcomes.
The impetus in both Williams and Nagel is this inconsistency in common 
sense, over the question of whether outcome luck can threaten responsible 
agency. Both begin with Kant as the source of the view that there can be a 
quintessential form of value, moral value, which is "unconditioned,"^^ that 
is, free from external contingency. Both are also concerned at the outset 
to distinguish outcome luck from constitutive luck, that is, good fortune 
in having the "right" or the most praiseworthy inclinations, abilities, or 
temperament. This fourth variety of luck has some bearing on the question 
of whether good character can be destroyed by ill chance, and I shall 
discuss that in greater detail in chapter two, emphasising Nussbaum*s 
concern with this question. It combines with the three other sorts of luck 
idiich I have already mentioned— luck in the problems which have to be 
faced, luck in antecedent circumstances, and luck in outcomes— to complete 
the typology which Nagel offers.
, Listing all these ways in which moral agency appears to be subject to 
chance leads to a heightened sense of the possible threat from moral luck, 
even though both authors mainly confine themselves to outcome luck. In 
Nagel and to a lesser extent in Williams, the purpose of glancing at other 
forms of luck than the outcome sort is to demonstrate how little might seem 
to be within the moral agent’s control. Nagel presents this as apparently 
only for the Kantian enterprise, but also for the ordinary 
practice of attributing rightness and wrongness to actions:
[T]he broad range of external influences here identified seems on
Page 8 Moral Luck in Medical Ethics and Practical Politics
Ethics versus Luck?/Chapter 1
close examination to undermine moral assessment as surely as, does the 
narrower range of familiar excusing conditions. If the condition of 
control is consistently applied, it threatens to erode most of the 
moral assessments we find it natural to make.^'
Again, "if one cannot be responsible for the consequences of one’s acts due
to factors beyond one’s control, or for antecedents of one’s acts that are
properties of temperament not subject to one’s will, or for the
circumstances that pose one’s moral choices, then how can one be
responsible even for the stripped-down acts of the will itself, if they are
the product of antecedent circumstances outside of the will’s control?"!^
This raises deep problems of identity as well as of responsibility. As
Nagel puts it, "The inclusion of consequences in the conception of what we
have done is an acknowledgement that we are parts of the world, but the
paradoxical character of moral luck which emerges from this acknowledgement
shows that we are unable to operate with such a view, for it leaves us with
no one to be."^^ Williams moves from this deep problem about identity as a
responsible agent into two possible ways out of the paradox, on which I
shall elaborate shortly.
One’s history as an agent is a web in which anything that is the 
product of the will is surrounded and held up and partly formed by 
things that are not, in such a way that reflection can go only in one 
of two directions: either in the direction of saying that responsible 
agency is a fairly superficial concept, which has a limited use in 
harmonizing \diat happens, or else that it is not a superficial 
concept, but that it cannot ultimately be purified..
But are matters really this serious? Is "moral luck" is a genuine 
contradiction in terms, a true paradox? A useful borrowing here would be 
the recasting of the puzzle by Michael Zimmerman:
1. A person P is morally responsible for an event e^’s 
occurring only if e^’s occurring was not a matter of luck.
2. No event is such that its occurring is not a matter of luck.
Therefore
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3. No event is such that P is morally responsible for its occurring. 
Nagel, according to Zimmerman, denies the conclusion but accepts both 
premises, believing the paradox to be genuine. Williams, he says, tends to 
accept the second premise while denying the first. But if this is so, 
Williams is not obliged to accept the paradox as genuine— still less to 
call for a complete overthrow of the Kantian ethical tradition because it 
is radically undermined by the paradox, or to doubt whether any doctrine of 
ethics can resolve the dichotomy. I suspect that Williams does accept the 
first premise as well. Certainly he is no less sceptical than Nagel, as 
Zimmerman’s assessment would imply: in fact Williams presents himself as 
more sceptical than Nagel about the possibility of there being 
unconditioned moral value, untainted by luck.
Early in this chapter I suggested a focus on the weakness of premise 
two: although all events are a matter of luck, they are not all a matter 
of moral luck, nor are they all moral events. Zimmerman also proposes that 
we narrow the terms down. Thus, if premise one is reformulated as *’P is 
morally responsible only if he was in restricted control of e^ ,’’ premise 
two cannot be maintained if it is in turn reformulated as ”no event is such 
that anyone is ever in restricted control of it.” To reverse the procedure, 
premise one becomes palpably false if refashioned as **P is morally 
responsible only if he was in unrestricted control of e", while two is true 
if revised to read ’’no event is such that anyone is ever in unrestricted 
control of it.*’ Thus the distinction becomes that between restricted and 
unrestricted control.
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Zimmerman believes that the paradox is false, and that recasting the 
terms dispels the moral luck problem. I do not think things are quite so 
simple, but I do believe that trying to apply limits to what agents are 
responsible for, with restricted and unrestricted control as background 
concepts, is a promising way to proceed. I shall explain why below.
Let us operate on the partially tested assumption, then, that the
paradox of moral luck cannot simply be dispelled by recasting the terms. If
matters are this serious, are they only grave for Kantians? Although
Williams warns that "the aim of making morality immune to luck is bound to 
*  ^ ... 
be disappointed,"'^ '^  he also asserts that the paradoxes about moral luck are
not merely some strange Kantian mania, that no notion of responsible agency
can ignore them.
[Non-Kantians] may be disposed to think, so far as morality is 
concerned, that all that is in question is the pure Kantian 
conception, and that conception merely represents an obsessional 
exaggeration. But it is not merely that, nor is the Kantian attempt to 
escape luck an arbitrary enterprise. The attempt is so intimate to our 
notion of morality, in fact, that its failure may rather make us 
consider whether we should not give up that notion altogether. ^
To resolve the paradox of moral luck, we could absolve agents from 
responsibility for all matters beyond their ability to predict or control. 
But then we will wind up holding them responsible for very little. This is 
the strategy \diich Williams has pursued, and which is hinted at in this 
quotation. On some natural assumptions, it follows from Williams ’ s 
assertion that only success can justify an agent’s decision under 
uncertainty.
If he fails...then he did the wrong thing, not just in the sense 
in which that platitudinously follows, but in the sense that having 
done the wrong thing in those circumstances he has no basis for the
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thought that he was justified in acting as he did. If he succeeds, he 
does have a basis for that thought.
If only success can justify a decision, but success is not certain at the
time the agent makes a choice, there will turn out to be no basis but
hindsight for judging whether an action was right or wrong. We do not
generally think that agents are responsible for matters which they could
only have known with hindsight. Therefore we will not be able to hold
agents responsible for very many of their choices.
Alternatively, we could try to retain some notion of responsible 
agency but limit what agents are responsible for. This is a crude 
representation of Nagel’s answer to the dilemma. My own view— extremely 
tentative at this point— is that Nagel is more likely to be right about how 
to resolve the paradox, although I do think that Williams’s diagnosis of 
the paradox’s gravity is correct. Moral luck is not only a problem for 
Kantians, as I argue further in chapter three. Nevertheless, I believe that 
Williams has despaired unnecessarily, although some commentators, such as 
Nussbaum, think that his despair has an attractive tragic-mindedness to it. 
It looks as if Williams is advising us to change our practice, to stop 
holding people responsible when they are not, and Nagel is telling us to 
come up with a different theory of agency, to which we should then try to 
make our practice conform. But actually Williams goes much further than 
this, almost to a refusal to have any further dealings with ethical theory 
at all— presumably because the notion of responsible agency, which is seen 
as crucial to any ethical theory, is undermined by the dependence of 
success on factors outside the agent’s control.
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Yet it is strange that Nagel should be more optimistic about retaining 
some notion of responsible agency, since he identifies more ways in vdiich 
chance threatens that notion. The difference is that Williams retains a 
very broad notion of \diat counts as moral. In the end that turns out to be 
more crippling to the notion of ethical agency than an extensive catalogue 
of what counts as In discussing a Gauguin-figure^^ whose decision to
abandon his family responsibilities : and stake, nil on aesthetic (if not 
commercial) success will only have been morally right if that success is 
forthcoming, Williæis relies, on the assumption that being a good or bad 
artist has some bearing on good or bad moral character. But suppose the 
twain simply do not meet? What if this is not an example of mor^ luck? As 
I said at the start, not all kinds of luck are moral.
Nagel agrees that this is not a moral luck example, even if failure as 
an artist undermines Gauguin’s deepest sense of his own identity.
[Williams] points out that though success or failure cannot be 
predicted in advance, Gauguin’s most basic retrospective feelings 
about the decision will be determined by the development of his 
talent; My disagreement with Williams is that his account fails to 
explain why such retrospective attitudes can be called moral. If 
success does not permit Gauguin to justify himself to others, but 
still determines his most basic feelings, that shows only that his 
most basic feelings^need not be moral. It does not show that morality 
is subject to luck.
Williams counters this objection with what might appear a tautology; if 
Gauguin is injured on the way to Tahiti and never paints again, he cannot 
know whether or not his decision is justified. In that sense the injury is 
relevant to the moral decision, but only in establishing its parameters. It 
merely prevents him from knowing whether he was justified: ’’It is too
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external for it to unjustify him, something which only his failure as a 
painter can do."^^ c
Although Williams retains:a. broad definition of what counts as moral, 
he does introduce an additional distinction to do with what happens if 
things go wrong.
From the perspective of consequences, the goods or benefits for the 
sake of vÆiich Gauguin’s choice was made either materialise in some 
degree, or do not materialise. But it matters considerably...in what 
way the project fails to come off, if it fails. If Gauguin sustains 
some injury on the way to Tahiti which prevents his ever painting 
again, that certainly means that his decision (supposing it now to be 
irreversible) was for nothing, and indeed there is nothing in the 
outcome to set against the other people’s loss. But that train of 
events does not provoke the thought in question, that after all he was 
wrong and unjustified. He does not, and never will, know whether he 
was wrong. What would prove him wrong in his project would not just 
be that it failed, but that he failed. ^
There are two points worth noting here. The more minor one is that Williams
adds that utilitarianism misses something about this situation. This
implies that utilitarianism could leam something by considering the
paradox of moral luck, even thoiigh the paradox looks foreign to
consequentialism at first glance. The major point, however, is Williams’s
distinction between the failure of Gauguin’s 
as a moral agent. -
project and Gauguin’s failure
In chapter five I shall draw on a similar dichotomy in discussing how 
medical professionals should feel if they choose one patient over another 
for receipt of a scarce medical resource, but the patient who receives the 
kidney or the expensive operation then dies. The doctors chose the ’’wrong’’ 
patient, but not necessarily on the basis of a faulty diagnosis of the two 
patients’ chances of recovery. Since diagnoses are statistical judgments, a
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certain proportion of them are bound to turn out "wrong". I present this 
as a moral luck case, but also suggest principles which would allow the 
case in which the doctors "get it wrong" to count as a project failure, 
occasioning regret, rather .than a personal failure as a moral agent, \diich 
would dictate remorse. 1^ handling of the two categories of regret and 
remorse is a little different from Williams’s, however. In particular, 
Williams likes to use.a term which I find rather unnecessary at least in 
the example of scarce medical resources: "agent-regret," which is felt by 
an agent about her past actions, rather than about external states \diich 
have gone wrong. Williams prefers "agent-regret" because he says it need 
riot only relate to voluntary acts, as "remorse" conventionally does, but to 
any outcomes of a causal chain in which one has some role. (In chapter five 
I give an explanation of why I shall retain the more conventional terms, 
"remorse" and "regret".)
It seems, then, that not all project failures are personal moral 
failures. If Gauguin suffers the ill chance of injury on the way to Tahiti, 
his failure is neither personal nor moral. It is a failure of his project: 
and here I part company with Williams, agreeing with Nagel that no matter 
how deeply Gauguin feels about his failure, the intensity of that feeling 
does not itself make the failure a matter of ethics. (If it an ethical 
decision, that is because Gauguin breached his responsibilities to his 
family.)
Now it might appear that we could get round these confusions by means 
of a scheme dividing factors necessary for personal or project success into
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those extrinsic to the agent and those intrinsic to her, and Williams does
try something like this: A:
The intrinsic luck in Gauguin’s case concentrates itself on virtually 
the one question of whether he is a genuinely gifted painter who can 
succeed in doing genuinely valuable work. Not all the conditions of 
the project’s coming off lie in him, obviously, since others’ actions 
and retrainings provide many necessary conditions of its coming off—  
and that is an important locus of extrinsic luck. But the conditions 
of its coming off which are relevant to unjustification, the locus of 
intrinsic luck, largely lie in him— v^diich is not to say, of course, 
that they depend on his will, though some may. This rough coincidence 
of two distinctions is a feature of this case. But in others, the 
locus of intrinsic luck... may lie partly outside the agent, and that 
is an important, and indeed the more typical case.^u
The example which Williams uses to illustrate this ’’more typical’’ and thus
perhaps more important case is a similarly schematized version of Anna
Karenina. He takes Anna’s suicide to be an admission that she has failed,
not merely that her project has failed through some extrinsic factor— for
example, if Vronsky had been killed in an accident. "What she did, she now
finds insupportable, because she could have been justified only by the life
she hoped for, and those hopes were not just negated, but refuted, by what
happened.
If we accept Williams’s interpretation of the Anna Karenina story, 
grave paradoxes certainly ensue. Anna could not have known in advance that 
her affair would end badly, but she could only have been justified by its 
turning out well. What basis could she then have had for her decision about 
whether to leave her husband? This looks at first to be the problem about 
hindsight and responsibility which I identified before.
But actually to me this example is mainly about what counts as an 
ethical choice and what agents are responsible for. The case of Anna
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Karenina cannot be the universal example which Williams thinks it is, 
because in Anna’s society only women had to make:such a choice. Admittedly, 
Anna is a schematised figure, as was Gauguin, ; but this does not get round 
the problem of non-universalisability. There is no moral luck in this 
example because there is no genuine moral choice or responsibility. Here I 
would adopt a Kantian position, of saying that the genuine moral life must, 
by its nature, be equally open to all, and its dictates equally applicable 
to all. Because men were free of the strictures which required Anna to make 
a choice,, because they operated under a much less restrictive system of 
responsibilities than did women in Anna’s society, the system of ’’virtue’’ 
which obtained in Anna’s time cannot count as a genuinely moral system, nor 
can her failure to live up to it count as a moral failure.
I want to suggest that perhaps Anna should be viewed as a victim 
rather than as an agent making a moral choice. This is not to accept 
Williams’s very broad assertion that no one can definitely be said to make 
moral choices, because the entire existence of such a thing as ethical 
choice is in doubt. I also want briefly to ask how Anna could have 
succeeded, given the systematic way in which the odds were stacked against 
her, and to suggest that the fact that she had to make a decision at all is 
evidence of that sort of discrimination.
Anna had to decide between husband/son and lover. Her brother Oblonsky 
was allowed, under the double standard, to keep both his mistresses and 
his home life. ’’Although Oblonsky was entirely in the wrong as regards his 
wife, as he himself admitted, almost everyone in the house, even the nurse.
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[his wife’s] best friend, was on his s i d e . W i t h  a fine and deliberate 
irony, the novel begins with Anna persuading her sister-in-law to forgive 
Oblonsky for his latest dalliance. Williams seems to want to argue that 
Anna’s affair was wrong from the start because it ended badly. Her 
brother’s affairs don’t end badly: are they any less wrong?
Williams does hone his analysis by noting that once Anna left her 
husband, the relationship with Vronsky would have to bear too much weight. 
He calls her failure to foresee this an intrinsic matter. Certainly the 
hovel’s description of the lovers’ scenes confirms that the relationship is 
overloaded; but that is only because society will not allow Anna to retain 
the marital relationship as well.Although Williams calls this failure to 
forecast the extra burden on the relationship ’’a truth not only about 
society but about her and Vronsky,*’—  I cannot see that the occasion of the 
moral decision would have arisen but for society’s extrinsic laws and 
mores.
Still less do I agree with Judith Andre’s contention that we would be 
right to ' praise Gauguin and condemn Anna Karenina because !’the person who 
can correctly assess his or her chances of success is better-formed than 
the person who c a n n o t . T h i s  confuses acting ethically with being a 
successful technician. But even if there were a moral virtue in being well- 
calibrated, the-point is not proved by the contrast of Gauguin with Anna 
Karenina.
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First, we do not know \diether Gauguin judged the probability of 
success accurately or inaccurately; we only know that he succeeded. Old 
Laminitis, the 100-1 shot whom I decide to back in the 2:30 at Towcester 
because I think his name is a good joke, may actually romp home first 
against the odds, but that says nothing about my knowledge of form. Second, 
although it is arguable whether Anna has the stature of a tragic heroine, 
she does face a tragic dilemma in which there is no chance of unmitigated 
"succèss". Provided that we accept her love for Vronsky as a fact of the 
situation rather than as something she could do something about, both her 
possible choices entail unavoidable penalities. Her lot will be very 
different from her brother’s if she, like him, tries to have it both:ways. 
If she tries to carry on her affair under her husband’s nose, he has the 
legal right and the economic clout to make her life very uncomfortable. If 
she runs off .with Vronsky, society’s sanctions will be the predominant 
ones. Of course if Gauguin fails to measure up to his own artistic 
standards, he faces self-condemnation, but there is no external social 
penalty, as there is for both Anna’s choices. Either way Anna loses. The 
probabilities of full-fledged success attaching to the two . outcomes are 
irrelevant because they are equal, at zero; she has not in fact 
demonstrated faulty calibration by opting to run off with Vronsky.
; I have criticised both of Williams’s examples, as not being 
specifically about moral luck. In the process I have begun illustrating how 
limiting vdiat counts as moral might enable us to retain a notion of morally 
responsible agency, of which Williams despairs. But perhaps this is only 
because he stakes so much on these two examples, which I consider faulty.
Moral Luck in Medical Ethics and Practical Politics Page 19
Ethics versus Luck?/Chapter 1
Then \diat sorts of examples would constitute genuine moral luck cases? It 
would he possible to stipulate that good examples must involve agents who 
stake their moral success— not their worth as artists, their happiness, or 
any other value— in advance on outcome luck. I believe that there are many 
such examples to be found in medical ethics.
Take the case of a hospital ethics committee which approves random 
clinical trials of a new drug on bowel cancer patients without their 
consent. A patient with a prognosis of several years of active life dies 
two weeks later because her bone marrow becomes irreversibly depressed 
after administration of the d r u g . L e t  us suppose that no negligence is 
present, that the drug was administered correctly but turned out to have 
side-effects which no one could foresee. The experiment has gone wildly 
wrong, for reasons which are not the committee’s fault. (For the time 
being, I am equating two matters I shall separate out in chapter three, 
prediction and control.) But should we still hold the committee members 
responsible for the patient’s death? In chapter seven I look at several 
such cases, in the area of informed consent.
Perhaps because I am not convinced about Williams’s two examples, I am 
not entirely persuaded by his fear of the ’’final destruction*’ which occurs 
when Kantian strictness is united with a utilitarian doctrine of negative 
responsibility.
There is, at the end of that, no life of one’s own, except perhaps for 
some small area, hygienically allotted, of meaningless privacy.
Because that is a genuine pathology of the moral life, the limitation 
of the moral is itself something morally important.
Here I do agree with Williams, but I think he is now pointing towards the
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second path out of the paradox, rather than towards his generally preferred 
first solution. That is, rather than saying that we can have no meaningful 
conception of responsible agency, he is indicating that we can have such a 
conception if we limit vdiat agents are responsible for. This is close to my 
own hypothesis, and I shall discuss this question further in chapters three 
and four.
However, it is the first, rather deliberately tragic-minded, course 
which Williams has pursued in later work, notably in Ethics and the Limits 
of Philosophy. In this t^ok he rejects the Kantian claim even more 
emphatically: *'[T]he idea of a value that lies beyond all luck is an 
illusion. Part, Of. Williams ' s motivation is the attempt to avoid 
circularity: "the standpoint from which pure moral value has its value 
is...only that of morality itself. It can hope to transcend luck only by 
turning in on i t s e l f . N o w  this raises an interesting line of argument 
\diich I pursue in chapter five, to do with drawing luck's fire by 
recognising it openly . But I am sceptical about Williams * s subsequent 
solution to the problem about unconditioned value. That is, roughly, that 
we could substitute for Kantian morality something approximating to an 
Aristotelian conception of the good whole. life for a man.
In thinking that a culture could agree on values, even if the values 
were not given the full weight of ethical norms, Williams is making a 
pluralist assumption of consensus. That is, he merely assumes that society 
is not radically divided by structural imbalances of gender, race or class. 
(In chapter five I criticise in similar terms one schematic analysis of
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"society's" criteria for who shall receive scarce medical resources.) In 
any case, it is through reviving this conception from the ancients— whether 
or not the device succeeds— that Williams tries to mitigate the paradox of 
moral luck. This leads us neatly into the concerns of chapter: two.
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"If there remained only the good will...it would sparkle like a jewel 
in its own right, as something that had its full worth in itself." To Kant 
the good will is implicitly beautiful; but to Martha Craven Nussbaum, the 
good cannot be **beautifully human" if it is distanced from chance.^ Its 
fragility is what makes human endeavour admirable and touching, and the 
Kantian attempt to create a risk-free ethics, as she interprets it, 
impoverishes the branch of human endeavour called acting well. (This is 
particularly serious if the moral life is the highest branch of human 
endeavour, taking precedence over the good life, and I shall return to this 
question shortly.) Nevertheless, Nussbaum recognises that there is no 
reason to aim at moral excellence if it cannot be called one's own, if it 
is inherently vulnerable to chance. "The question of the human good" thus 
becomes: "How can it be reliably good and still be beautifully human?"^
"Human excellence grows like a vine tree, fed by the green dew, raised
up, among wise men and just, to the liquid sky." Taking her metaphor for
virtue from Pindar, Nussbaum implicitly rejects Kant's jewel parallel:
[T]he poetic image...suggests that part of the peculiar beauty of 
human excellence just its vulnerability. The tenderness of a plant 
is not the dazzling hardness of a gem. There seem to be two, and 
perhaps two incompatible, kinds of value here.^
Still, the possession of reason is also part of human excellence: part of 
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this particular plant's genetic blueprint is to develop the cutting 
hardness of a diamond. In some sense, according to Nussbaum's 
interpretation of the Greeks, we are less vulnerable to chance than is the 
rest of creation, because through reason we exercise some measure of 
control. Presumably this would be mainly through partial foreknowledge of 
vÆiat is going to occur, although through rational persuasion we might 
sometimes control the actions. of others, and through the application of 
scientific reason we might develop some control over nature.
Notwithstanding, reason does not give us full control. The fragility 
of goodness— in Nussbaum's fine phrase— is confronted openly in 
Aristotelian philosophy and the Greek tragic poets, she says. But according 
to Nussbaum, Kantianism refuses to recognise that the goodness or badness 
of character and the rightness or wrongness of actions simply do hinge on 
chance, on matters beyond the agent's control. This wilful blindness, 
combined with vdiat she views as the dominance of Kantian thought throughout 
the modem period,^ has persuaded us that somehow tragic conflicts can be 
mitigated, if not avoided. We delude ourselves into thinking that we can 
still retain a sense of agent-responsibility even when agents are faced 
with two equally evil alternatives— as Agamemnon was at Aulis, when, on 
Zeus's arbitrary instructions, his only choice lay between allowing the 
plague to continue among the becalmed Greek ships and sacrificing his 
daughter. For Agamemnon to have been "morally lucky", in the Greek view, 
would have been to have escaped this quandary altogether; but once it was 
visited upon him, it was impossible for him to retain his moral integrity. 
No Kantian notion of a good will or pure intentions could have saved him
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from this ill-luck. (It should be noted, however, that this is what Nagel 
calls luck in the decisions which have to be faced, not outcome luck— the 
main focus in Kant and in this dissertation. Nussbaum does not always
separate out the various forms of luck, a criticism to which I shall return 
later. ) . r \
Because of our Kantian presuppositions, Nussbaum says, we are prone to
distance ourselves from the Greek approach, to deny that some dilemmas
simply are irreparably tragic, to assert "that Greek thinkers held the
false and primitive view that moral value is vulnerable to luck. To
Nussbaum, this is a catastrophe for ethics, almost as grave as the mythical
one with vdiich MacIntyre begins After Virtue.^  Moreover, the Kantian, in
Nussbaum* s presentation, makes a watertight distinction between ethical
value and other sorts of value, as she says the Greeks did not. Not only
does the good will shine like a jewel in its own right, having its full
worth in itself; its worth is also greater than that of anything else in
the human sphere. This would lead the Kantian to a second, related
conclusion about why Greek ethical thought was primitive: it did not even
bother to distinguish between the virtuous life and the good human life.
When the truth of these Kantian beliefs, and the importance of the 
Kantian distinction between moral and non-moral value, are taken as 
the starting-point for inquiry into Greek views of these matters, the 
Greeks do not, then, fare well. There appears to be something peculiar 
about the way they agonize about contingency, lamenting an insoluble 
practical conflict and the regret it brings in its wake...It is as if 
they were in difficulties because they had not discovered what Kant 
discovered, did not know what we Kantians all know.'
Now the point for my purposes is not whether the Greeks have been hard 
done by; it is Aether this is an accurate picture of Kantianism in
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relation to moral luck. Basically, Nussbaum charges Kant with ignoring the 
dilemma of moral luck, with turning away from the myriad ways in which 
chance affects how things turn out and focusing only on the purity of the 
will. Recall that the paradox of moral luck arises from the tension between 
(1) the way in which responsibility depends on some things outside moral 
agents* control and (2) our unwillingness to blame people for things beyond 
their control. Nussbaum accuses Kant of ignoring the first pole of the 
dichotomy. But this conflicts with the rough sketch of Kantianism which I 
presented in chapter one. There I said that the paradox derives from a 
Kantian outlook, from asking Kantian questions.
To charge Kant with ignoring reality also overlooks his remark in the 
Lectures on Ethics that a deathbed repentance is not a genuine act of 
conscience because it has no chance of being carried into practice.^ Kant 
wants conscience to have ah effect on the world; does he also want the 
world have some impact on the integrity of conscience? How would this be 
compatible with his assertion that the good will is untouched by how things 
turn out? In this chapter I want to defend Kant against the charge of 
ignoring the dilemma of moral luck/ and to ask whether a Kantian solution
to the paradox looks like the most promising one after all. 
proposes a solution does not mean that he ignores the problem.
Because Kant
But I shall deal first with Nussbaum*s secondary charge against Kant, 
that he impoverishes the good life by narrowing it to the moral life. 
Thomas Nagel identifies more possible positions on this question than 
Nussbaum allows. In criticising the use of a similar dichotomy by Bernard
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Williams, Nagel distinguishes five rather than two possible relationships 
between moral and other sorts of value
1. The moral life is defined in terms of the good life, the position 
attributed by Nagel to Aristotle. The two sets of values are not seen as 
equivalent, but the content of the ethical is. dictated by background 
conditions for the good life, particularly the good life as appropriate for 
a certain social station.
2. The good life is defined in terms of the moral life. Both the first 
two positions deny that there is a conflict between the good and moral 
lives: Nagel reads the Republic as an elaborate and **heroic** justification
of this denial, and Plato as demonstrating empirically what Kant can only 
postulate, "that moral virtue forms an indispensable part of the good for 
each person. The next two positions admit that there is a disparity 
between the good and the moral lives.
3. The good life overrides the moral life— the view taken by 
Nietzsche, Thrasymachus in the Republic, and Philippa Foot in her later- 
work, Nagel thinks, and perhaps, also by Gorgias, Polus and Callicles in the 
Gorgias, I would add.
4. The moral life overrides the good life. Although Nussbaum 
identifies this argument as quintesssentially Kantian, Nagel regards it as 
typical of utilitarianism and rights theory as well. The link between the 
two charges levelled by Nussbaum at Kantianism is highlighted by Nagel's
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observation that position one defines the good life as vÆiat is best for a 
particular individual, distinguished from others by sex, age, social 
standing and other personal characteristics. Position four makes no such 
distinctions ; it is concerned with the totality of humans , Nagel asserts—  
and, I would add, with the statistical totality of events, in some 
consequentialist formulations. "Any coincidence between this [the good for 
all humanity] and what is best [for the individual] will be a matter of 
luck, or political and social arrangement."^^ The importance of "political 
and social arrangement" as an adjunct to luck is that it helps to explain 
cases like Anna Karenina's, which Williams misconstrued, I argued in 
chapter one, because he confused factors intrinsic to Anna's self-worth 
with those external social biases which doomed her project.
On this matter, I think Kant is more coherent. Unlike the ancients 
(particularly Aristotle), he refused to accept à system of virtues in which 
the ability to attain praiseworthy behaviour depended crucially on station 
in society or on other chance factors of birth. This is the relevance of 
his reference to the "niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature". A 
modem corollary of this Kantian - view, is Rawls' insistence  ^that 
intelligence is not a matter of desert or merit, but is conferred by good 
fortune; therefore rewards should not flow from it, under a fairness- 
orientated system of justice. Another modem application of the Kantian 
principle that the virtuous life must be equally accessible to all might be 
a feminist condemnation of the classical system of virtues, in which the 
ill-chance of being b o m  female limited a woman to a single, confining 
virtue, sophrosyne or self-restraint, and barred her from the more highly
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rated heroic qualities. But this would be an egalitarian reworking: in Kant 
this requirement of equal accessibility to the virtuous life flows from the 
demands of .the ethical enterprise itself, not from any egalitarian impulse.
5. Neither the good life nor the moral life consistently overrides the 
other. ' ;
Nagel considers position five attractive but comes round to the view 
that four is probably corrects Clearly he disagrees with both Williams and 
Nussbaum, with their mutual preference for position one— and he might well 
accuse them of failing to distinguish one from three. What matters here is 
not so much his reason for approving the fourth view as his reminder that 
there are more than two possible relationships between the good and the 
moral lives. If so, the second of Nussbaum*s charges against Kant is an 
oversimplification. Moreover, it is inaccurate, in Nagel's typology, to 
conflate Kant and Plato. To borrow a term from Williams, Plato's project is 
very different from Kant's, as Nicholas White has asserted in a critical 
review of Nussbaum. White thinks that Williams is tarred with the same 
brush, but not from head to foot: Nussbaum is writing a major study of the 
Greeks, whereas Aristotle and (even more so) Plato are only peripheral to 
Williams's work. However, as I pointed out before, my concern in this 
chapter is not the accuracy of Nussbaum's reading of Plato or Aristotle: 
only her faithfulness to Kant. But if she is using Kant as a stalking horse 
for Plato, there are grave reasons to be suspicious about the accuracy of 
her picture of the former.
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What about Nussbaum*s first charge against Kant--wilful négligence of 
the moral luck paradox? For my purposes, ' thia is the more important 
accusation, to which most of the rest of this chapter will be dedicated.
But there is a parallel between Nussbaum* s failure to consider all five 
possible couplings of the good and moral lives and her failure to- 
distinguish among the four sorts of luck which Nagel identified in "Moral 
Luck" as having a bearing on ethical worth. (See chapter one.) White, who 
is extremely (and in the end, I think, overly) dismissive of Nussbaum* s 
work as ill-formulated, agrees that she is guilty on both these counts. He 
believes that in the Republic Plato advocates philosophical thought because 
it is good in itself, but not, as Nussbaum claims, because it is impervious 
to the vagaries of chance, because it is "unlosable." The ethically right 
does have its full worth in itself, but "all of that is compatible with its 
being as fragile as you like."^^ Giving money to buy food for the hungry is 
always right, but vdiether the food actually gets through and the good deed 
has any effect is eminently vulnerable to blocked roads, floods, civil wars 
and flat tyres. Nussbaum, White charges, lumps together all sorts of luck 
as instability, but as I argued in the first chapter, not all luck is 
moral. And as John M. Cooper has pointed out, the sort of luck from which 
Plato, at least, wants to liberate us may not have much to do with the kind 
which concerns Williams.
In short, Nussbaum may be prone to oversimplification, and this 
failing could affect the accuracy of her portrayal of Kant. White 
particularly censures her for what he views as an unfair attack on 
Kantianism as if it were a monolithic whole. It may be indicative that
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Nussbaum makes no attempt to differentiate between Kant*s various ethical 
works, and in particular that she makes no reference in her bibliography to 
the Lectures on Ethics. The translator of the Lectures, Lewis White Beck, 
argues that it is in them, and also in the Metaphysics of Morals, that we 
glimpse the Kant whose lively conversation and striking way with words are 
said to have charmed audiences of students and enlivened drawing-room 
repartee. In the Grundlegung and the Critique of Practical Reason, Beck 
says,
[e]verything anthropological and narrative or anecdotal, everything 
that would make perspicuous the relation of philosoophical morals to 
the conduct of life, is there apparently sacrificed for an abstract 
intellectual articulation. It is no wonder, then, that Kantian ethics 
has since appeared to be forbidding in its intellectualism; to be 
rationalistic at the expense of emotion, habit, and institutions 
in the make-up of the good life; to have sacrificed all the graces for 
a few of the virtues...[Only in the Metaphysics of Morals and the 
Lectures do we see what Kant never forgot, butwEit he expected 
his readers to remember even vdien he was talking of other things—  
viz., that the good life is more than mechanical obedience to the 
categorical imperative, that right action requires more than right 
thinking, and that man is more than a thinking machine.
White also emphasises that we must keep Kant * s view that were no genuinely
tragic choices separate from his position on moral luck.:
Although Kant seems to have believed that there are no genuine 
conflicts of duty, he was certainly not forced to that belief by his 
doctrine that the only genuine value is independent of contingencies. 
For he could have maintained that doctrine and still held that when a 
person is confronted with a genuine conflict of moral 
incommensurables, the goodness of his or her will is unaffected 
by making one choice or the other, so long as the decision is made 
in full consciousness of the existence of both obligations (which is 
not far from what Nussbaum herself seems to maintain.
This chapter will now concentrate on Kant*s views about risk and moral
luck, but will include a short section on tragic choices at the «end.
main argument here is that. Kant is not so much concerned with freedom from
moral risk as with freedom of the will, and that the ultimately
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undetermined action of the will presents a sort of risk in itself— one 
vdiich Kant in fact recognises. I want to show that » Nussbaum could accept 
Kant if she had read_him correctly. More broadly, this entails dismissing 
Nussbaum* s criticism that Kant has simply ignored the way in which luck 
impacts on ethical choice. : .
Nussbaum seems to accept the commonly held view that Kantianism sets
itself up as a risk-free system of ethics. Here she and Nagel would agree;
In Kant a course of action that would be condemned if it had a bad 
outcome cannot be vindicated if by luck it turns out well. There 
cannot be moral risk.
To Nussbaum, a risk-free system of ethics is not worth having. Somehow the
moral enterprise hardly seems worthwhile if it does not recognise how
deeply the rest of life i s ? w i t h  chance. This risk is so profound,
she argues,. as to threaten even the good will. Using the .example of
Euripides *s Hecuba, she asserts that even good character may decay through
chance reversals. This possibility, is deeply, repugnant to Kantianism, she
says; in terms of J*a moral philosophy that speaks of the incorruptability
of the good will, sharply distinguishing the sphere of contingent
happenings from the domain of the moral personality, itself purely safe
against the * accidents of step-motherly nature*... this play tells 
lies.*'^ ^
dangerous
But the will is not the same as character in Kant; it is practical 
reason. A Kantian could perfectly well accept that good character partly 
a matter of luck, just as intelligence is to Rawls. Both are normally 
considered achievements or personal virtues, but could equally well be
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partly matters of chance. Nagel does treat character as a fourth type of 
luck, the constitutive variety.,
In any case, this is a different criticism from the one about whether 
the good life should be confined to the moral life, as I have said: that 
one had to do with the narrowness of the Kantian vision. That insularity 
Nussbaum presents as itself a moral fault, in her discussion of Antigone, 
whose heroism is lessened by "a ruthless simplification of the world of 
value which effectively eliminates conflicting obligations...[S]he can be 
blamed for refusal of vision. But that is a common enough criticism of
Kant,^^ and a more limited one. It does not question the worth of the 
entire Kantian ethical enterprise as does the assertion that a risk-free 
morality is not worth having. But in turn, the bigger charge is only a 
threat if Kant is in fact concerned to "risk-proof" ethics. I shall argue 
that this is not so: in Kant the moral enterprise is saturated with risk.
One obvious way in which Kantian ethics deliberately opens itself to
the full vagaries of .chance that it refuses to excuse morally wrong
decisions which, happen to turn out well. Nagel notes this, but does not
present it as an assumption of extra risk. Of course there are many cases
in which bad judgement is saved by good luck. I argued in my first chapter
that Gauguin might be one such example, although Judith Andre seems to
think that his judgement must have been good because the decision turned
out well. Here Nussbaum agrees with me, but appears not to realise that by
so doing she also agrees in part with Kant.
We must avoid from the beginning a confusion between the assessment 
of the decision and the asssessment of the deliberations that led to 
the decision. It is perfectly possible for a person to have reached
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the better overall decision through a deliberative process that 
neglects certain valid claims; the decision will still, then, be 
correct— but not for the right reasons,, and almost, as it were, . 
by accident"'^
But Nussbaum regards the decision as still correct in sane sense, even 
though correct by chance. The Kantian standard is stricter, and also more 
stringent than everyday attitudes towards blame and praise, however similar 
to coirmon sense it may appear. No matter whether the action turns out well 
or badly: if we disobey the moral law "we feel its power even when we are 
most defying it...[T]he moral law itself, unlike any motive of desire, 
propels [us] onward to destruction.""^ '^
This looks at first as if it could have very little to do with freedom
in the moral agent. Nevertheless, the moral law, the categorical
imperative, obtains its legitimacy and force from agent-freedom. It alone
is unconditioned, to use the terminology which first appeared in relation
to Kant in chapter one.
The categorical (unconditioned) imperative views the action as 
objectively necessary and necessitates the agent to it immediately, 
by the mere thought of the action itself...and not mediately, by the 
thought of an end to be attained by the action...All other 
imperatives...are, one and all, conditioned...The ground of 
the possibility of categorical imperatives is this: that they are 
based simply on the freedom of the power of choice, not on 
any other characteristic of. choice (by which it can be subjected to 
a purpose).
It is precisely our freedom which enables the moral law to exist, in a two- 
way relationship. "..[T]hough freedom is certainly the ratio essendi of the 
moral law [the reason the moral law can exist], the latter is the ratio 
cognoscendi of freedom [the reason we know that we are free]".^^
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Now there is obviously a link between my action being free and its 
being genuinely m i n e . A n d  we have seen that Nussbaum— rightly, I think—  
denies that there is any reason for me to aim at moral excellence if it is 
not truly mine. So there will be a connection between my action being 
being free and its being worthwhile. This is why I shall .argue that 
Nussbaum is wrong to view the Kantian moral enterprise as unworthy of us. 
In the Lectures on Ethics Kant actually asserts that someone who disobeys 
the moral law about truth-telling loses his selfhood; "A liar, even though 
by his lies he does no harm to anyone, yeti..he throws away his 
personality." ^
Since I do not intend to devote a chapter to the classical
philosophers— there being some doubt as to whether it is anachronistic to
treat them in terms of moral luck— I shall not consider at any length
Nussbaum* s preference for Aristotelianism as truer to what it means to be
human. But in passing, it is useful to point out that if an action is
worthwhile because it is freely chosen, there must be serious doubts about
whether Aristotelianism really is more attractive. Freedom to choose one*s
moral position would have been foreign to the Greeks, MacIntyre argues :
A man who tried to withdraw himself from his given position ... 
would be engaged in the enterprise of trying to make himself 
disappear...For freedom of choice of values would from the 
standpoint of a tradition ultimately rooted in heroic societies appear 
more like the freedom of ghosts— of those whose human substance 
approached vanishing point— than of men.
There is another reason why it is incorrect to depict Kant as 
attempting to provide a risk-free ethics. In Kant the risk-free course, 
doing only what is required, carries no chance of blame, but also no
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possible gain in praise* "If I do exactly what is required of me, the 
consequences are neither my fault, nor are they to my credit# It, is the 
freedom of the agent which allows us to attribute responsibility * Iti b. 
word, the key to the imputation of responsibility for consequences is 
freedom. Kant goes on with the familiar dictum that the good will is not 
good because of its consequences ; but neither is it good because it is 
determined by duty. The good will can never claim to be simply following 
someone else*s orders.Orders can be given either by an external authority, 
by law, or by an internal authority, practical reason. It is only the 
principles dictated by the latter which qualifies as ethical pronouncements 
in Kant. An external law may have the same content as an ethical command, 
but we cannot claim to have behaved well if we obey the law out of simple 
compulsion.
Duty does not subordinate the will, though it determines it
temporally. Instead, duty is central in Kant because it is through the
immediate perception of duty that the will realises its unconditioned
freedom. Kant simultaneously presents duty as universal and also as
entirely contingent upon each individual freely giving it to himself or
herself. "Kant continued to regard the paradox of human freedom as
unavoidable; we could never solve it through theoretical reason, while
practical reason assured us only that it has a solution. Freedom is also
the distinguishing mark of an ethical choice as opposed to an action taken
in obedience to the external law.
In the moral sphere compulsion has no place; no one can compel 
us to acts of kindness or charity. Thus moral omissions and their 
consequences can never be imputed, but legal omissions can.
Conversely, moral acts of commission with their consequences can be 
imputed, but legal acts of commission cannot, since they are
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obligatory acts...I do not impute iri demeritum the consequences 
of an action which a person is obliged to perform, because in such 
circumstances he has ceased to be free. He;is responsible for_the 
factum in itself but not for the illegitimacy of the factum.
This is another way of limiting what agents are responsible for while
retaining a notion of agency. By this standard, Agamemnon is of course
responsible for killing his daughter, but not for the killing being an evil
deed. At first this looks puzzling: how can killing ever be anything but an
evil deed? But the point is not whether it could ever have any other moral
content; it is that Agamemnon is responsible only for the bare action, not
the action*s content. Zeus is responsible for that, presumably, if gods can
be held responsible in the ordinary mortal way. But because Agamemnon is
not to blame for the deed's illegitimacy, he should not try to justify it.
Perhaps, indeed, he is only guilty if he tries to justify the action as
being somehow legitimate. (This, of course, is exactly what he does try to
■   * ;
do, as I shall discuss at the end of this chapter, and this is why Nussbaum
blames him— for wliat may be seen as surprisingly Kantian reasons.)
Similarly, and more broadly, we can be held responsible for setting events
rolling through actions which we could control, but not necessarily for all
the consequences of those actions.
lAatever appertains to freedom can be imputed to us, whether it 
arises directly through our freedom, or is derived indirectly from it. 
A drunken man cannot be held responsible for his drunken acts; he can, 
however, for his drunkenness. The causes which make it impossible to 
impute responsibility to a person for his actions, may themselves 
be imputable to him in a lower degree.
This will turn out to be an important way of limiting agent 
responsibility in the medical ethics examples in chapters five and seven.
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It means that not only is there a connection between my action being free 
and its being truly mine; there is also a link between my action being free 
and its being invulnerable to moral luck. Miat can be said to belong to the 
drunk man and what he can be held responsible for, regardless of whether or 
not his drunkenness causes any actual harm to others, is his decision to 
drink heavily in the first place.
This is also apposite to an example given by Nagel in "Moral Luck", 
that of a drunk driver who swerves dangerously onto the pavement. Nagel 
does not actually take a fully Kantian line here: he asserts that the 
driver is morally lucky if there are no pedestrians on the pavement, and 
morally unlucky if there are. "if there were, he would be to blame for 
their deaths, and would probably be prosecuted for manslaughter."'^^ But 
this is to confuse moral and legal responsibility in the way Kant warns us 
against. Intuitively we do think that the driver should say to himself, "I 
could have killed someone," and stop combining alcohol and driving. We do 
blame him whether or not an accident occurs, presuming that we get to hear 
of his conduct, and whether or not he is punished by the force of the law. 
This Kantian way out of the paradox of moral luck, which common sense has 
created, is itself consistent with common sense. Kant would regard this as 
a considerable virtue, I think. In. dismissing the criticism that the 
Grundlegung ' contained "no new principle of morality in it. but only a new 
formula," Kant argued, "Wno .would want to introduce a new principle of 
morality and, as it were, be its inventor, as if the world had hitherto 
been ignorant of what duty is or had been thoroughly wrong about it?"^^
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In taking the "dry stick" view of Kant , as someone who tried to seal
himself and his philosophy off from the world of chance and the emotional
life, Nussbaum— and others— may simply have been influenced by the fabled
regularity of Kant's daily routine, in which freedom appeared to play
little part. Or perhaps she is over-emphasising the negative conception of
freedom which does sometimes occur in Kant at the expense of the more
positive concept. Roughly, the negative reading is freedom from sense-
impulse, \diich can affect free choice but cannot determine it. The positive
concept, which I view as more important, is the power of pure reason to be
itself practical.The metaphysical centrality of this positive concept of
freedom is illustrated in this quotation from The Metaphysics of Morals;
..[l]n reason's practical use the concept of freedom proves its 
reality through practical principles vhich, as laws of a causality 
of pure reason i^ich is independent of all empirical conditions (of 
sensibility as such), determine choice and prove the existence in us 
of a pure will in ^ ich moral concepts and laws have their source.
This is asserted despite Kantls statement that "Because the concept of
freedom is such that no example adequate to it can ever be given in any
possible experience, freedom is not an object of our possible theoretical
knowledge.
What may also have encouraged the "dry stick" view is, ironically 
enough, what strikes me as most personal and revealing in Kant's writing; 
the struggle against odd inclinations and chance passions, on the grounds 
of their irregularity, their vulnerability to contingency, rather than 
their content. Even the virtues are vulnerable— an observation surprisingly 
similar to Nussbaum* s analysis of Hecuba. Moral innocence would be 
'■glorious" but for the high probability of its downfall.
Innocence is indeed a glorious thing; only, on the other hand.
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it is very sad that it cannot well maintain itself, and is easily 
seduced. On this account even wisdom— which otherwise consists more in 
conduct than in knowledge— yet has need of science, not in order 
to leam from it, but to secure for its precepts admission and 
permanence.
Similarly, accepting favours is a breach of one's duty towards oneself 
because there is always à risk that the debt will be called in, in some 
unpalatable and unforeseeable way.
This thrust towards controlling the unpredictable and unstable is a 
continual theme in Kant, as in this quotation from Religion within the
Limits of Reason Alone; ".. .[W]hen incentives other than the law itself
(such as ambition, self-love in general, yes, even a kindly instinct such 
as sympathy) are necessary to determine the will to conduct conformable 
with the law, it is merely accidental that these causes coincide with the 
law, for they could equally well incite its violation. A similar concern 
permeates the Grundlegung; "The sublimity and intritisic dignity of the 
command in duty are so much the more evident, the less the subjective
impulses favour it and the more they oppose it, without being able in the 
slightest degree to weaken the obligation of the law or to diminish its 
validity. Because we cannot summon up the emotions at will— not without 
Pecksniffian hypocrisy, or Hitler's unpleasant power to induce hysteria in 
himself as well as in his audience— the feelings are not a certain
foundation,for right action.
Yet very early on in the same work Kant also warns us that hedging 
one's emotional bets cannot alone constitute the ethical life. "Moderation 
in the affections and passions, self-control and calm deliberation are not
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only good in many respects, but even seem to constitute part of the
intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far from deserving to be called
good without qualification, although they have been so unconditionally
praised by the ancients. (There is a nice little irony in this last
phrase: Kant is disparaging sophrosyne. Effectively this stands Nussbaum* s
thesis on its head: the ancients now come out as the "dry s t i c k s . B u t
the main point here is that Kantian morality can be "beautifully human",
that Kant does take account of the full range of human needs and attitudes,
does not want us to close ourselves off through an obsessive frugality of
the emotions and continual scrutiny . of our motives. In particular he is
fully aware of our need for a motivating force to obey the Categorical
Imperative \diich cannot be provided by logic alone.
Morality consists in this, that an action should arise from 
the impulsive ground of its own inner goodness...That it is so is well 
appreciated by the understanding. Nevertheless, this impulsive ground 
has no driving force...But we should be on our guard against becoming 
,hypercritical about it, against probing too deeply into its incapacity 
to attain moral purity. Those who are forever on the look-out for 
moral impurities in their actions tend to lose confidence in their 
ability to do good and moral actions...We must rather believe that 
rectitude moyglis can be a strong impulsive ground of
our actions.44
I think it is rather shallow to depict Kantian ethics as itself 
shallow, particularly in its allegedly life-hating narrowness and 
intolerance of risk. The strictness of the Kantian standard is itself an 
impressive piece of risk-taking. "Even though there might never yet have 
been a sincere friend, yet not a whit the less is pure sincerity in 
friendship required of every man, because, prior to all experience, this 
duty is involved as duty in the idea of a reason determining the will by ^  
priori p r i n c i p l e s . "45 critics were not the first to recognise the
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ensuing risk— that Kantian ethics will produce Tartuffes, as Hegel put it. 
Kant accepts this danger but still claims that we can know hypocrisy when 
we see it. The vastness of the risk lies in the overpowering odds that so 
far as know, we will never encounter anything but hypocrisy: in our 
inability to be certain, for reasons similar to Karl Popper*s arguments 
about falsiflability, that any actual example is determined by moral 
motives.
We cannot show with certainty in any example that the will was 
determined merely by the law, without any other spring of action, 
although it may appear to be so. For it is always possible that fear 
of disgrace, perhaps also obscure dread of other dangers, may have a 
secret influence on the will. Who can prove by experience the non­
existence of a cause when all that experience tells us is that we 
. do not perceive it?^®
This is a Kant to whom Nussbaum should warm: one with some awareness 
of paradox and pathos, as in his sad assertion that even innocence is bound 
to decay. Perhaps this is not strictly speaking a tragic awareness, and the
not believe there are 
it has an Oddly Greek
usual interpretation, as in White, is that Kant does
true tragic choices, genuine conflicts of duty. But
feel to it, much like Plato's prediction of the inevitable degeneration of
the Republic into a lesser political form. "Nothing gold can stay," as
Robert Frost puts it. And Kant also recognises that freedom is the genesis
of evil as well as of good:
The inherent value of the world, the summum bonum, is freedom in 
accordance with a will which is not necessitated by action. Freedom 
is thus the inner value of the world. But on the other hand, freedom 
unrestrained by rules of its conditional employment is the most 
terrible of things...All evil in the world springs from freedom.^'
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Indeed, Nussbaum is not so much of an anti-Kantian as she thinks she
is. Sometimes she even recognises this openly:
We can claim to be following a part of the deep motivation 
behind Kant's own view of duty when we insist that duty does not go 
away because of the world's contingent interventions. Greek 
polytheism, surprisingly, articulates a certain elenent of 
Kantian morality better than any monotheistic creed could: 
namely, it insists upon the supreme and binding authority, the 
divinity so to speak, of each ethical obligation, in all 
circumstances whatever, including those in which the gods themselves 
collide.
This conflict of duties is the source of tragedy, and it is worth a brief 
concluding discussion: partly because medical ethics and public policy 
offer so many examples of tragic choice, such as allocation of scarce 
medical resources and nuclear deterrence. It may seem that Greek polytheism 
can have little to do with kidney allocation, and that the discussion of 
tragedy will be irrelevanti But as Bernard Williams says, "There is no need 
of irrational gods, to give rise to tragic situations.
Tragedy actually seems to be a source of moral value in Nussbaum, a 
view vdiich would be rejected by both Kantiahs and consequentialists. To 
repeat my opening paragraph, vhat makes human endeavour admirable to her is 
its fragility^ though #iat makes my own endeavour valuable is also that it 
is mine, self-generated, not the product of some external command or goal. 
A Kantian could agree with the second pranise; a consequentialist probably 
would not; and it does seem to me that there are serious problems in it for 
an Aristotelian such as Nussbaum. My virtue, as MacIntyre would imply, is 
so much conditioned by nomos and custom in Aristotle as not to belong 
uniquely to me. However, I do not intend to press this further.
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Nussbaum maintains that to the Greek playwrights at least, tragedy did 
not necessarily entail paradoxes about moral luck. It is possible for good 
character to survive tragic outcomes in the sense of external ill-fortune 
which happens . to agents. So Anna Karenina would not necessarily be proved 
to have made a wrong moral choice by her tragic end. Nor, hard as it 
sounds, would a case of scarce resource allocation in which the patient 
given the resource then dies be tragic in the strict sense for the patient 
who was not given the resource, although it might be tragic for the health 
professional who makes the decision. (This is because it is the health 
professional who is the moral agent dn this case, not the patient: because 
if there is an irreconcilable conflict of duties, it is the health care 
worker who faces it.) Nussbaum argues - that what good character cannot 
endure is having to do things "otherwise repugnant to [agents'] ethical 
character and commitments, because of circumstances whose origin does not 
lie with them."^® Tragedy is most disturbing when it depicts good people 
doing bad things. However, they can retain a measure of their goodness and 
human dignity by recognising that they are doing bad things.
This is something more than a recommendation of hypocrisy. Nussbaum
says that what is most evil about Agamemnon's decision to sacrifice
Iphigenia is not that he murders her but that he becomes more and more
convinced, as the play proceeds, that he should be lauded for killing her.
Because the sacrifice brings favourable winds and good (outcome) luck, he
is able to ignore the ill-luck (in the situations encountered) \diich forced
him to cause suffering no matter which course he chose. -
Agamemnon seems to have assumed first, that if he decided 
right, the action chosen must be right; and second, that if an 
action is right, it is appropriate to want it, even to be
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enthusiastic about it. From "Which of these is without evils?" he has 
moved to "May all turn out well."^^
But of course all cannot be well. Agamemnon has killed his daughter. The
chorus blames him not so much for her murder as for his callous attitude
towards it, his lack of remorse. And without remorse we cannot be said to
be either fully human or genuine moral agents. In this sense an awareness
that acting well is open to luck but that it is nevertheless incumbent on
us to act well— a position with vdiich I think Kant could agree— upholds
rather than threatens the ethical enterprise.
Aeschylus has shown us how thoroughly, in fact, the pain and 
remorse...are bound up with ethical seriousness in other areas 
of life; with a seriousness about value, a constancy in commitment, 
and a sympathetic responsiveness that we wish to maintain and 
develop in others and in ourselves... [W]ithout. •.acknowledgement 
of the tragic power of circumstance over human goodness we cannot, 
in fact, maintain other valued features of our goodness; its 
internal integrity, its ongoing fidelity to its own laws, its 
responsiveness of vision.
This seems to be a sensitive and profound reading by Nussbaum, and I 
return to it at the end of the dissertation, where I use the Agamemnon 
example as a parallel for the decision to maintain a strategy of nuclear 
deterrence. But here Nussbaum upholds a version of ethics with surprising 
resemblances to Kantianism. Moral personality can remain beyond the reach 
of external contingency to corrupt, and indeed the power of even evil 
contingency can be beneficial to an innately good character: pathei mathos. 
Nussbaum qualifies this assertion in her discussion of Hecuba,but she 
nevertheless maintains that the good moral agent is not one who obtains the 
good outcome, but one who approaches dilemmas in the right way: 
compassionately, honestly, imaginatively, with a lack of self-delusion 
either about the possibility of avoiding tragic outcomes or the likelihood
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of their being blessings in disguise, "Aeschylus has indicated to us that 
the only thing remotely like a solution here is, in fact, to describe and 
see the conflict clearly and to acknowledge that there is no way out."
But Nussbaum* s reading of this supreme example of ill-luck is 
perfectly consistent with Kant's assertion that what I am forced to do is 
not my action, since it does not proceed from my choice. Agamemnon was 
compelled by Zeus to choose between two evil alternatives, and he cannot be 
condemned within Kantianism for either action. (This is why there cannot be 
a genuine conflict of duties here, to Kant, since duty is self-generated.)
. ■ : . cc
Nussbaum does recognise, though only in a footnote^^, that Kant could get 
round the Agamemnon example in this way, though she asserts that "this, 
however,, in no way affects the general point; for he cannot extricate 
himself from all conflicts in this way." But that is a rather sophistical 
argument, since Nussbaum has chosen this example to be telling against 
Kant. Further, Kant may not be able to defuse all conflicts by invoking the 
notion of compulsion, but the concept does afford one way of limiting the 
paradox of moral luck. I have not yet asserted that we can eliminate the 
dilemma altogether, but I do think that we should be looking for such ways 
of fencing it in.
In any case, perhaps Kant would agree that Agamemnon cannot avoid 
responsibility altogether in this example. He cannot be held responsibe for 
taking either of the two alternatives which the god has forced on him. But 
he can be blamed for justifying or even welcoming Iphigenia's death, since 
he is not compelled to do this.
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Another way of delimiting what counts as ethical lies in Kant's
inveighing against "fantastic virtue", his assertion that some matters are
matters of moral indifference.^^ There is no moral merit in ostentatiously
multiplying the occasions of duty. In this sense, Hegel is wrong to accuse
Kant of giving rise to Tartuffes. ...
Some burden their consciences with many matters of 
: negligible importance.. • Conscience should not lord it over us like 
a tyrant; we .do no hurt to our conscience by proceeding on our 
way cheerfully; tormenting consciences in the long run become 
dulled and ultimately cease to function.
Kant might have argued that the conditions which make Williams ' s sort 
of scepticism about ethics possible also make it false: self-consciousness, 
the awareness of one's actions as something other than conditioned. 
Williams says that the doubts arising from the perception that ethics 
contradicts luck are ultimately at risk of shrinking the idea of agency to 
an extensionless point; yet without the idea of agency there could be no 
questions about moral luck. The condition vdiich makes the moral luck 
paradox possible also disproves it: the existence of agency. Yet the 
unconditioned freedom of the moral agent remains paradoxical. In this sense 
it is both right and wrong to assert that Kant tries to erase the paradox 
of moral luck. But it is certainly ill-advised to depict him as wilfully 
blind to it.
Practical reason is the cornerstone of our selfhood in Kant, what 
makes us "beautifully human". Although it is not the source of character, 
on which constitutive luck and events take their toll, it is the source of 
personality in Kant's sense of the term. This is best expressed in the
Moral Luck in Medical Ethics and Practical Politics Page 51
Risk and Kant/Chapter 2
moving conclusion to the Critique of Practical Reason;
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration 
and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: the starry 
heavens above me and the moral law within me. I do not merely 
conjecture them and seek them as though obscured in darkness or in 
the transcendent region beyond my horizon: I see them before me, 
and I associate them directly with the consciousness of my own 
existence...The former view of a countless multitude of worlds 
annihilates, as it were, my importance as an animal creature,
\diich must give back to the planet (a mere speck in the universe) 
the matter from which it came, the matter which is for a little 
time provided with vital force, we know not how. The latter, on the 
contrary, infinitely raises my worth as that of an intelligence 
by my personality, in which the moral law reveals a life 
independent of all animality and even of the \diole world of 
sense— at least so far as it may be inferred from the purposive 
destination assigned to my existence by this law, a destination 
which is not restricted to the conditions and limits of this 
life but reaches into the infinite.
The surprising similarity between Nussbaum*s and Kant's arguments can 
be seen even more clearly in contrasting Nussbaum's view with an outcome- 
orientated one such as utilitarianism. After all, vhat is evil in Greon, to 
Nussbaum, is that he considers "only" the welfare of Thebes, defining right 
and wrong purely in outcome terms. It is to utilitarianism and moral luck 
that I will now turn.
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Chapter Three 
Probability and Utilitarianism
Although I have not presented Kant as striving to create a risk-free 
system of ethics, I do not deny that moral luck looks at first to be 
particularly paradoxical for a Kantian. A Kantian is primarily concerned 
about the state of his or her own will; but how can a will be stably good 
if its goodness is subject to factors beyond the agent's control? It might 
be easier for the good will to "sparkle like a jewel in its own right, as 
something that had its full worth in itself," if it were the only thing in 
the world, "if there remained only the good will." It is the subjection of 
the will to the outside world which creates the dilemma of moral luck. 
Nussbaum can be seen as arguing that Kant deliberately chose to ignore the 
way in which the agent simply subject to chance in order to preserve the 
integrity of the good will. I have asserted that this is a misreading of 
Kant, and that Nussbaum's own position is closer to Kant's than she 
acknowledges. And I have argued that Kant both recognises the moral luck 
paradox and suggests a resolution of it, through limiting what agents are 
responsible for whilst retaining a strict notion of agency. Agents are not 
responsible for things they are compelled to do; nor should the bounds of 
the ethical be stretched to include "fantastic virtue", to make too many 
matters moral.
Because utilitarians emphasise consequences rather than conscience, 
they seem to have no such difficulty to get over at all, however, and the
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dilemma of moral luck appears not to exist for consequentialists in 
general. It is only by asking Kantian sorts of questions that it arises. 
Perhaps this might be a good time to restate the paradox, \diich depends on 
a dichotomy between the outside world and what is defined as the locus of 
moral worth in the individual agent. If good and bad pertain purely to 
consequences, rather than to the will, it looks ^  first as if the problem 
of moral luck cannot arise. The dichotomy should no longer exist because 
the locus of moral value has shifted from the agent to the outside world. 
Since the paradox of moral luck seems to result from this tension between 
individual responsibility and determination by things outside the agent, 
consequentialism should be able to eliminate the paradox.
Common-sense judgment holds people responsible for their actions 
according to how those actions turn out; yèt common sense also maintains 
that people are not responsible for matters beyond their control. Much of 
how things turn out is inevitably beyond agents' control. It is possible to 
resolve this, the paradox of moral luck, by ceasing to hold people 
responsible for what is beyond their control, but then we may not wind up 
holding them responsible for very much. This is essentially the line which 
Williams has pursued, with increasing severity over the years— so that a 
fixed ethical system -becomes more and more of a .nonsense in his recent 
work, to be replaced by a consensual system of societal values. It is not 
the path which I intend to take in the rest of this thesis.
Instead I mainly want to investigate the alternative way of 
resolving the paradox, closer to Nagel's formulation. This is to retain a
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broadly Kantian idea of agent responsibility despite the actions of chance, 
but to limit what agents are responsible for. Recall, for example, that 
Nagel did not think that aesthetic failure would have made Gauguin's 
decision morally wrong; nor would success as an artist have proved his 
choice ethically correct. Even if success "still determines his most basic 
feelings, that shows only that his most basic feelings not need be moral. 
Chapters five through eight of this dissertation comprise this effort to 
limit what agents are responsible for, so as to avoid the moral luck 
problem, by illustrating how such limits might apply in some areas of 
practical ethics. They may appear at first to focus not so much on moral 
luck as on how to make the optimal choice under conditions of uncertainty, 
but I shall deal with that objection vÆien I come to chapter five.
Meanwhile, let us return to consequentialism and moral luck. This 
chapter has quite a modest aim; to argue that moral luck is not a 
peculiarly Kantian fixation, even though the dilemma appears to arise by 
asking Kantian questions. Again, it seems at first that consequentialism 
does not have a problem with moral luck, though of course it does concern 
itself with how to make the optimal choice under conditions of uncertainty. 
I want to argue, however, that vihat looks like a split here is not genuine, 
and that moral luck is relevant to consequentialism. The reason why this is 
true relates to how consequentialism has defined what kinds of outcomes the 
agent is responsible for, and this is turn relates to probability. The rest 
of this chapter will concern probabilities and outcomes in 
consequentialism, particularly in utilitarianism.
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To ascribe responsibility on the basis of consequences inevitably 
raises the question of whether the agent is responsible for the actual or 
the potential consequences of his or her action. If it is the actual 
consequences, we seem not to have evaded the problem of moral luck after 
all. The rightness or wrongness of my decision will still depend on some 
matters beyond my control, if matters do not turn out as I had intended or 
foreseen. (I shall not distinguish the two. at this point in the argument.) 
If we still want to retain some conception of responsibility and agency, 
this creates a temptation to think in terms of potential consequences, 
which is normally translated into the likelihood of those outcomes and 
their desirability, or probability and utility.
Whether it is actual or probable consequences which are most 
ethically relevant is a debate which goes back at least to Russell and 
Moore, and which is summarised by G.D. Broad in "The Doctrine of 
Consequences in Ethics."- To be more precise. Broad thinks that the Moore- 
Russell controversy suggests that even ascribing responsibility by actual 
consequences requires probabilities to be taken into account. Although 
Moore held, against Russell, that it was actual consequences which 
mattered, he was compelled to introduce probability in the end. Broad 
asserts. But this is not the main point at the moment, however : rather, 
the question is vÆiether a consequentialism that thinks solely in terms of 
actual consequences— whether or not it has to incorporate probabilistic 
reasoning— is not just as vulnerable to the paradox of moral luck as 
Kantianism looked to be.
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It does appear that Russell was aware that reliance on actual 
consequences as the touchstone somehow lessens the agent's control and may 
make it hard for us to know: just what the agent could be responsible for. 
This is essentially the moral luck problem. Using probable rather than 
actual consequences as the guide has the advantage, as Broad ‘ phrases 
Russell's argument, of "making objective rightness independent of 
unforeseeable circumstances. Now not controlling is broader than not 
foreseeing: foresight is at best a minimal sort of control. I will need to 
distinguish the two later on in this chapter, and again in the next 
chapter, on rationality. But there is a germ of a moral luck argument here, 
and one which appears to work in favour of potential rather than actual 
consequences.
In contrast, Moore is not too bothered by the dilemma of moral luck. 
Being judged by the actual .consequences, he asserts, will not turn out to 
be intolerably harsh, because we ought to distinguish what is right to do 
from what is right to praise. Further, rightness only refers to 
consequences, according to Moore, but we may still say that the agent's 
choice was good even if the consequences,turned out "wrong". Although Broad 
calls Moore's formulation generally more plausible than Russell's, his 
preference for Moore's position does not extend to his claim about praise 
and blame:
This supposition is hot necessarily true. A's praise or blame 
of B ' s act is a second act, and like all others, its rightness 
or wrongness must be,judged by its own consequences, and not 
by those of B's act.^
- .
So Broad is unwilling to allow Moore this evasive action. But this may be 
because Broad himself does not fully recognise how deeply the moral luck
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problem would affect a .consequentialism based on actual outcomes. He is 
blithely willing ; to accept that "since the rightness of your action is at 
the mercy of all that is going to happen in the .universe throughout all 
future time, there is no reason to expect better results from conscientious 
acts than from the most stupid and biased o n e s . T h i s  seems hopelessly 
demoralising: to a consequentialist, the point of making conscientious 
decisions is precisely to obtain desirable outcomes. If.there is no reason 
to expect better results from conscientious acts than from stupid ones, 
there can be no reason in consequentialism to make one's ethical choices in 
a conscientious manner. (There would be reasons in Kantianism, of course. ) 
The first half of Broad's claim, at least, might strike Nussbaum as an 
admirably tragic-minded view, but it is hard to see how Broad's formulation 
could motivate right action.
Broad's main reservations about relying on potential outcomes concern
Russell's alleged mingling of actual and probable consequences, with
disastrously confused results:
It is not clear whether the objective rightness of an act depends on 
the actual value of its probable consequences, or the probable value 
of its actual consequences, or the probable value of its probable 
consequences. All we are told is that it does not depend on the actual 
value of its actual consequences. ■ . .
But of course this does not defend the actual-consequences position against
the moral luck problem; it merely criticises Russell's particular
formulation, of the potential-cbnsequences line. Is it impossible to
formulate a consequentialism of actual outcomes without encountering moral
luck dilemmas? I have suggested so far that the answer is probably yes,
but A.N. Prior's work provides additional grounds for doubting that an
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actual-consequences utilitarianism can work.^ His argument bears on moral 
luck, though it is not couched in moral luck terms; rather, in those of a 
different paradox.
Moore maintains that it is our duty to perform that action which 
actually ; produces the best total consequences, of all available 
alternatives. But Prior says that it is a practical impossibility to 
determine the contents of that duty. This is true not only because we lack 
the power to predict; it is also because Moore is making paradoxical 
assumptions about control. No such best package of outcomes exists unless 
determinism is total; but of course if determinism is total and free will 
non-existent, we cannot be said to make ethical choices. The total future 
of the world depends on how other agents choose, too: not just on what I 
choose.
Now it might be possible to approach such decisions through game 
theory, with the game being viewed as played against others rather than 
against a neutral nature. But whether they could be approached through 
ethical reasoning, particularly consequentialist reasoning, is more
o '  ' ‘ ■ -
problematic. One consequentialist attempt to get away from the notion of 
nature (stepmotherly or otherwise) as the sole determiner of outcomes has 
been made by Bart Gruzalski, although in a manner rather incidental to his 
main concern, "the defeat of utilitarian generalization."? Gruzalski does 
indeed tend to present future outcomes as knowable: perhaps controllable, 
and certainly very precisely knowable, quantifiable in probability terms—  
when in fact they depend on the decisions of all agents. But these
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decisions are meant to be influenced by the very arguments being made on 
the basis of this future package of outcomes. This entails a profound 
circularity. .
Gruzalski has devised the hypothetical case of a worker, Fred, whose
decision about whether or not to strike is dependent for its outcome's
success on other workers' decisions. (Gruzalski does not debate whether
this is an ethical or merely a prudential decision, but again, I leave such
questions until the following chapter.) The conditions surrounding Fred's
choice are as follows:
A strike has been called. If the strike fails, the consequences would 
be very undesirable, vAiereas the consequences of a successful strike 
would be very desirable. Everyone knows that almost certainly all 450 
workers will strike and that the strike would still be successful if 
only 300 workers were to strike. Although each act of striking 
produces an undesirable consequence (loss of salary), these 
consequences, even if magnified five times, are less undesirable than 
the strike's not succeeding. In these circumstances, what should a 
utilitarian do?^^
What makes this calculation problematic is that Fred's action changes the 
probabilities of success. In fact, this is the classic free-rider problan. 
A recent economic study of the free-rider dilemma has concluded, 
interestingly, that it cannot be solved except through a Kantian system 
emphasising beneficence rather than self-interest.^^ The best outcome for 
Fred would be to keep his pay packet and to see the strike succeed. But if 
everyone reckons like Fred, the.strike will fail. However, even if Fred 
reports for work, the strike will still succeed provided that no more than 
149 other workers reason as Fred has.
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Yet no one— including Gruzalski— can know in advance how the other 
workers will reason. . Gruzalski simply stipulates that the strike's 
probability of success is very high, 0.9999. Now this is not actually a 
mistake in moral mathematics, although Gruzalski does make such errors: for 
example, in one table a probability of 3,550 appears, when probabilities 
can only range between 0 and 1. Gruzalski can of course stipulate \diatever 
probability of others' striking he likes; but if we are to regard Fred's 
decision as generalisable and instructive, we have to view all the workers 
as Freds, and all their decisions as up for grabs. It is therefore puzzling 
when Gruzalski says that "everyone knows that almost certainly all 450 
workers will strike.". After all, Fred is one of the 450, but his decision 
is regarded as undetermined. And "everyone could know" equally well—  
indeed, perhaps more certainly— that all the employees will turn up for 
work because each wants to be a free-rider.
Matters become even more tangled when Gruzalski tries to derive 
Fred's likely share in the strike's success, if it succeeds, from the 
probability that 399 other workers will actually strike in the end. This 
appears to contradict his earlier assignments of probability.^^ If it took 
300 workers to assure, the strike's success, we only know that at least 300 
stayed home; how did the 400 creep in? Once again Gruzalski has simply 
inserted it as an a priori proposition. Again, in a sense this is perfectly 
legitimate: Gruzalski can do what he likes with his own example. He defines 
his, and any utilitarian's concern as being "with what a person or group of 
persons should do given the facts, not what should be done were the facts 
different.But in real life the question is often not \diat to do with
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either, these or different facts, but what to do with no facts. How can Fred 
know in advance what his likely share in the strike's success will be? Can 
he control his co-workers' decisions in any way? Certainly he needs at 
least to know his likely share of credit in order to decide what to do, in 
order to balance the gain attributable to his action against the loss of 
pay.
Again, there is a distinction between the uncertainty introduced by 
our inability to control many of the decisions of others and that 
introduced by our lack of knowledge of the future. The first is certainly 
part of the paradox of moral luck, but the second also enters in. It is the 
first that Prior regards as the problem for a consequentialism of actual 
outcomes. The second. Prior says, "is only part of the general problem of 
'duty and ignorance of fact', which has nothing specially to do with 
utilitarianism, and [which] was allowed for by Moore anyway.However, it 
is debatable whether Fred's ignorance of fact can actually be shrugged off 
this lightly. In any case, lack of control over outcomes is : certainly 
difficult to get round, though in a reply to Prior, D.D. Raphael attempts 
to argue that "the consequences of my actions are also the consequences of 
yours, [in] that we both bring (in the ascriptive sense) whatever 
h a p p e n s . I f  I am seen as having some control over the consequences of my 
actions, I also have some over yours. However, even Raphael admits that 
this is "stretching the meaning of the concept of action and its 
consequences far beyond conventional use."
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How does this bear on moral luck, and what happens now to the actual- 
consequences variety of utilitarianism? Recall that the dilemma of moral 
luck concerns the simultaneous common-sense requirements that we be held 
responsible only for actions which we can control and that we be held 
responsible for bur actions according to how they turn out. If Prior is 
right, a doctrine of actual consequences radically extends what we are 
responsible for to include the decisions of others; but these we cannot 
normally control anything like reliably. This might result in what Williams 
calls "the final destruction" (in a slightly different c o n t e x t ) t h e  
combination of Kantian strictness of duty with an impossibly broad and 
(according to Prior) ultimately undefinable list of duties to fulfill. I 
shall argue in the rest of this dissertation that the best way to avoid 
this worst of both worlds is to retain a fairly strict notion of agency but 
to limit equally strictly what agents are responsible for.
Prior prefers to leave agents responsible for a much broader range of 
outcomes, but not for actual consequences. We may have to be content to 
consider as our duty that action \diich will probably engender the most 
desirable total consequences, he says. But this too leads to problems: for 
example, probabilities must be conceived as having an objective existence. 
Prior stipulates; It is not enough that we believe the consequences of an 
action are likely to a certain degree; they must actually ^  probable to 
that level of magnitude. After all, \diat affects other people is the 
outcome, not my estimate of it.However, One obvious difficulty is 
exactly vÆiat probabilities represent. As Broad says about the related 
concept of expected value (probability times utility), "[there is] no
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reason to think that the notion - of mathematical expectation is really a 
measure of anything in this world. This is true mainly because its 
component of probability may likewise have no substance: utility represents 
a definite something desirable, but probability may not represent anything 
at all. This is not the least of the problems and paradoxes associated with 
probability, and it is to these, and the associated probable-consequence 
variety of utiltarianism, that I shall now turn.
I said before that we need to distinguish uncertainty resulting from 
ignorance with that stemming inevitably from the freedom of other agents. A 
concentration on probable consequences lOoks at first as if it can lessen 
much of the first kind of uncertainty, through the statistical discipline 
of probability interpretation. (However, this does not answer Prior's 
objections about control of others' actions.) And of course we do 
incontestably use probabilities in ordinary prudential decisions. Why not 
also use them in moral choices? I do not intend to tackle any such broad 
question in this chapter; in the next chapter I do give ‘ further 
consideration to the distinction betweeen prudential and ethical reasoning. 
But aside from the arguments within statistical theory about whether 
probabilities are objective or subjective— and as I have indicated in 
discussing Broad's doubts about vAiether mathematical expectation represents 
anything real, such questions about the status Of probabilities are 
subst^tial matters, not just technical questions— there are grave 
questions about using probabilities as the touchstone for right action.
Moral Luck in Medical Ethics and Practical Politics Page 69
Probability and Utilitarianism/Chapter 3
Two sorts of questions arise. The first is to do with mistakes in 
moral mathematics, the second with incommensurabilities of moral value. 
Both sorts are illustrated in the following example, but I shall need to 
separate them out in ny elucidation of it. Broadly, however, the point of 
the example is that we cannot improve matters by trading in one.paradox for 
another. I want to suggest that the paradoxes of probability are no less 
crippling than those which Williams believes that moral luck presents, and 
that some utilitarians have been insufficiently aware of their 
imperviousness to better methods of calculation.
Consider a typical probability, that of dying in a motor vehicle 
accident. The risk for Americans in 1975 was .0027, or 27 deaths for every 
ten thousand Americans per year. These deaths constitute a statistical 
certainty, within the limits of the appropriate degree of confidence. Of 
every ten thousand Americans, 27 could "certainly" have expected to die in 
road accidents that year, although of course no one knows which 27 would 
die. But the group total is certain, and indeed is derived by taking those 
who did die in road accidents that year as a proportion of the populace. 
Now consider a probability derived with similar certainty from actual 
figures, though in a hypothetical example.The point here is that there 
is no quibble about vdiether the probability is accurate, and no improvement 
in the paradoxes presented by the example could be made by obtaining the 
initial probabilities in some more accurate fashion. There no more 
accurate fashion. Nor are there the game-theoretical sorts of problems I 
identified in Gruzalski*s example.
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Twenty-five prisoners are exercising in a yard, under the surveillance 
of a lone guard. A solitary witness, who is too far away to identify any of 
the prisoners, sees the guard— recognisable by his uniform— trip and fall, 
knocking himself out. After huddling together for a moment, the prisoners 
separate. One hides in a shed in the comer, whilst the other twenty-four 
fall on the guard and kill him. Then the twenty-fifth man re-emerges and 
mixes with the other prisoners. The rest of the prison guards rush into the 
yard, where they .find the dead man and the twenty-five prisoners. How many, 
if any, will be found guilty of murder?
None, says the originator of the example, Charles Nesson: no jury 
would convict any of the prisoners. To do so would be equivalent to 
announcing that it believed a probability of .96 (24 in 25) to constitute 
guilt **beyond a reasonable doubt,** the standard in criminal prosecutions. 
This would be detrimental because doubt is functional: the public can only 
defer to jury verdicts, if they are not couched in such bald and cynical 
terms. This is not actually the point about value which I want to discuss; 
I shall not pursue this functionalist line. Instead, I want to ask whether 
the problems here arise from the moral imperative that we should not 
convict someone, vÆio might be innocent on a probabilistic basis, or from 
mathematical difficulties. Difficulties there are in plenty: contradictions 
occur \diether the jury.convicts all twenty-five prisoners, twenty-four, or 
none. . . ■ : .. .
If the jury convicts the first prisoner. in the dock on the .96 
probability of his guilt, it must do so with all the remaining prisoners.
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But that is equivalent to announcing that twenty-five men killed the guard, 
which we know to be false. That is, at the end of all the trials the 
probability of each man's guilt would have been proclaimed to be 1.00. But 
if the jury convicts no prisoners, it announces that the probability was
0.00 for each man. The only way the jury could obtain the statistically 
correct result for the group as a whole would be to convict any twenty-four 
men on any basis it liked, randomly or systematically. But somehow this is 
even more abhorrent than convicting all twenty-five.
Here is where the distinction between ethical paradox and mathematical 
error comes in. It looks as if we can solve the mathematical problem by 
convicting twenty-four prisoners, chosen at random. (In a moment I shall 
note that this would only produce the statistically correct result for the 
group, however.) But no one would assert that this will solve the ethical 
problem. The jury will have transgressed the basic Anglo-American legal 
principle of judging each case on its merits, without a predetermination of 
guilt. Whatever it decides about case twenty-five will have been determined 
already by whether it chooses to locate the one innocent man among the 
first twenty-four. And of course there is no guarantee that the man chosen 
for acquittal will be innocent: indeed, there is a .96 probability against 
it.: Yet the jury will effectively have declared that his likelihood of 
guilt is 0.00, and that of the others 1.00. In this sense the ethically 
wrong thing to do will not even have solved the mathematical problem. It 
will have produced the statistically correct result for the group, but not 
for any individual.
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Whether the jury would be to blame if it chose the twenty-four guilty 
men arbitrarily has nothing to do with the level of potential loss in the 
case. It would still have acted wrongly whether or not the death penalty 
were in force, for example. This is a case about probabilities and their 
paradoxes, not utilities. To convict, the jury should have to be able to 
assert that it was incapable of being surprised by à wrong result. Yet it 
also knows that in each case it stands a .04 chance of being wrong, and 
that for the group of twenty-five men it stands only a .04 chance of 
getting the distribution of guilt and innocence right. It has been said 
that probability would be an appropriate tool "for any legal system that 
aimed solely to discover the truth more often than not, but not for one 
which aims to dispense justice to individuals. However, a .04 chance of 
getting the distribution right for the group hardly makes it likely that 
even that minimal criterion will be satisfied.
If we want to maintain a strict legal principle such as "innocent 
until proven guilty," we will simply have to ignore probabilities 
altogether in this case. This will limit our responsibility as agents: we 
will be responsible for not infringing the presumption of innocence, but we 
will not be responsible for getting the outcome right in terms of 
identifying the one innocent man and convicting the others. In fact, we 
will have to accept that the rightness or wrongness of the jury's decision 
cannot depend on how things turn out, on outcome luck. A consequentialist 
ought to be much more bothered about this example than a Kantian, who would 
be more likely to adhere to a strict ^  priori principle for its own 
apparent sake, or rather for the sake of respect for persons; And the
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example casts at least some initial doubts on probability as a guide for 
ethical action.
The case illustrates two points. First, even indubitably accurate 
probabilities entail statistical problems of the sort highlighted before, 
the extreme unlikeliness of getting it right for the group and getting it 
right for the individual. Second, getting it right for the group has to be 
balanced against another, indubitably ethical value, that of not wishing to 
convict individuals solely oh a probabilistic basis if that means
trespassing on the presumption of innocence. Possibly a very extreme
consequentialist would reply that there is nothing particularly special 
about the presumption of innocence, any more than any other a priori
principle. This would be consistent, in the sense that the principle
"innocent until proven guilty" comes out of someone else's toolkit, and is 
not an instrument which consequentialists are obliged to use. But it would 
be a very extreme reading which would step outside the established
parameters of the case and the actual ethos of the , courtroom. I think that
the balancing can only go one way, against using, probability as a guide to
judgment in this case.
' Now some utilitarians have talked as if having a better theory of 
probability or a better set of techniques for handling it could eliminate 
all paradox and all incommensurability of values, making utilitarianism 
unassailable. J.J.C. Smart has written: "What utilitarianism badly needs, 
in order to make its theoretical foundations secure, is some method
according to which numerical probabilities, even approximate ones, could in
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theory, though not always in practice, be assigned to any imagined future 
e v e n t . T h e  argument seems to be that if we could be sure that we were 
dealing with objective frequencies rather than subjective probabilities, we 
could use probabilistic estimates with confidence as the guide to ethical 
choices. The problem is conceived as admitting of a "technical fix". Smart 
appears to believe that subjective probabilities only need a little tidying 
up to make them into the objective probabilities on which utilitarianism 
can find a firm foundation;
. We need a method of assigning numbers to objective, not subjective, 
probabilities. Perhaps one method might be to...define objective 
probabilities as the subjective probabilities of an unbiased and 
far-sighted man. I do not know how to do this, but I suspect, from 
the work that is at present being done on decision-making, that 
the situation may not be hopeless. But until we have an adequate 
theory of objective probability, utilitarianism is not on a 
secure theoretical basis.
However, we have already seen that indubitably objective frequencies cannot
always eliminate difficulties in moral mathematics or resolve
incommensurability of values, in the example of the twenty-five prisoners.
So confidence in a technical fix is misplaced.
Furthermore, subjective probabilities are not merely a downmarket 
version of objective ones, as Smart implies. To a subjectivist in 
probability theory, probabilities can never constitute anything but degrees 
of belief. Therefore probabilities are "assigned" rather than "discovered." 
A subjectivist would actually be willing to accept a rather Kantian 
premise; that vÆiat I am responsible for is not the outcome of my decision, 
but the diligence with which I make it. This again constitutes a limiting 
of \diat we are responsible for, interestingly enough, but this is really 
only an aside.
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Thé more important point about subjective probabilities is that 
conceiving of probabilities in this manner lands us back with the problems 
which Broad identified; what sort of reality do such estimates possess? 
None,, according to one subjectivist; "The calculus of probability can say 
absolutely nothing about r e a l i t y . Now it is hard to see how subjective 
probabilities, construed in this manner, can help a utilitarianism which 
concentrates bn probable outcomes. After all, utilitarianism traditionally 
claims to be hard-headed, "realistic", and positivistic; this is exactly 
.its defence against luck and chance, as Bentham made clear. "Every 
circumstance by which the condition of an individual can be influenced, 
being remarked and inventoried, nothing;.. [is] left to chance, caprice, or 
unguided discretion, everything being surveyed and set down in dimension, 
number, weight and measure.
I do not mean to argue that we should not try to avoid mistakes in 
moral mathematics ; only that doing so will not always eliminate the 
paradoxes of probability or resolve problems of incommensurable values. The 
Nesson example illustrates both sorts of problem, even though it contains 
indubitably objective probabilities and entails no game-theoretical 
difficulties about controlling or predicting the actions of other agents. 
It is not sufficient simply to make sure that we are dealing with objective 
probabilities if we want to make probabilistic estimates of potential 
consequences the touchstone of right action. However, it would certainly be 
crucial for a cons equentialism of probable outcomes to avoid whatever 
mistakes in moral mathematics can be avoided. Before concluding I shall 
briefly illustrate a class of case in which I do think that it might shore
Page 76 Moral Luck in Medical Ethics and Practical Politics
Probability and Utilitarianism/Chapter 3
up this type of consequentialist argument to deal with a .factor which is 
often overlooked when dealing with probable outcomes, statistical 
independence ; This appears to be a case about utility rather than 
probability, or perhaps about whether rights are additive. But a probable- 
consequences utilitarianism would also need to use statistical independence 
in order to handle it successfully.
The sort of case I have in mind is the "innumeracy of ethics" variety, 
and the example I shall use is the one vhich first sparked the debate, 
Elizabeth Anscombe's lifeboat hypothetical.(I have altered it slightly 
to parallel a case developed by Derek Parfit.) Five people are stranded on 
one rock, and one person on another. There is only enough time for the 
rescuer to go to one rock: which should he choose?
Anscombe concludes that the rescuer is not wrong to save the single 
person: the others would have no grounds for complaint so long as the 
choice is not made for some bad reason, "some ignoble contempt." The 
rescuer "acts badly if he chooses to rescue rich people rather than poor 
ones, having ill regard for the poor ones because they are poor. But he 
doesn't act badly if he uses his resources to save X, or X, Y, and Z, for 
no bad reason, and is not affected by the consideration that he could save 
a larger number of p e o p l e . T h i s  looks like a deontological argument 
about a pure will, as Anscombe phrases it. But the decision to save one 
person rather than five has also been defended in consequentialist terms by 
John Taurek. It is not necessarily preferable to save many lives rather 
than one, since, Taurek asserts, we cannot understand how pain could be
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additive. This has been vigorously rebutted by Derek Parfit: the deaths of
the five would be a worse outcome than a single death. What is interesting
about Parfit *s rebuttal is that he uses Anscombe* s warning against
"ignoble" reasons in order to come to the opposite conclusion from
Ansccxnbe: \ i ' : ;
If we give the rich priority, we do not give equal concern to 
saving each. Why do we save the larger number? Because we ^  give 
equal weight to each. Each counts for one. That is why more count for 
more.^°
"Each counts for one." This seems incontrovertible : it should also 
mean that the five deaths should not be considered as a whole, but as a run 
of five independent trials. Let us change the probability of effecting a 
successful rescue from 1.00 to any lesser figure, even 0.9999. That is, let 
us incorporate uncertainty, either in the situation itself or in the 
rescuer's mind. Surely this makes the example more realistic? If any 
uncertainty at all is allowed in the lifeboat example, statistical 
independence and the calculus of probability now dictate going to the more 
crowded rock. Let us assume that the weather conditions, the distance of 
the two rocks, and the limits of the rescuer's strength are such that the 
chances of reaching either rock are one in five, a probability of 0.20 of 
successful rescue. The two possible rescues between vdiich the choice is to 
be made are statistically independent events. Following an expected-value 
strategy, the rescuer stands to save 1/5 of a life (0.20 probability times 
a utility of one) if he goes to the rock with the single person on it, but 
one life (0.20 times a utility of five) if he chooses the rock with five 
people. So if numbers come into it at all, the rescuer should try to save 
the greater number, as Parfit asserts; but to make the numerical reasoning
Page 78 Moral Luck in Medical Ethics and Practical Politics
Probability and Utilitarianism/Chapter 3
correct, the argument needs to incorporate statistical independence. 
Recognising outcome luck requires that.
Let me recapitulate the argument of this chapter. It seemed at first 
that consequentialism could avoid the dilemma of moral luck because it 
emphasises outcomes rather than the good will. But consequentialists have 
been unable to agree on whether actual or potential outcomes are the 
standard by \diich to judge actions.^9 There are serious reasons to doubt 
whether reliance on actual consequences avoids the paradox, since actual 
consequences are often outside agents* control. This difficulty is cited by 
Russell, along with the related moral-luck question of what agents can then 
be considered responsible for, as an argument for emphasis on potential 
consequences instead.
Using potential 6r probable consequences as the touchstone appeared to 
give us greater foreknowledge, if not necessarily greater control over the 
actions of other agents. But while probabilities can be a source of some 
enlightenment if we avoid mistakes in moral mathonatics (such as ignoring 
statistical independence, or failing to delineate risk for individuals from 
statistical certainty for groups^O) they cannot do everything vMch has 
been claimed for them by some utilitarians, such as Smart. In particular, 
no amount of improvement in assigning or manipulating probabilities can 
get rid of conflicts of incommensurable values, such as occurred in the 
twenty-five prisoners example. Of course we would like to get the outcome 
right, apportioning acquittal and punishment correctly; but we must not 
convict an innocent man. In this case it 'Se^ed that the . only solution was
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not to hold the jurors responsible according to whether they reach the 
factually correct verdict, identifying the one innocent man and convicting 
the twenty-four guilty ones. Only by not making jurors responsible for 
getting the "correct" outcome could we avoid being intolerably surprised by 
how the outcome turned out. Only by limiting what they were responsible 
for— to upholding the presumption of innocence— was it possible to avoid 
the depredations of moral luck in this case.
Limiting \diat agents are responsible for eliminates the problem of 
moral luck in the twenty-five prisoners example. As I said earlier, 
narrowing down the ethical requirements in this way helps to avoid what 
Williams calls the ultimate destruction, the conjoining of a strict Kantian 
sense of duty with a broad definition of \diere our. duties lie. In the next 
chapter I want to explore this sort of limiting in more detail. In 
particular, I want to look at vdiere the ethical leaves off and the 
prudential begins.
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Chapter Four 
Rationality and Prudence
In my previous chapter I touched on the assertion that it must be 
possible to employ probabilistic reasoning in ethical choice because it is 
used in everyday prudential decision-making. This claim is made by Smart 
and many other utilitarians, normally coupled, as in Smart, with an 
assumption that everyday prudential decision-making can actually teach us 
something about ethics. But wliat if the twain shall never meet? Most of my 
attention in this chapter will be directed towards this claim that we 
should be able to use prudential reasoning as a model for-ethics, and the 
related but broader supposition that ethical choice and rational or 
prudential decision-making are one and the same. That second position will 
in turn be subdivided, so that there will be several possible propositions 
about the relationship of prudence, rationality, and moral choice. Among 
them I discuss the following permutations: _
, 1. Prudent decisions are moral decisions, though imprudent decisions 
are not necessarily irrational. This is the view which I attribute to Derek 
Parfit.
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2. Rational decisions are the same as prudent decisions and also the 
same as moral decisions. This I take to be Richard Brandt's claim.
3. Irrational decisions are imprudent but not necessarily unethical; 
the prudent is not coterminous with the ethical. This is the Kantian 
position, and also my o^m; but it is also found in a different form in the 
work of Robert Nozick and David Richards.
That is, I want to ask whether or riot there is an ethical realm which 
is separate from that of prudence, whether there is a class of decisions 
which we are not happy merely to get right in the long run, as we are with 
everyday consumer choices and similar prudential cases. It should be clear 
by now that a Kantian would reject the equation of the rational and the 
ethical, and equally obvious that I want to keep a firm boundary between 
the two, in the interests of retaining a notion of agency but limiting what 
agents are responsible for. This, it will be recalled, is my preferred way 
out of the moral luck, paradox— or at least my method for reducing the 
paradox's impact. At the end of this chapter I also discuss briefly 
whether we should try. to eliminate it altogether, in relation to Thomas 
Nagel's claims in The View from Nowhere.
However, before I begin the substantial discussion, I want briefly to 
query Smart's prior assumption, that we use probabilities in ordinary 
prudential decision-making. At first this may seem an unexceptionable 
assumption. Indeed, the principle of prudence is often stated in terms of 
statistical aggregates, probabilities and utilities: "that one ought to
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maximize the sum of intrinisic value or minimize the sum of intrinsic 
disvalue for oneself over one's lifetime as a w h o l e . B u t  on the other 
hand, many psychologists and other students of actual decision-making have 
cast serious doubt on the claim that agents are "rational" enough to use 
probabilities.^ Cognitive and motivational biases are said to dominate, so 
that there is no model of rational decision-making in everyday affairs 
which could serve as a parallel for moral choice. Perhaps we still ought to 
make everyday decisions on the basis of careful calibration in 
probabilities, but that is another claim, and a weaker one. To some extent. 
Smart does realize that the empirical basis of his first claim is dubious: 
"The fact that the ordinary man thinks that he can weigh up probabilities 
in making prudential decisions does not mean that there is really any sense 
in what he is doing.Granted, gladly; but then the direction changes. 
Smart is really trying to apply a moral imperative— that in favour of 
making decisions "rationally"— to everyday decision-making, rather than 
taking ordinary choices as a model for ethical ones.
What then is the relationship between ethical and prudential reasoning? 
In Butler, for example, there is a strong connection between them, and a 
further link between the prudential and the probabilistic. These pairs of 
relations are transitive, so that Gladstone could write: "Butler's
fundamental contention is that probability involves moral obligation.But 
it is not always clear whether Butler's equation of the ethical, the 
probable, and the prudential is anything more than a semantic muddle. For 
example, he calls a probability of 1.00 that there will be frost on at 
least one day this winter "a moral certainty, i.e., ground for an
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expectation without any doubt of it."^ Perhaps a better starting point 
is Derek Parfit*s argument that the grossly imprudent is also immoral.
According to Parfit, the imprudent person is effectively treating his
future self callously, as a different person. The ethical criterion of
respect for persons then applies; he is obliged to treat his future self
with whatever degree of respect he should evince for others. A young man's
decision to take up smoking is not only imprudent but also unethical,
because he is imposing on another the risk of a painful early death.
This boy does not identify with his future self. His attitude 
towards this future self is in some ways like his attitude towards 
other people. This analogy makes it easier to believe that his act 
is morally wrong. He runs the risk of imposing on himself a premature 
and painful death. We should claim that it is wrong to impose on 
anyone, including such a future self, the risk of such a 
death. More generally, we should claim that great imprudence is 
morally wrong. We ought not to do to our future selves what it would 
be wrong to do to other people.^
What is interesting, and atypical, is that Parfit refuses to call the
teenager's decision, to smoke irrational. In this he differs from Richard
Brandt, for example, whom I shall discuss later in this chapter. In fact,
it is the inappropriateness of calling an imprudent action irrational which
compels Parfit to label it immoral. It cannot -be termed irrational to be
unconcerned about someone else's welfare— including that of my future self.
Parfit says. But we still need some way of criticising that attitude, he
feels. Let us therefore call it immoral. Parfit concludes.
But why not just call it a gamble? It would seem more straightforward 
simply to say that the young smoker has made a bad bet if he turns out to 
die of lung cancer or heart disease, and a profitable gamble if he does
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not. If he "wins" his "bet", if he survives to his threescore and ten, 
would Parfit still want to term his decision unethical? The answer appears 
to be yes, and in this respect Parfit is actually taking a stringent 
Kantian position on moral luck.
What is wrong is not simply to kill another person, but to impose on 
him the risk of a racked, painful death. If the identity argument is 
granted, this seems a plausible position in Parfit*s example, but perhaps 
only because the risks imposed by smoking are high. Cigarette smoking is 
the main cause of premature death in the United States.^ But would it be 
equally wrong to impose on oneself or another the risk of dying from a very 
minor cause,of death? In chapter seven, on informed consent in medicine, I 
examine this question further. .....
In terms of Parfit*s argument, there is a paradox. If Parfit wants to 
maintain that even minuscule risks should not be imposed, he will have to 
abandon the ordinary distinction between prudent and imprudent risks, good 
and bad gambles. Yet the procedure seemed to be equating the imprudent and 
the immoral, that is, knocking down the barriers between the prudential and 
ethical realms. That would imply that the smaller the risk, that is, the 
less imprudent the decision, then the less ethically wrong would be the 
imposition of the risk. And yet what was wrong was not to kill another 
person, but to impose a risk of death. That would indicate that it does not 
matter how unlikely something actually is to kill.
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If it is imposing any risk which is morally wrong, the prudent will 
not be coterminous with the ethical. Smart's proposition will actually be 
reversed: however much we rely on cost-benefit reasoning in ordinary life, 
we will be forbidden to use it in moral decisions. That is, if an action 
carries with it a probability greater than zero of harm to one's future 
self or another person, it will be forbidden. Now in some cases this is 
clearly correct. Since I have a responsibility to provide for my dependent 
children,, I would be morally in the wrong if I failed to insure my life, 
whether or not I die before they grow up. It would be taking risks with 
their security which would be wrong, whatever the actual outcome. In this 
case the imprudent and the immoral would be coterminous. But the upshot of
Parfit' s position would seem to be more extensive than that. Even if a risk
is prudent, it would still be disallowed simply because it is a risk.^
This is itself carries a risk: broadening the realm of the unethical beyond 
that of the imprudent, to an obsessive and paralysing extent.
In contrast, Robert Nozick seems to suggest that there are indeed 
duties not to take risks with other people's futures— leaving out the 
question of Aether one's later self constitutes another person— but that 
they are limited by certain prior considerations.9 Even if Jane Doe knows
that she will be fully compensated for enduring the risk of having her arm
forcibly broken at some unspecified time during the next month, there is 
still something wrong in taking that kind of risk with her future. This has 
nothing to do with the level of the risk, but with the general legitimate 
interest in avoiding a nervous, fearful kind of society. But taking risks 
with other people's futures is not prohibited in blanket fashion. Doing so
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would itself create risk and insecurity, since no one would be immune from 
the operations of moral luck. As long as an agent was deemed to have set
the probability machine in motion, he or she could be punished for any
harmful consequences, no matter how low their probability.
Exactly what kinds of risks would Nozick forbid us to take with other 
people's futures? Nozick does also consider how great a probability of 
social consternation would trigger off a ban. What must be considered is 
the cumulative total of acts, each of which taken individually may only 
involve a low probability of harm. (This is relevant to nuclear deterrence, 
and comes up again in chapter eight.) There is a case for banning the 
totality of such acts, but the law does not generally deal with groups of 
acts or agents^9. To forbid each individual action, as a natural rights 
theory might, would also verge on a blanket prohibition on all risk-taking,
and would tell us nothing about how great a probability of harm is
necessary for rights to have been threatened. There is a sort of paradox of 
the heap here.
Each individual act's probability of causing harm falls below 
the threshold necessary for apprehension, but the combined totality 
of the acts may present a significant probability of harm. If 
different persons do each of the various acts in the totality, 
no one person is responsible for the resultant fear. Nor can 
any one person easily be held to cause a distinguishable part 
of the fear. One action alone would not cause fear at all due 
to the threshold, ^ d  one action less would probably not 
diminish the fear.^^
In the end, for such reasons, Nozick finds it difficult to apply
probabilistic, prudential calculation to ethical decisions. The calculus of
probability cannot itself reveal how great a probability of harm
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constitutes unjustifiable imposition of risk on others. Any cut-off point 
will appear arbitrary.
If Nozick is less willing to equate the prudential and the ethical 
than was Parfit, Richard Brandt goes further in the other direction, that 
of collapsing the prudent, the right, and the rational into a single 
category of value. Brandt begins by asking two questions;
1) What would a person (perhaps all persons), if rational in the sense 
of having made optimal use of all available information, want and 
choose to do?
2) What kind of moral system, if any, would such a person support 
for a society in which he expected to live?^^
The rational person would want and choose certain kinds of actions, and
these actions are later identified with prudence^^. The same rational
attitudes which create prudent choices are also the touchstone for the
ethical system. So it is clear that Brandt identifies the ethical,
prudential, and rational decision-making attitudes as one. It is therefore
incorrect to treat him as simply a theorist of prudence, if prudence is
merely conceived as an adjunct to normative moral theory, even if an
essential one.^^ For Brandt, the theory of priidence, recast as a model of
rational decision-making, is not a minor satellite of the ethical sun, but
a guiding light in itself. This becomes even more apparent when Brandt
asserts that all the traditional questions of ethics really represent
questions about rational attitudes and behaviour.
[The methodological section of the argument] will assign a clear 
and useful meaning to the term "rational", explain why the term in 
that sense will naturally be commendatory, and argue that the... 
traditional questions of moral philosophy can be satisfactorily 
rephrased as questions about what it is rational to want for itself, 
rational for a person to do from his own point of view, and about 
which forms of action would be permitted by a moral system for a
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society which it would be rational for a member of that society 
to support"^
Brandt presents his work as reacting against Rawls's modus operandi 
for ethical judgment, that is, to pretend that we know less than we 
actually do. Instead of imposing a veil of ignorance, Brandt advocates the 
application of cognitive psychotherapy and empirical psychology. This goes 
some way to getting round my initial objections to the argument that we can 
generalise from the application of prudential judgment. in everyday 
decisions to create a model for ethical choice. Brandt could accept that we 
do not in fact demonstrate perfect calibration in ordinary choices, but 
his normative model is a refined version of prudential judgment, purged 
through the application of empirical psychology to both the values we seek 
to maximise and the method by which we seek to maximise them.
To Brandt a prime, if not necessarily the prime, question is:
...how far actions, desires and moral systems can be criticised by 
appeal to facts and observations.. .That question everyone will want to 
answer, although the precise form of the question, and the answer 
which can be given, will depend on the state of knowledge at the time 
vdien it is asked...With this question in mind, I shall pre-empt the 
term "rational" to refer to actions, desires or moral systems^\diich 
survive maximal criticism and correction by facts and logic.
Now I very much doubt that in fact "everyone will want to answer" this
question as a matter of priority, and some theorists would not have wanted
to answer it at all. Plato would have thought it quite misguided, for
example, and Nietzsche would have found it distinctly boring. But having
registered a disclaimer about the first part of Brandt's assertion, I want
mainly to examine the ensuing second part, that "the answer which can be
given will depend on the state of knowledge at the time." I shall try to
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show that this is a variant of Smart's confidence in a technical fix which 
would finally place utilitarianism on an unshakeable foundation. This is of 
course an old concern: Sidgwick also thought that "a more scientific 
process" of assigning probabilities would strengthen utilitarianism. But 
Sidgwick thought that improvement would be limited by three factors: the 
extent to which we can make our past judgements consistent with each other, 
the barriers to our comprehension of others' past experience, and the 
limitations on how well we can assess vhat will make us happy in the
■ -| *7 ■ ■ :
future.^' Brandt s confidence seems greater: he does appear to believe that 
he can turn up rational value systems through his examination. Indeed, he 
remarks that his success in so doing has exceeded his own initial 
expectations.
Brandt offers three senses of the term "rational". An action is
rational to a first approximation if all relevantly available information 
is at the focus of the decision-maker's attention. The second variant is, 
roughly, the action vdiich the .agent would have chosen had he undergone 
cognitive psychotherapy whilst making the decision. Brandt's final 
definition of "rational" combines the first two: an action is rational if 
it is motivated by rational desires and aversions as per sense two, and if 
the conditions for the first approximation are met, in terms of
availability of information. This first definition is meant to be the 
easiest to satisfy, although I shall point out in chapter six on secrecy 
and moral luck that its implementation is very contentious. But if it is
not satisfied, the third and final criterion cannot be met. m a t  then does
Brandt have in mind by this first approximation?
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The example Brandt gives is that of an academic who picks the "wrong" 
university for his sabbatical: he "overlooks the (possible) fact"^9 that a 
second university which he had considered briefly actually, possessed 
materials crucial to his research. Brandt's phrase "overlooks the 
(possible) fact" is confusing, although perhaps it translates as "possible, 
for all he knew." Whatever "the (possible) fact" means, it does seem clear 
that this example is a matter of retrospective rather than future 
judgement, that it does not involve predicting the outcome of one's 
decision as Gauguin and Anna Karenina have to do. In this case we are 
dealing with hindsight: the decision is already taken, and the consequences 
have become apparent. In other words, there is no uncertainty here, and 
that in itself makes it an odd example. Decisions under risk— which are 
meant to be elucidated by prudential models— always involve uncertainty.^^
Now of course one can be in a state of uncertainty (through ignorance) 
about the past as well as about the future. Conversely, prediction can be 
of things gone by: Darwinian theories were confirmed by the "predictive" 
power which they gave to paleontologists, to unearth evidence of 
unsuspected, phrases of the past.^l However, none of this applies to 
Brandt's academic: he had the facts about both universities' libraries at 
his fingertips, but overlooked one set. Or perhaps it would be more correct 
to say that the relevant information on both universities was freely 
available to the academic, but that the facts about the second university 
were not at the focus of his attention because he chose to ignore them, 
having been seduced by the .first university's better climate or more 
attractive ambiance. This seems not to be cognitive uncertainty at all, but
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motivated bias, if anything, and perhaps a better illustration of 
irrationality under Brandt*s second definition of rationality than the 
first.
Let us return to the point about hindsight^ however. Recall that
Williams was open to criticisms about hindsight insofar as he argued in
"Moral Luck" that only success could have justified Gauguin*s decision. But
how could Gauguin have known in advance \diether he would succeed? Perhaps
generalising from .the example of the academic, in which hindsight is not a
problem, Brandt stakes a great deal on our being able to know the rational
or best action at the time we make our decisions. Moral luck is not a
quandary for him because he believes that we can control the outcome of our
choices at least minimally, through foresight. Nor is he disturbed by
Russell-style doubts about using actual consequences as the touchstone of
right action, a scepticism based on the vulnerability of actual outcomes to
external factors. Brandt appears willing to judge by actual rather than
possible consequences in many of his examples:
It is a fact that people are uncomfortable if a decision they make 
turns out to have distressing consequences, when they know it would 
have been avoided by fuller or more careful reflection. For instance, 
if one buys a car Wdich turns out to hold the road poorly and to 
consume large quantities of petrol, and if one knows one could have 
anticipated these facts by perusing an easily available copy of 
Consumer Reports, one is quite annoyed with oneself. Now a rational 
action is by definition one 3^ ich avoids all mistakes deriving 
from inadequate reflection.
Nor does this confidence in our ultimate ability to get it right through
the application of rational principles apply only to decisions
conventionally regarded as prudential. Nussbaum has pointed out the
complete absence of a tragic sense in Brandt's assertion elsevhere that "If
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a person is disappointed in love, it is possible to adopt a vigorous plan 
of action which carries a good chance of acquainting him with someone he 
likes at least as well."^^ But of course this is consistent with Brandt*s 
expansionist sort of rationalism, which claims for rational decision-making 
the power to handle all the traditional questions of moral philosophy. 
There are no insoluble dilemmas, no true conflicts of duties, no source of 
tragedy, on this view.
Still, at the very least Brandt should tanper his confidence with the 
realisation that statistical independence means Consumer Reports * general 
advice is at best correct only in the long run. It. cannot describe the 
particular car I am considering: only the class of all cars of that model 
and perhaps year. It gives a typical mileage figure for this statistical 
aggregate, derived, if done properly, by testing a statistically valid 
number of vehicles chosen at random. Even assuming that these procedures 
are followed to the letter, the report will only be correct in the long 
run. Nothing stops it being right in the long run if the particular car I 
have the misfortune to buy turns out to be the odd **lemon**. But Brandt 
defined a rational action not as one which took Consumer Reports into 
account, but as one \diich avoids all mistakes deriving from inadequate 
reflection. Adequate reflection would have taken statistical independence 
i^nto account. Brandt also said that the distressing consequences would 
actually have been avoided by fuller reflection. But the fuller reflection 
\diich encompasses the concept of statistical independence does not actually 
guarantee that I will not wind up with a lemon: it merely warns me that
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this remains a possibility despite my having made the decision in the best 
possible way.
There is an element of the technical fix here. Brandt asserts that "It 
will hardly be questioned that one's choices should be affected by right 
estimates of the probability of certain outcomes.Sometimes, however, 
even indubitably correct probabilities must actually be ignored in order to 
get the ethically correct decision. This was so in Nesson's example of the 
twenty-five prisoners, discussed in the previous chapter. ; I do not intend 
to repeat those arguments here, merely to point out that Brandt seems to be 
unaware of them.
Indeed, Brandt relies heavily on probability in what he calls the
"law" of action-tendency:
If an individual expects, to a degree E, that a consequence 
of an action A by him now will bring about an outcome 0, then, 
if 0 has a positive valence for him, his tendency (T) to perform 
A(Ta) will have the magnitude of the product E times V.
If 0 has a negative valence V, the tendency (T) not to do 
A(Ta)«i^ 11 have the magnitude E times the absolute value 
of
Now this "law" is actually one of several optional strategies in decision 
theory, usually called expected-value or expectation strategy. It has no 
status as an empirical law of human behaviour: it is a normative principle 
for rational choice, and not one which is appropriate in all instances. For 
example, if probabilities are unknown, or if they are cancelled out by 
infinitely high or low utilities^ as in Pascal's wager, another strategy is 
often thought appropriate: maximin, in which probabilities are deliberately 
ignored and the "least worst" option chosen. I argue in the the chapters on
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nuclear deterrence and on allocation of scarce medical goods .that maximin 
is indeed more appropriate in both these cases. Rawls also asserts that it 
would be used by those in the original position to rule ,out a society in 
which slavery would be sanctioned, for example. He has been criticised for 
this claim by those who argue that expectation strategy would be more 
appopriate, but even Rawls's critics would hardly term expectation strategy
nr
a universal law. Y e t  another possible decision strategy is the principle 
of maximising conditional expected utility, which advises the agent to 
perform that act which makes the most desirable outcomes the most 
probableanother is Richards's lottery principle, discussed later in 
this chapter.
It seems that Brandt is trying to use his version of rationality, 
embodied in expectation strategy, as both a normative principle and a 
descriptive law. Indeed, he presents this as a strength:
"Rational," in my sense, would be both a descriptive tenn and a 
recommending term. In the latter respect it would then be like "ought" 
and "good" and "best" reasons...although these are unlike "rational" 
in my usage in not having any definite descriptive meaning.^®
This is fraught with danger for a scientistic project like Brandt's, as
Nigel Howard has pointed out in another context:
We wish "rational behaviour" to be simultaneously the way people 
do behave, the way that logically they must behave, and finally the 
way they should tehave. But these are extraordinary demands, not 
fulfilled by any other s c i e n c e . ,
Yet Brandt also appears not to believe that his "law" is fully statistical
in its probability operations. He is not happy to sum probabilities in
order to get the total likelihood if several different outcomes are
involved, and he refuses to commit himself consi^stently to cardinal
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measurement. At one point he doubts whether we can have a quantitative
formulation of probabilities at all^^— the formulation on which expectation
strategy relies. This seems to be a case of wanting to have it both ways,
to enjoy the certainty of a scientific law without the bother of its
rigour. As Howard puts it, with attractive cynicism:
Very often, when a quantitative model is built, the social 
scientist [or philosopher] will wave his hands and say, "The 
actual numbers used in this model do not matter. One has to apply 
this result in a general, qualitative kind of way." Surely this is 
inadmissible.
To recapitulate, then; there is no gap in Brandt between the
procedure for making more efficient prudential decisions -and that for
making right moral choices.
So we. think of individuals first undergoing cognitive 
psychotherapy with respect to the desires and aversions possibly 
relevant to the present question, to make these rational; and then, 
with the rectified desires and aversions, we think of them acting 
to select or support a moral system on the basis of an ideally 
vivid representation of all relevant available information. The 
person making the decision...will be disabused of "unauthentic" 
desires, and desires based on false beliefs or on childhood 
deprivations or on improper generalization of experiences; he will 
not overlook outcomes or wrongly estimate their probability, and 
he will weight them in an undistorted holistic way, and so on.
Neither is there any tension between our being held responsible for
outcomes, over which we have imperfect control, and the simultaneous
requirement that we should not be held responsible for matters beyond our
influence. That is, there is no problem of moral luck. This has been
achieved at the cost of assumptions I find untenable, particularly whether
we typically know as much as Brandt thinks* we do, and xdiether, even if we
could control outcomes in prudential matters minimally by forecasting them
correctly, we might still face incommensurabilities of moral value in
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ethical decisions. In other words, I doubt that this is a resolution of the 
moral luck paradox, since the concept of moral luck would be quite foreign 
to Brandt; it is an indirect assertion that the paradox does not exist.
I want to end with David Richards's more limited model of human 
rationality, xdiich may be. more acceptable than Brandt's excessively grand 
one. Like Brandt, Richards is concerned to explore the principles of 
rational decision-making; unlike Brandt, he confines those principles to 
prudential decisions. That is, he represents a third alternative to Parfit 
and Brandt. In Parfit, an imprudent decision is immoral, although it may be 
be impossible to label it irrational. In Brandt, an irrational decision is 
both imprudent and immoral. Richards, more conventionally perhaps, terms 
irrational decisions imprudent but not necessarily unethical.
The actual principles of rational choice employed by Richards differ 
from Brandt's in at least two ways. First, they do not always yield a 
solution— or if they do, it is likely to be a "satisficing" rather than a 
"maximising" function. "Satisficing" means settling for less than maximum
utility, roughly speaking, for a "good enough" rather than an ideal 
solution. Second, even if they could be made to yield a definite answer, we 
should not always let them do so. This would be a form of technological 
determinism, the belief that because we can do something we ought to do it. 
But as Tom Stoppard says in The Dog it was that Died, "something can't be 
right because it's inevitable". To maintain otherwise is a form of the 
naturalistic fallacy.
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Before invoking the decision procedures for rational choice— and for
Richards, there may be more than one procedure, yhereas Brandt accepted
only one principle and elevated it to the status of a law— we must decide
whether this is a matter of ethical or prudential interest. Now Richards
may seem simply to be asserting rather than proving the distinction between
the rational/prudential and the ethical here. He is aware of this danger:
At every point of my account, the primacy of the principles 
of morality to the principles of rationality was emphasised; the 
characterisation of these principles is, clearly, a theoretical 
requirement on the adequacy of my account of rationality, for the 
principles of morality «importantly determine when the principles of 
rational choice apply.
That this distinction is, however, something more than mere intuition was
shown by our reaction to Nesson's prisoners example. The rational choice
appears to be convicting twenty-four prisoners, chosen at random. If we do
that, we avoid the paradox of maintaining that the probability of each
prisoner's guilt was 1.00— if we convict all twenty-five— or 0.00— if we
convict none— though we are certain that the likelihood is .96. Yet the
rational procedure is even more deeply repellent, for reasons which I
discuss in chapter three, than convicting all twenty-five men in the
certain knowledge that one of them is innocent. What appears the "moral"
choice, or at least the one which coincides with the Anglo-American
presumption of innocence and the demands of treating each case as
individual, is to convict none of the men. Yet this is profoundly
unreasonable, in light of the facts— about which there is no argument.
Just as the relation between the moral and rational principles is 
hierarchical in Richards, so there is an ordering to the rational 
principles themselves, one which emphasises the importance of probability
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judgments. The first dictum which the agent should invoke is. the lottery
principle. The simplest example of this is a choice between lottery tickets
offering different sets of probabilities for objects of value. The rational
agent will a) prefer the lottery ticket which gives the higher
probabilities of winning; b) where probabilities are exclusive, prefer the
ticket which gives the higher probability of w/inning a more valuable prize;
and c) where probabilities are equal, prefer the ticket which yields the
more valuable objects. Generalising from this example, Richards enunciates
the lottery principle as the first element of a strategy for advancing
self-regarding ends, which he equates wzith the donain of practical reason
although not with that of ethical choice.
Given a plan of action which achieves x, the object of a desire, 
w/ith pro^bility p (Q^p^l), and y, the object of another desire, with 
probability p (where p <l-p), and another plan which achieves x with 
probability and y with probability p^^ (xhere pjL^ <l-pj^ ), then that 
plan is to be chosen in which the probability of securing x is greater
than or equal to the probability in the other plan and the
probability of securing y is similarly greater than or equal to that 
of the other plan, except where p=p^ and p =Pi > ^ e n  the plans 
are to be indifferently chosen. Where plans of action secure the same 
ends (e.g. x and y, as above), and p-1-p^ and p^  -1-pj^
(i.e. the probabilities being exclusive), then that plan is to be 
chosen which gives a higher probability to the more preferred 
alternative. And if there are the same probabilities in two plans of 
action, which secure entirely different ends, that plan is to be
chosen which secures ends, at least one of xhich is preferred (the
others being indifferently preferred) to one of those secured by the 
other plan, all ceteris paribus.^^
If the lottery principle does not yield an answer, the decision procedure
then directs the agent's attention to the followTing other principles, in
order:
1) Dominance: given several plans of action, choose the
plan which secures all the desired ends of the other plans, and more.
2) Effective means: given a desired end, chooose the action 
which most effectively and at least cost attains that end.
3) Postponement: if it is unclear at the time of choice what
the desired ends wd.ll be or how they will best be secured, put off 
making a choice among the plans of action which secure the desired
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end. .
4) Satisficing; if the other principles do not apply, choose 
that plan which, after a dispassionate, well-informed weighing of 
probabilities_and preference intensities, will best secure one's 
desired ends.*^ '
Richards's procedures for rational choice appear more complete than 
Brandt's, more sophisticated in their treatment of probability, and clearer 
in their hierarchical ordering and applicability. Why does he make lesser 
claims for them than Brandt does for his principles of rationality?
Richards chooses to limit his principles to prudential decisions 
because the calculations become infinitely more complicated in moral 
choices. There, he says, we typically have to take into account our 
responsibilities to others, whereas prudential cases are usually concerned 
mainly with our owm desires. This is no hard and fast rule, admittedly, but 
the second proposition is at least true of Brandt's two prudential cases. 
The examples of the professor choosing a sabbatical location and the driver 
choosing a new car do not incorporate the needs of others. How can Brandt 
simply generalise from them to moral choices? And in particular-, what help 
would they be in medical ethics and political decisions?— areas in which 
responsibility to patients and accountability to democracies' populations 
are crucial.
Granted, Brandt also builds in cognitive psychotherapy, but his 
purpose there is simply to rid the decision-maker of "unauthentic" desires, 
wishes "based on false beliefs" or on "improper generalisation of 
experience." This "generalisation of experience" is not the Kantian 
requirement of universalisability which leads to the Categorical Imperative
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and to respect for others. Nor is a desire to advance one's own interests, 
first and foremost, necessarily "unauthentic." The agent vho has undergone 
cognitive psychotherapy "will not overlook outcomes", but there is no 
mention of whether or not he will overlook the claims of others. Brandt 
does not view failure to consider the wishes of others as an ailment to be 
cured by cognitive therapy, and indeed it is dubious that, he could. As 
Parfit points out, it is not irrational to be self-centred.
Here Parfit would agree with Richards by implication; it may not be 
irrational to ignore the claims of others, but it cannot be ethical. 
(Therefore, to Parfit at least, if one's future self is conceived as an 
other, it is unethical though not irrational to impose risks on oneself in 
old age.) But actually this is a rather Kantian way of looking at things. 
By contrast, utilitarianism, according to Richards, "commits the profound 
conceptual error of assimilating moral principle to individual rational 
choice. It supposes that what is legitimate in the case of rational choice, 
namely, to satisfy, certain desires less in order to satisfy certain desires 
more, or to refuse to satisfy certain desires because of wishing to satisfy 
other desires later, is legitimate in the case of the moral choice of 
satisfying the desires of different persons.
Richards does not propose a complete split between the ethical and 
the prudential realms ; nor does he deny that some aspects of prudential 
reasoning may be instructive in.ethical choices. Using a proto-Rawlsian 
device which he terms "moral amnesia" in preference to Rawls's "veil of 
ignorance", Richards asks what ethical standards would be accepted by
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perfectly rational egoistic people, from a position of equal liberty, in 
uncertainty about their own desires, nature and circumstances. Very 
roughly, Richards can be understood as claiming that practical rationality, 
which he equates with prudence, is necessary for ethical choice, but 
insufficient to determine it. Other background conditions must also be 
specified. Nor is the project of making deliberation fully rational 
sufficient to motivate the ethical agent, as Brandt seans to think. Indeed, 
E.J. Bond has suggested that there is a paradox about rationality and 
motivation.
If practical rationality and morality are a matter of reason or 
cognition, which are objective and universal, they must lack the power 
to motivate, since that power depends upon the presence of the 
relevant contingent desires. If, on the other hand, practical 
(including moral) reasoning is confined within the limits of the 
agent's contingent desires, there can be no universal or objective 
reasons for action.
To posit a complete split between the ethical and the 
rational/prudential (to collapse these two together) seems untenable; but 
to equate them, as Brandt does, seans jejune. Furthermore, it is 
inadvisable from the point of view of moral luck. If we want to retain a 
notion of moral agency, we must limit what agents are responsible for as 
moral agents. It therefore seems undesirable to expand what counts as 
immoral to include crimes against one's future self, as Parfit does. But 
there is some link between the ethical and the rational: it is certainly 
true that irrational people are not expected to bear full moral 
responsibility for their decisions. This point will surface again in 
chapter seven, on informed consent in medicine. But the relationship is not
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two-way: we do not simply say that evil people are irrational. Indeed, 
conventionally they are presented as cunning.
I have reached the end of the theoretical section of my dissertation. 
The dilama of moral luck has been identified as arising from the 
incompatible requirements that we be held responsible for our actions and 
character partly according to the effects which they produce, and that no 
concept of responsible agency should hold people responsible for that which 
they cannot control. I have identified the problem -as arising through 
asking Kantian questions, but have also suggested that Kant proposes some 
solutions rather than simply hoping the problem m i l  go axvay. Tiiese escape 
routes are biiilt around the notion of limiting what we are responsible for, 
as, for example, by exempting acts done under compulsion or by defining 
xdiat counts as ethical more narrowly than is done by those theorists who 
equate rationality and/or prudence and ethics. But I have also suggested 
that consequentialism cannot ignore the problem of moral luck either.
In fact what I have been doing is to depict moral • luck not as a 
Kantian hobby-horse, but as a dilemma which cuts across the boundaries of 
ethical schools, a general problem. Before Teaving the theoretical section 
of the dissertation, I want to point out the parallel with what Thomas 
Nagel identifies in The View from Nowhere as the single problem which 
underlies philosophy of mind and ethics, what he calls the "problem of 
excess objectivity".^^ Nagel’s concern is how to reconcile being in the 
xforld and being a person. "[H]ow to combine the perspective of a particular 
person inside this world with an objective viexv of that same xvorld, the
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person and his viewpoint included...is the most fundamental issue about 
morality, knowledge, freedom, the self, and the relation of mind to the 
physical xmrld."^^ This is very close to the tension betxfeen being 
responsible for our actions* often unknowable and generally largely 
uncontrollable consequences, and being responsible at all, being moral 
agents in any meaningful sense.
Nagel attributes "excess objectivity" to impersonal theories such as 
consequentialism, xvhich he describes as "holding that we should try so far 
as possible to transform ourselves into instruments for the pursuit of the 
general gopd, objectively conceived (though our own interests play their 
part along with everyone elsè’s in defining that good)."^^ But he also 
reserves some ammunition for Kantianism, which he accuses of trying to 
ignore perplexities about objectivity and subjectivity. Now I noted before, 
in relation to Nussbaum and moral luck, that simply because Kant proposes a 
solution does not mean that he ignores the problem. And there is a risk of 
excess romanticism in holding with Nagel that "Certain forms of 
perplexity...embody more insight than any of the supposed solutions to 
those p roble m s . T h i s  is a particular dilemma, in practical ethics, 
although on a personal note, I have,found when, teaching medical ethics to 
nurses that health professionals do not expect philosophy to give them 
answers: merely to teach them to ask the right questions.
In this later work Nagel's scepticism is less extensive than 
Williams * s in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, just as in the original 
moral luck debate; but it is nonetheless substantial, particularly where
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the concept of agent-responsibility is concerned. I have hoped to retain a 
sense of responsible agency by limiting what agents are responsible for, 
and in the practical ethics chapters, I shall continue to follow this line,
which seems suitably pragmatic. But I do want to say something on the
subject of Nagel's doubts about the concept of moral responsibility, and 
how he thinks we might leam to live with them, to retain a notion of 
agency, although a much revised one.
Nagel thinks the problem of moral responsibility is unsolved, and 
possibly insoluble. He begins by setting up a dichotomy very similar to the 
one about moral luck, though couched in terms of objectivity and 
subjectivity:
Once people are seen as parts of the world, determined or not, 
there seems no way to assign responsibility to them for what they do. 
Everything about them, including finally their actions themselves, 
seems to blend in with the surroundings over which they have no 
control. And when we then go back to consider actions from the
internal point of view, we cannot on close scrutiny make sense
of the idea that what people do depends ultimately on them. Yet we 
continue to compare what they do wdth the alternatives they reject, 
and to praise or condemn them for it.
What Nagel terms "the radically external standpoint that produces the
philosophical problem of responsibility"^^ seems to erase agency
altogether. This criticism was first raised in relation to extreme
consequentialism, but Nagel also means it to apply to Kant. However,
reading Kant in terms of freedom rather than only responsibility gives a
result xhich Nagel should find more conducive. Nagel asserts that "To be
really free we would have to act from a standpoint completely outside
purselves, choosing everything about ourselves, including all our
principles of choice— creating ourselves from nothing^ so to speak.''^ But
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something very much like » this is going on with the determination of the 
will directly by the Categorical Imperative. Indeed, later Nagel identifies 
himself as agreeing with Kant's view that ethics and freedom are linked*^ .^
Furthermore, although Nagel says the problem of responsibility has no 
solution, he does think that we can live with it, and that we can confer a 
kind of freedom on ourselves. This * can be done through "a kind of 
reconciliation between the objective standpoint and the inner perspective 
of agency which reduces the radical detachment produced by initial 
contemplation of ourselves as creatures in the w o r l d . T h e  maxim which 
Nagel produces is this: "Since we can' t act in light of everything about 
ourselves, the best we can do is to try to live in a way that wouldn't have 
to be revised in light of anything more that could be known about us."^^ 
This has something to do with avoiding remorse but being able to express 
regret. It does not mean "never having to say I'm sorry", but perhaps being 
able to say simultaneously "I'm sorry about how things actually turned out" 
and "ich konnte nichts anders," to paraphrase Luther. Specifically, in 
relation to the moral luck argument, it is a refusal to say with Williams 
that we can manage nothing better than judgements from hindsight; which 
cannot be ethical judgements at all.
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Chapter Five
Moral Luck and the Allocation of Scarce Medical Goods
Does moral luck apply to the allocation of dialysis machines? To 
the provision of scarce beds in an intensive care unit for children 
with heart conditions? To organ transplants? I want to show that it 
does; but conversely, I think that we can apply findings from this 
area back to the general paradox. That is, there is a two-way 
relationship between practical and theoretical ethics here.
Ethics has generally been willing to treat questions about the 
allocation of scarce medical resources as part of its province 
insofar as they constitute questions of distributive justice.^ 
Alternatively, the debate here might seem to relate to general 
questions about how to make the best decision under conditions of 
uncertainty. In either case, questions about medical resource 
allocation might appear to have no specific relevance to moral luck, 
and this thesis would appear to divide into two separate sections: 
the first on moral luck, the second on decision-making under 
uncertainty, as illustrated in some spheres of medical ethics and 
practical politics. Further, decision-making under uncertainty might 
might not even be an ethical matter, according to what boundary line 
is set up between rational consideration, prudent action, and moral 
behaviour— as discussed in chapter four. (One possible corollary of 
this second perspective is that allocating the kidney to the patient
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with the highest probability of cure can be presented as a value-free 
decision. Some philosophers and health care professionals have taken 
this line, though I think fewer accept it these days. I certainly do 
not, and the reasons why not will become clear as the argument 
progresses, I hope.)
Of course it is important to consider decision-making under 
uncertainty and morally optimal outcomes, ^ d  if I can contribute any 
, principles of choice I will reckon I have achieved something 
important. But this is not all I want to do. These practical chapters 
still retain the focus on responsibility and agency which 
characterised the theoretical half of the dissertation. It is 
crucial to remember who the agent is in cases of scarce resource 
allocation, however, or confusion may ensue. The patient is not the 
agent, and if ill-luck strikes her, if she does not get the kidney or 
the operation, that really is just ill-luck, no matter how serious 
the outcome. It is not moral ill-luck. The agent is the health care 
professional, and the moral luck questions which the professional 
faces are those about whether the agent's responsibility is to get 
the optimal distribution in light of available resources or to make 
the decision in a manner which maximises patient autonomy and 
demonstrates respect for persons; and xdiether the professional's duty 
is to the individual patient or to a class of sufferers. Broadly, I 
want to ask idiether Nagel's maxim, vdiich I identified in the previous 
chapter as related to the moral luck paradox, can be put into 
practice in making choices about scarce resource allocation in health 
care. Is it possible.for the health care professional to act in a way
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that would not have to be revised in the light of outcomes? And what 
if both choices available to the professional are evil? It is no 
coincidence that decisions about the allocation of operations and 
organs have been labelled "tragic choices."^
In the discussion of moral luck and scarce resource allocation 
which follows, I shall need to consider two other subsidiary 
questions. First, let me return to the matter of whether cases about 
scarce resource allocation are prudential or ethical matters, or 
perhaps both. Now there is something very strange about depicting 
choices which may result in life for one and death for another as 
merely prudential. Perhaps we ought to say that decisions which we 
must get right this time are ethical; those which we are content to 
get right in the statistical aggregate may count as prudential. It 
would appear obvious that life-and-death decisions have to come out 
right this time. This would be consistent with the impetus in the 
twenty-five prisoners-example, in which it was not good enough to get 
an overall figure of twenty-four convictions and one acquittal by any 
means. Each man was being tried on his own, and each deserved to have 
his case kept separate from any considerations about the a^regate, 
if we wanted to maintain basic legal principles. We had to get each 
trial right; in each prisoner's case, we had to get it right this 
time, r
But is this so? To begin with, what made it wrong to breach the 
ethical/legal principle of prior innocence in the Nesson case was not 
that this was a life-and-death example. It would still have been
Moral Luck in Medical Ethics and Practical Politics Page 118
Scarce Medical Goods/Chapter 5
wrong even if the .death penalty were not in operation. And in fact it 
was not initially obvious what "getting it right" could mean in that 
case. The criterion in the Nesson example was not getting the 
mathematical conundrum right in each case, or even for the aggregate, 
but maintaining the principle of prior innocence. We were unable to 
"get it right" in mathematical terms: the only solution appeared to 
be acquitting all twenty-five prisoners, even though we knew that 
twenty-four were guilty. So "getting it right" this time may mean 
respecting personal autonomy or some other ethical criterion which 
occupies a similar rank to the principle of innocent until proven 
guilty. It may entail making the decision in a particular way, not 
necessarily getting the optimal outcome. But, as in the Nesson 
example, there remains a tension here between individual and group: 
these life-and-death decisions about resource allocation are made for 
classes of patients æid for the individual patient to whom the 
medical professional owes a duty of care. And the agents in organ 
and dialysis allocation make decisions which are affected by the luck 
of the draw— so that prognoses made about statistical aggregates may 
not be true in this particular case.
Second, vÆiat .will be the appropriate reaction for the health 
care professional who "gets it wrong"? That will require some 
consideration of remorse, regret, and Williams's additional concept, 
"agent-regret"é This is actually linked to the question of whether 
questions of scarce medical resource allocation are prudential or 
ethical. We seem to want agents in decisions about allocation of 
scarce medical goods to be able to feel remorse, which does not apply
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in-prudential decisions which go wrong. There— in finding that my new 
car has turned out to be a lemon even though I followed "rational" 
decision procedures such as reading Consumer Reports— I may well feel 
regretfully that "I could kick myself," but I would hardly expect to 
feel guilty or remorseful. But I might expect remorse from a health 
professional vdio "wasted" a kidney on a patient who belied her good 
prognosis and conformity to the professional's predictive model by 
promptly dying. Guilt would again be too strong a feeling to demand: 
but somehow the health professional should feel differently, and more 
deeply, about the kidney case than I would about the car.
Would it help to introduce a third concept here, that of "agent- 
regret"? Williams connects this sentiment to failure not only of the 
- agent's "project" but, more fundamentally, to his or her own failure. 
It is felt specifically about the agent's past actions, rather than 
about external states which have gone wrong. That is, the agent is 
not divorcing herself from the success of failure of her project: its 
success may or may not be hers; but the actions which she took to set 
it in train certainly are. As far as Gauguin is concerned, says 
Williams, "what would prove him wrong in his project would not just 
be that it failed, but that he failed."^ Gauguin's self-respect is 
so intimately bound up in his art that the miscarriage of his 
artistic ambitions would have meant not only that his decision to 
abandon his commitments in Paris for Tahiti was wrong, but also that 
he himself was evil, to put the argument in a deliberately forceful 
fashion. I do not now want to discuss the difficult points about 
hindsight xdiich I have treated elsexdiere. The only point which I want
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to resurrect here is the tightness of the link between Gauguin’s 
sense of his own agency and worth, and his profession.
Clearly there is a parallel with health professionals here. 
"Getting it wrong"— and I do not yet want to spell out what "getting 
it wrong" means in the case of kidney transplants— is .more than just 
"project" failure to the health professional. The duty of care which 
the doctor or nurse owes to each individual patient forbids the agent 
in this case to write off a "failure" in such comforting terms as 
"better luck next time." This is the source of remorse: the 
combination of a lowered sense of one’s professional self-esteem and 
failure to provide the best standard of care.^
But there is also a difference, and one which makes agent-regret 
less useful in medical ethics than Williams finds it in the Gauguin 
example. The medical professional owes a duty of care to the patient; 
it is hard to see how Gauguin owes a "duty to his art" except as a
cliche. This makes it less useful to separate the outcomes for the
patient of the health professional’s actions from the actions
themselves. What affects the patient is the outcome, not the 
intention or the action of the professional. So agent-regret, whilst 
perhaps a useful concept in other spheres, does not do justice to the 
relationship between health professional and patient.
Yet a health professional can hardly be expected to drag herself 
through agonies of remorse each time the s tatis tically inevitable 
occurs, when the one patient in one hundred dies under a course of
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; treatment which has a probability of cure equalling 0.99. Nor would 
we expect the doctor to forgo that course of treatment for future 
patients. Indeed, if 0.99 is the best rate of success available from 
alternative treatments, a consequentialist, at least, would claim the 
medical professional was at fault if he did not prescribe that 
course. ’
Perhaps in such cases all we can ask the medical professional
to feel, after all, is ordinary regret? As Williams notes.
Regret necessarily involves a wish that things had been 
otherwise, for instance that one had not had to act as one did. 
But it does not necessarily involve the_wish, all things taken 
together, that one had acted otherwise.^
This is in fact surprisingly close to Nagel’s maxim, that the best we
can hope for is to arrive at decisions which would not have to be
revised in light of our subsequent knowledge of how things turned
out. Furthermore, Williams says.
While [the agent’s] justification is in some ways a matter of 
luck, it is not equally a matter of all kinds of luck. It 
matters how intrinsic the cause of failure is to the project 
itself
It also matters how intrinsic the duty to ’’get it right this time’’ is 
to one’s professional worth. Thus health care administrators and 
political decision-makers may not be bound by as strict a duty of 
care as medical professionals, although we would still want to say 
that they should feel regret over callous decisions or cases of 
corruption and bribery.
What other kinds of regret administrators and politicians should 
feel about health is beyond the scope of this chapter, although some
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related issues about public versus private morality are treated in my 
chapters on secrecy and deterrence. The compelling cases are.those of 
mixed feelings— standing by a "rational" decision which happened to 
turn out badly, or ruing a lucky but ill-made one. These cases abound 
in the area of scarce medical resources, made more compelling still 
by the existence of others who might be said to have a grievance— the 
patient who does not get the "wasted" kidney, the relatives of the 
patient who did get the kidney but died after "false" hopes had been 
raised, the old women in need of hip replacements vdio must wait years 
for a safe and cheap operation when medical resources are diverted to 
headline-grabbing transplants with a low rate of success. Indeed, it 
is the claims of others which can be argued to make this a moral 
rather than a merely prudential area.
It may help to make health professionals’ duties less all- 
encompassing if we make a distinction between deciding how much of a 
scarce health resource will be produced and deciding how it will be 
allocated.^ We might want to claim that nature decides how many 
kidneys will be available, that nature also decides the prevalence of 
kidney failure, and that health professionals’ responsibilities are 
second-order. Medical personnel do not set the probability machine 
rolling, after all, and to the extent that it rolls of its own 
accord, "deciding how much of a scarce health resource will be 
produced" misrepresents the kidney case. Of course this assumes a 
distinction between positive and negative responsibility which is 
open to debate: Helga Kiihse, for example, denies that letting die is 
different from killing, as does John Harris.^ In addition, deciding
Moral Luck in M e d i c a l  Ethics and Practical Politics Page 123
Scarce Medical Goods/Chapter 5
how much of a health "good" will be produced can be a human function- 
-the province of health ministers arid the powerful medical interests 
whom they may consult— when treatments other than organ transplants 
are under consideration. Even in the case of transplants, human 
agency affects how many kidneys are available, since donors decide 
that— sometimes under the influence of other persons* actions. The 
carrying of kidney donor cards dropped dramatically after a 
television Panorama report alleging that organs were being taken from 
donors before brain stem death.
"To return to the first subsidiary query: can the allocation of 
scarce health goods be made in a purely prudential manner? To come 
back to the second: can this be done so aS to occasion no remorse in 
the health care professional? Why not decide on purely medical 
grounds, for example? Some doctors, particularly in Britain, still 
maintain that this is perfectly feasible, and if that were true, 
moral luck would not enter into it. But what constitutes the most 
medically correct choice is itself ambivalent. The-most "savable" in 
terms of prognosis is unlikely to be the neediest or "illest" in 
terms of diagnosis. Nor could moral controversy be eliminated by the 
adoption of efficiency criteria in, say, a policy of triage, even 
among medical personnel— let alone between the health care 
professions and the general public. Indeed, the classic example of 
triage embodied conflict over ethics within the medical profession: 
between the medical officer in charge of the US North African forces 
in the Second World War and à consultant surgeon over whether scarce 
penicillin should be given to venereal disease sufferers rather than
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to men wounded in battle— on the efficiency grounds that the VD 
sufferers could be more quickly returned to active service. Medical 
advisability is not a straightforward criterion on which agreement is 
possible, nor one which can eliminate tragedy and chance.
This general point can be made more specific with reference to 
the British model of allocation as described by Galabresi and 
Bobbitt.^ This clinical judgement model interprets the Aristotelian 
dictum on justice by treating as likes those potential recipients 
"who are equal with respect to exterior, observable, therapy-related 
criteria."
The criteria are applied unswervingly and damn the implications 
for general equality. Thus hemodialysis is allocated so as to 
achieve the highest.rate of success, given a limited number of 
kidneys available.
Now it is open to question whether the efficiency approach is self-
defeating or self-contradicting even in its own terms. If there is a
policy of not even considering those over a certain age as potential
recipients, for example, how can we know what the success rate would
be if they were treated? Is the highest level of possible efficiency
actually being achieved? And how can we know idiether this particular
means of allocation meets the rational requirements of successful
prudential thinking, in Brandt's terms? We can be even more sceptical
about whether it fulfills ethical criteria, and still more so about
whether it can avoid being judged on whether or not it is ethical.
This is clear at the most basic level from the outraged condemnation
of the English system as profoundly unethical which Galabresi and
Bobbitt found in Italian doctors idiom they interviewed. In these
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doctors* view, it is a sort of bad faith to claim that a purely 
clinical approach can avoid the operations of moral luck.
. The Italian method of kidney allocation, as described by 
Galabresi and Bobbitt, confronts the need to take an ethical stance 
in dealing with scarce medical resources. The moral creed which it 
seeks to reflect is absolute egalitarianism, and favourable 
prognosis is abandoned as a criterion. This leads to what many would 
regard as a result idiich allows the vagaries of chance full play: 
under the Italian first-come-first-served system, a ninety-year-old 
patient with terminal cancer gets the kidney if he comes before the 
thirty-year-old with no other clinical symptoms. Surely this counts 
as failure and occasions regret, or even remorse?
Not if clinical merit is itself regarded as conferred by chance, 
the answer runs. Patients do not choose to suffer from terminal 
illness. **Why, after all, should their shorter lives be measured 
against lives that would have been longer from no merit of their 
own?**^  ^What the Italian model does is to confront luck head-on and 
to draw its fire by incorporating it. (The reasoning parallels 
Rawls *s treatment of intelligence— normally considered as a personal 
merit— as the gift of the Fates.) That the possibility of failure— in 
terms of inefficient use of resources— has been taken into account is 
clear from interviews with doctors who reiterate their loyalty to the 
"principle of humane non-interference even if, as a result, lives 
were lost.**^  ^There can be regrets in that case, and a certain amount 
of hedging: the doctors normally reserve one or two emergency
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dialysis machines for the hard cases. Beyond this mild hypocrisy, 
however, the Italian model is considerably more honest than the 
British, vMch fails to confront the medically inescapable fact that 
members of the middle class have a better prognosis of recovery, 
since they are educated enough to understand the importance of the 
necessary diet and affluent enough to afford i t . T h u s  ethical 
issues of justice and fairness, once again, creep into supposedly 
clinical judgments.
Nevertheless even Italian egalitarianism does not produce 
complete fairness— not even on its own terms; If "first come first 
served" operates as a kind bf lottery at an individual dialysis 
centre, it does not do,so for the country as a whole. On a per capita 
basis, there is a sizeable distinction between dialysis places 
available in the industrially developed north and in the poorer 
south.And of course firs t-come-firs t-served may not even be fully 
random at an individual centre: perhaps middle-class people will be 
more assertive or more aware of the centre's existence, and thus more 
: likely to turn up for treatment.
But it seems fair to ask, as Williams might, whether such ill- 
chance is external to the doctors ' own project of treating all those 
who come to them on a basis of strict equality. It may constitute 
project failure or perhaps even personal failure:for national health 
administrators or politicians, but not personal failure for an 
individual doctor, whose duty of care is to the individual patients 
or potential patients who come before him. Such questions of public
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policy are beyond the scope of this chapter, although I recognise 
that this omission leaves open important questions of bias towards 
wealthy regions, high-tech acute care, and predominantly middle-aged 
male diseases such as coronary conditions. But these questions are 
: not so amenable to consideration in terms of moral luck. As a matter
of individual agents* responsibility, I do not see how the failure to 
achieve countrywide fairness,can occasion remorse in the individual 
physician. .
The key paradox here is that only by openly recognising the 
operations of chance can one avoid vulnerability to moral luck. The 
second-order decision to randomise treatment, either through a 
. lottery or, slightly less thoroughly, through a policy of first-come- 
first-served, remains a matter of ethics, not prudence, and is 
presented proudly as such by the Italian doctors. But I shall delve 
into public policy just deep enough to point out at the first-order 
level of deciding how much of a given health good is to be produced, 
lotteries may be counter-productive. As Galabresi and Bobbitt note, 
"lotteries tend to attract attention.We do not care to be 
reminded that luck is so endemic to the human condition that our 
lives may depend on it. If it becomes known that hospitals are 
allocating life and death on a random basis, through a lottery or a 
first-come-first-served procedure, fewer people may bequeath their 
kidneys, feeling that their gift of potential life is not being 
treated with due gravity and gratitude. This likelihood is mitigated, 
in a cynical view, by the certainty that power-holders would do their 
damnedest to eliminate scarcity of medical resources if they had to
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take their chances in a lottery, rather than being favoured by 
decision procedures based on "social m e r i t . ,
Lotteries may be dynamite, but less so than the Seattle "God" 
Committee's standards of "social merit", including income, net 
worth,church membership and Scout leadership.Not surprisingly, the 
Committee's recommendations turned out to produce what Galabresi and 
Bobbitt tactfully term "a pattern of preferences." It was noted that 
"the Pacific Northwest is no place for a Henry David Thoreau with bad 
k i d n e y s . T o  their credit, the members of the committee eventually 
recognised that they were producing biased judgments.The 
consequence was regret so massive as to close the committee down.
If clinical criteria were unable to remain purely within the 
realm of prudence, still less, of course, can social criteria for 
allocation of scarce medical resources escape being ethical 
judgements. And in legal-ethical .terms, lotteries have been held 
fairer than social criteria idien there is conflict of life with life. 
In U.S. V. Holmes (1841), the presiding judge ruled that a surviving 
crew member. Holmes, should not have collaborated with his mates in 
devising and implementing social criteria for deciding who among a 
shipwreck's survivors must be thrown off a lifeboat in order to 
lighten its load. Despite his counsel's contention that the crew's 
method of selection— "not to part man and wife, and not to throw over 
any woman"— was. more humane than a lottery. Holmes was convicted of 
unlawful homicide. In the judge's opinion, only casting lots would 
have been a remedy which the law could sanction: "In no other way
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than this or some like way are those having equal rights put on an 
equal footing, and in no other way is it possible to guard against 
partiality and oppression, violence and conflict.
Holmes is a particularly telling case because it was deeply 
permeated by moral luck. The crew failed to prevent female deaths : 
two sisters jumped overboard to drown with their brother, who was 
among the fourteen men jettisoned. Now of course the justice of 
drawing straws could also have been threatened by the unexpected: a 
husband or wife idio drew a long straw might well have chosen to die 
with an unlucky partner. But would this be cause for remorse in the 
lottery's organisers? Somehow this twist is less tragic: it only 
undermines the randomness of a lottery, not the moral value of 
keeping families together or of saving women from the deep. Of course 
any extra death is tragic, but then so is the entire situation: there 
is no good outcome. But some outcomes are worse than others not for 
the dead, but for the living. The ill-luck of a spouse choosing to 
die against the lottery's impersonal"will" is less damaging to the 
organisers' moral character than the sisters' death was to Holmes and 
his fellows, because the crew presumably held the sanctity of female 
life dear in a deep way which no one could feel about the randomness 
of lotteries ' outcomes. The unlucky outcome of a lottery would have 
been a project failure; in legal terms— and, I argue, in ethical 
ones— the crewmen's failure in Holmes was the personal sort, and the 
grounds for an individual criminal prosecution.
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There is another reason for preferring random procedures in
cases of scarce medical resources. In such cases, or at least idien
life and death are at issue, the judgement in a sense surpasses our
powers of reckoning. As Pascal's Wager argues in the case of eternal
damnation, probabilities are irrelevant, dwarfed by the infinity of
the possible loss. No odds are telling. Randomisation recognises this
explicitly for the parallel modem loss of dying "before one's time."
As Paul Freund has written of social criteria for allocating scarce
medical resources;
The more nearly total is the estimate to be made of an 
individual, and the more nearly the consequence determines 
life and death, the more unfit the judgment becomes for 
human reckoning.. .Randomness as a moral principle 
deserves serious study.- .
As we will be doing in chapter eight on deterrence, nhat we are
dealing with in conflicts of life with life is a kind of infinite
loss. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the loss is the
equivalent of an infinite one for the loser in the case of scarce
resources, vhereas in. the case of nuclear holocaust it is the
equivalent of an infinite one for the whole world, at least
potentially. A strict consequentialist would view even this modified
claim as risky, since setting an infinite value on human life would
require the agent to go on saving lives obsessively, no matter idiat
the damage to her own health or strictures on her other activities.
And to a mathematician or a true believer, death is not an infinite
loss, perhaps. Nevertheless, it is the nearest we in a secular age
come to the unending loss of eternal damnation, and that makes
Pascal's Wager considerations relevant.
[A]s eternity [has] receded in the popular 
consciousness, longevity [has] moved to the fore.
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Among medieval Christians, eternity was a socially 
recognized need; and every effort was made to see that 
it was widely and equally distributed, that every 
Christian had an equal chance at salvation and 
eternal life; hence a church in every parish, regular 
services, catechism for the young, compulsory 
communion, and so on. Among modem citizens, longevity 
is a socially recognized need; and increasingly every 
effort is made to see that it is widely and equally 
distributed, that every citizen has an equal chance 
at a long and healthy life: hence doctors and hospitals 
in every district, regular check-ups, health education 
for the young, compulsory vaccination, and so on.^^
In fact, some consequentialists agree that the fallibility of
the utilitarian calculus in life-and-death matters makes random
selection the fairest procedure.So might deontologists:
paradoxically, respect for persons can best be met by this impersonal
procedure. There is nothing hurtful about being rejected by a random-
number generator, everything painful about being condemned as surplus
to society's requirements and standards. Lotteries are not rational,
but they are profoundly ethical. If this is accepted, it should give
some pause to those vdio, like Brandt, Claim that the pmdential or
rational and the ethical are coterminous, (it would of course be
consistent with Parfit's unwillingness to equate the irrational with
the immoral.)
But is this too enthusiastic an acceptance of the lottery 
principle? Are there no cases in which we would refuse to intervene 
rather than allow randomness its Sway? At least two sets of hard 
cases can be identified: those involving the very old, and those 
featuring dependants. I want to argue that the lottery principle 
should apply in the first case but not in the second. In this I draw
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on the work of Jonathan Glover and John Harris,but disagree to 
some extent with both authors' conclusions, ; %
If there is only one dialysis machine or kidney available, and a
choice must be made between giving it to an eighty-year-old or a
twenty-year-old, most people find the answer obvious enough. Harris
calls this common-sense preference for saving the younger patient a
form of ageism and argues that it contradicts respect for persons.
The eighty-year-old's attachment to life may be as great as the
twenty-year-old's. More generally, patients with short life
expectancies may be as worthy of receiving the scarce medical
resource as those with longer expectancies. This appears at first to
be a similar point to Taurek's about the non-additivity of suffering
(see chapter three). But Harris is actually willing to give greater
weight to the desire for life in the patient with a shorter -
expectation of it, in this example of a terminally ill person:
Suppose I am told today that I have terminal cancer with 
only approximately six months or so to live, but I want to 
live until I die, or at leas t until I decide that life is 
no longer worth living. Suppose I then am involved in an 
accident and because my condition is known to my potential 
rescuers and there are not enough resources to treat all 
who oculd be immediately saved I am marked among those 
who will not be helped. I am then the victim of a double 
.tragedy and a double injustice.rl am stricken first by 
cancer and the knowledge that I have only a short time to 
live and I'm then stricken again when I'm told that 
because of my first tragedy a second and more immediate 
one is to be visited upon me. Because I.Mve once been 
unlucky I'm now no longer worth saving.
I find this argument from ill luck quite compelling; it is 
disappointing, however, that Harris backtracks from it almost
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immediately by intrcxiucing an opposing argument, grounded in "fair 
innings." Whereas the "anti-ageism" argument took the agent's 
subjective valuation of life as the criterion, the fair innings 
perspective sets an objective standard, that of the statistically 
average lifespan. (Harris should properly divide this into male and 
female lifespans if he wants to avoid disadvantaging women, but this 
is not my main criticism, although it remains a surprising omission.) 
Beyond this limit, set at seventy, the anti-ageism argument is not to 
trespass. That is, no one over that age is to be allowed the scarce 
medical resource in preference to someone under that age, no matter 
how intense the older person's desire for life. But the whole force 
of the argument that we should not necessarily prefer longer 
expectations of life in allocating scarce resources rested on its 
bold and probably true assertion that the desire to live does not 
diminish with age— still less vanish magically at seventy.
Admittedly, desire to live is not the only factor which we have to 
consider; There is also the good of living beyond twenty, and it 
might be argued that the seventy-year-old has already enjoyed that. 
But there is also the good of living beyond seventy, seventy-one, 
seventy-two, seventy-three and so forth. If life is good, it does not 
necessarily become any less sweet after seventy merely because 
seventy is a norm, assuming the patient is not in chronic pain or 
other distress. On this argument, we ought always to give preference 
to the younger person, even to a seventy-year-old over a seventy-one- 
year-old; but Harris does not want to say that.
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Actually Harris does not assert that the will to live does fade
away after seventy; but he substitutes the objective statistical
criterion for the personal, subjective one once the magic age is
past. Of course we need some way of deciding between the twenty-year-
old and the seventy-year-old \diich is not merely subjective, since
the strengths of their desire to live may be equal. This is exactly
the point, of my argument in favour of random allocation. But the
fair-irinnings principle offered by Harris seems a piece of sleight-
of-hand. The rationale of the fair-innings argument is that "there is
some span of years that we consider a reasonable life, a fair
innings.But  who is this "we"? The anti-ageism argument depended
on no such animal, and this was indeed part of its attraction: it
made no pluralist assumptions about underlying consensus in society,
but frankly posited the most basic sort of conflict--opposing and
irreconcilable desires to live. This was a valuable contribution in a
27field i^ere consensus in society has too often been assumed.
Because people in modem western societies ^  normally live to a 
statistical average of seventy says nothing .at all about whether they 
should live to seventy. To argue otherwise is a form of the 
naturalistic fallacy. Furthermore, statistical independence ensures 
that no individual has a definite expectation of living to seventy, 
let alone a right to it. For all these reasons I find Harris's 
retrenchment incorporating the fair-innings argument less convincing 
that his original bold assertion that intervening so as to give 
preference to the young above the old is an invasion of respect for 
, persons. A random principle should apply even here, I would argue—
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either a lottery or, more practically but less rigorously, first- 
come-first-served. To put the matter in Rawlsian terms, youth is not 
a form of desert any more than is intelligence or class.
Where I am willing to depart from random principles of
distribution for scarce medical resources is the case in which duties
rather than desert hold sway— that of dependants. In this I agree
with Glover rather than with Harris's critique of Glover's position,
: although my reasoning is somewhat different from Glover's. In the
hard case of a choice between someone with no family and the mother
of several young children, Glover holds that; .
Refusal to depart from random choice when knowledge 
about their dependants is available is to place no value 
on avoiding the additional misery caused to the children 
if the mother is not the one saved...A large part of the 
case against interventionism is the undesirability of 
creating a two-tier community, saying that we value some 
people more than others. This seems obviously 
objectionable if our preference is based on the belief 
that one of the people is nicer, more intelligent or 
morally superior to the other person. But the objection 
loses a lot of its force when the preference is justified 
by citing the interests of dependants rather than the 
merits of the person selected.
Harris feels that Glover's preference for saving those with
dependants does in fact set up a two-tier system, favouring parents—
"a systematic preference of those with families over those
without.. .[T]his looks very much like a covert grading of people into
the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'— those who have dependants and those
who don't."^^ Harris even goes on to suggest that a policy of
favouring parents of young children might lead people to "acquire"
children in order to benefit from "a relatively cheap form of
insurance against a low-priority rating in the rescue stakes.
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Clearly Harris views children as a **go<xi" which some privileged 
souls possess and other less advantaged people do not enjoy. This is 
highly suspect; having children is a source of economic disadvantage, 
particularly for women. Mothers do not find the economic cost of 
having children cheap— in terms of lost earnings during childbearing 
and childraising years, diminished pension and seniority rights, and 
the likelihood of returning to work at a lower level or in a part- 
time position. In 1982 almost half the families with dependent 
children on supplementary benefit were headed by single parents— the 
overwhelming majority women. Half of all single mothers were claiming 
b e n e f i t . I t  is probably also fair to say that mothers think of 
children in terms of duties rather than of privileges. This 
interpretation is not merely personal, but consistent with the fact 
that women have been found in psychological studies generally to 
think more in terms of responsibilities than of rights or 
entitlements.
In the hard case under discussion, we should save the mother 
because she has duties to perform, not because she has any 
entitlement or right as a mother which might "privilege" her. Harris 
might argue that the short-term effect is the same, and of course 
this is true; but the grounds for preferring the mother do not 
reinforce privilege in the long term, since, I argue, mothers are if 
anything a disadvantaged group. Fathers are a more difficult issue, 
since they might claim to be equally bound by duty— the duty to 
provide. However, this particular responsibility has been the source 
of privilege, through the trade union policy of the family wage, for
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example, which has systematically rewarded male workers and preserved 
income differentials between men and women In order to avoid the 
accumulation of further advantage— for the good reason cited by 
Glover and accepted by Harris, the avoidance of a two-tier system— I 
would view fathers of dependent children as having ho claim to 
special treatment unless they do at least half of the actual child 
care. A 1984 Department of Employment survey reveals that this would 
encompass at most about half of fathers with children under 16 if 
only child care is taken into account, about a quarter if equal 
shares in housework is also required.
. The exception to randomness for mothers and some fathers of 
dependent children does not threaten the earlier arguments I made for 
first-come-first served or lottery procedures. No judgement is made 
of these parents' social worth or of their life expectancies, 
likelihood of recovery, or other statistical factors whose accuracy 
becomes increasingly crucial and decreasingly reliable in life-and- 
death matters. Further, it is hard to see how medical staff could 
feel remorse at deciding in favour of the parent. Harris might argue 
that this is merely conventional prejudice, "parentism," another 
instance of more favourable treatment for parents, but the economic 
indicators about maternal poverty have already cast doubt on his 
claim that all parents are economically advantaged through possessing 
children. Statistics such as those compiled over the years by the 
Child Poverty Action Group consistently show that having children is 
the greatest cause of poverty. Therefore no ill liick in terms of 
unintentionally favouring already advantaged groups can result from
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preferring to save primary carers for dependent children— and perhaps 
by extension carers for the elderly, vÆio now outnumber mothers of 
dependent children among women. (There again the responsibilities of 
caring typically result in lowered economic expectations, through 
giving up work and losing out on pension rights.) .
Having demonstrated, I hope, that allocation of scarce medical 
goods is indeed an ethical rather than a prudential or clinical 
judgment, I have argued that random allocation— except in the case of 
primary carers for dependants— is least likely to occasion remorse in 
health care agents. It may well occasion regret, however, 
particularly if a ninety-year-old wins out over a twenty-year-old. 
This might well be a deeply sad occurrence, but not injustice, I 
would argue— and we need to keep the two straight. Nor would it be 
an instance of moral luck. Provided that moral agents make the 
decision about allocation according to the right principler-and I 
argue that randomisation is generally the right principle— they can 
satisfy Nagel's maxim, I think,.however things actually turn out.
That is, they have no reason to modify what decision they would have 
taken in the light of their knowledge of subsequent events.
The decision to randomise treatment draws chance's fire by 
incorporating its operations. It does not, of course, excuse a 
 ^ deliberate decision to reduce the total pool of resources available. 
That this has occurred in Britain in the last decade is well 
documented^^. Does moral luck apply at the level of public policy, 
too? Should a health minister feel remorse and be deemed to have
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suffered personal rather than project failure if the media publicise 
his decision to cut resources and so "allow kidney patients to die?" 
At an intuitive level, I feel that the answer must be yes. But a 
proper analysis of the question would require a deeper consideration 
of public versus private morality than this chapter can give. In the 
following chapter I hope to partially rectify that omission.
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Chapter Six 
Secrecy and Moral Luck
The Watergate scandal eventually forced President Richard Nixon from 
office after his illicit authorisation of surveillance against his 
Democratic opponents came to light. "Dirty tricks" perpetrated by "a 
national security culture, protected...by the shield of secrecy"  ^ were 
revealed in The Pentagon -Papers; they helped to ; defeat the Pentagon’s 
ambitions by spreading opposition to the Vietnam War. The British Special 
Branch was made to. look ridiculous after the public learned that it had 
carried out surveillance against an alternative form of Brownies and Cubs, 
the Woodcraft Folk. The Thatcher government’s campaign ,to prevent 
distribution in Great Britain of Spycatcher vastly increased sales of the 
book worldwide and publicised the claim of the author, former MI5 deputy 
head Peter Wright, that the security services had actually plotted to 
overthrow the Wilson government. Mrs Madeleine Haigh discredited the West 
Midlands constabulary by forcing its chief constable to admit that she had 
been spied on after her local paper printed a letter she had written 
criticising Cruise missile deployment. The BBC’s submission to undercover 
government pressures against journalist Duncan Campbell’s "Secret Society" 
exposes helped to. prove exactly the point which Campbell had wanted to 
make. The cancellation of the BBC "Real Lives" documentary involving a Sinn 
Fein member, under Home Office instructions, resulted in far higher viewing 
figures for the programme when it was finally shown months later.
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In all these cases, secrecy left those in authority with egg on their 
faces. In the first two examples, those in authority actually lost power, 
in large part through misjudgements about secrecy. Yet secrecy is generally 
perceived, particularly by political Realists and some other 
consequent ialists, as a necessary tool of authority. This is an 
illustrative, subsidiary paradox to the general one about moral luck.
The use of secrecy is normally justified in terms of producing more 
favourable outcomes: enhanced national security, or room for manoeuvre in 
negotiations, for. example. Yet in all the cases listed above, secrecy 
resulted in disasters of varying degrees of gravity. Of course, the reply 
may be that decision-makers could not have foreseen the unfavourable 
outcomes, or that even if they had foreseen them, they might not have been 
able to control them. This is exactly where moral luck comes into it. 
Normally, in theory, at least, we do dislike holding agents responsible 
for things beyond their control; but at the same time, in practice, we 
want people to be responsible to some extent for how things actually turn 
out. In the case of state secrecy there is an additional wrinkle: we 
particularly want political leaders to be responsible for outcomes, to be 
accountable, in a democracy. That we do make this demand is clearly 
something more than an inconsistency in common sense: it is the fulcrum of 
democratic theory as well as of democratic practice. Different models of 
democracy accord accountability varying degrees of weight: from intense 
scrutiny of almost every action of the leadership in the classical Athenian 
model, to a restricted right of popular review only once every fifteen
o
years in Hayek.^ Nevertheless, some form of accountability, however 
Page 146 Moral Luck in Medical Ethics and Practical Politics
Secrecy and Moral Luck/Chapter 6
minimal, is a sine qua non of every model, of democracy. But how can, leaders 
be held accountable if their actions are shrouded in secrecy?
It looks as if the use of secrecy is actually an attempt to evade the 
operations of moral luck, to assert that leaders are not responsible—  
because , they will never be found out— if things turn out badly. But this 
cannot be a genuine escape from the paradox, merely a sham. There are 
subsidiary questions here, too, haying.:to do with prudence and rationality. 
If the outcome is unfavourable— as it was\in these cases, by the decision­
makers* own standards— was the decision in favour of concealment merely 
imprudent? Or is secrecy actually morally wrong if it proves counter­
productive?
The puzzles about secrecy are increased by an epistemological Catch- 
22, neatly expressed by a Whitehall source interviewed about surveillance; 
**The trouble is that you don't know whether a thing is worth looking at 
until you have looked at it, and then you don't know whether it's going to 
change in the futiire, so you have to carry on looking at it."^ If this is 
true, it raises particular problems for a theory of ethics as information- 
centred as consequentialism. The information obtained through secrecy is, 
in this opinion, valueless as a predictive guide to how much more secrecy 
will be required, and rational calculation will be impossible.
Within consequentialism there are grounds for-and against secrecy, 
even though the traditional raison d'etre of state secrecy is deeply 
consequentialist. 1 shall discuss these varying cotisequentialist
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perspectives in more detail. But I shall also argue that responsibility 
cannot hinge on good or bad political fortune, on outcomes alone. 
Democratic accountability requires that we retain a notion of political 
agents* responsibility, though perhaps we will have to limit what they are 
responsible for.^ In this case it would seem that Kantianism is more 
likely to provide a satisfactory position on state secrecy. However 
Kantianism is rather surprisingly lax on this score, although Rawlsian 
contractualism is more satisfactory. I shall organise this chapter around 
these conflicting perspectives on secrecy and moral luck, particularly in 
politics— although medical confidentiality and truth-telling will also 
enter the discussion.
First, however, I need to clear away a possible preliminary objection. 
It may be averred that no ethical perspective could possible have anything 
to say about state secrecy because states are not bound by ethical 
considerations. National security, the usual justification for both 
internal and external surveillance, constitutes the prior base on which all 
theories of ethics rest, according to this raison d'etat line. Without the 
state's protection, there would be an internal war of all against all, and 
philosophers would not survive to tell their Kantian, consequentialist, or 
Rawlsian tales. Against others of their ilk, states are entitled to take 
any action they deem necessary to survive.^ Now there is a serious 
question about what actions states are allowed to take against their own 
subjects, even— or perhaps particularly— in this Hobbesian doctrine. 
Internal surveillance is less justifiable than external: the sovereign 
cannot claim the need for self-preservation against his own subjects, since
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by definition they have already submitted to him. Yet many sources—  
including some former secret service officials interviewed in 1988 for the 
BBC Radio Four programme "My Country Right or Wrong"— assert that the 
government is more concerned to keep its operations secret from its own 
citizens than from the outside world, more worried about avoiding 
accountability than reinforcing national isecurity.
Even more fundamentally, there may be grounds for doubting the 
empirical accuracy of the Realist claim that subjects* security is best 
protected by an amoral state. And predictive inaccuracy will be 
particularly damaging to the raison d'etat doctrine, for reasons which I 
hope will become clear in the next paragraph. But what might be the reasons 
for scepticism? I have listed a plethora of cases in the first paragraph—  
instances in which the state got it wrong. More broadly, what if the 
national security apparatus is a greater threat to our well-being, or even 
our survival, than we would face in a state of nature? This Orwellian 
niggle is an ironically realistic doubt for the relatives of the 
disparicidos in Argentina. What if the British defence and security 
establishment is more loyal to its American counterpart than to elected UK 
officials? What is the effect on sovereignty, and security of the UKUSA 
intelligence community, a world bureaucracy with a quarter of a million 
full-time staff and funds of $16-$18 billion per annum?^ This security 
apparatus has been said to rely even more extensively on secrecy than do 
national defence establishments. Yet its. existence may impose risks on 
Britain, because a hostile power would need to knock out US spying bases in 
this country even if Britain were not a formal combatant.
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As Stuart Hampshire has pointed out,^ whether one affirms or denies 
raison d'etat is itself open to moral discussion— and, I would add, to 
empirical scepticism about whether it produces the outcome which is meant 
to justify it. Indeed, a principal argument against the doctrine of raison 
d'etat, in my view, is that it is fatally prone to moral luck disease. The 
criterion for a right action in politics is frankly success, according to 
Machiavelli. Historians rather than philosophers are allocated the task of 
making moral judgments, since it is "a historian's yardstick; continuing 
power, prosperity, high national spirit, a long-lasting dominance"^ which 
measures the ruler's actions. But this leads to insuperable problems about 
hindsight, making the supposedly pragmatic guide of Realism a profoundly 
useless guide to political action. The Watergate revelations led to 
instability, regime change, national self-doubt, constitutional upheaval, 
and overall governmental weakness. Bugging is clearly wrong, it seems, 
because this particular "crime" most certainly did not pay. But the Wright 
memoirs, indicating that MI5 machinations against Harold Wilson were at the 
least inadequately investigated by the successive Conservative government, 
have had no such damaging political effects. Bugging is obviously all 
right, then— or at least the suppression of information that it took place 
is morally justified. We are back to the possibility embraced willingly by 
Williams, that only success could have justified Gauguin's action. That 
raised problems of hindsight which I called unsurmountable there. They are 
all the more so when the political future of nations rather than the 
artistic future of individuals is at stake.
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In a few cases, secrecy looks correct at first, but it does not need 
consequentialism to justify it. This turns out to be related to the absence 
of outcome luck as a determining factor. In 1973— shortly before Watergate 
broke— Nixon defended the secret negotiations which resulted in American 
prisoners* release in these consequentialist terms; VHad we not had 
secrecy, had we not had secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese...and 
had we not had that kind of security and that kind of secrecy for this kind 
,of exchange that is essential, you men would still be in Hanoi rather than 
in Washington today. (This standard Realist argument is also interesting 
for the lie which it gives to Realists who say that we only hear about the 
secret operations which fail. But for every Vietnam prisoner exchange there 
is a Bay of Pigs; the objections about moral luck cannot be overridden so 
easily.) In the case of secret dealings to free prisoners, moral luck may 
indeed not apply— because there is no prior ethical question of right and 
wrong, no ethical imperative being overridden in the name of national 
security. No one debates \diether it. is praiseworthy or blameful to bring 
prisoners home. If the negotiations had failed, nothing would have been 
lost in the ethical sense. Therefore if there is an argument against 
secrecy in this case, it will not have to do with outcome luck. And in the 
worst case which could have occurred with; the use of secrecy, the men would 
have remained prisoners— the same outcome as in the worst case with full 
disclosure. It appears that in such cases secrecy cannot actually worsen 
the outcome— unless it tempts negotiators to take extra personal risks, as 
it seems to have done in the harrowing case of Terry Waite. ;
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To conclude this preliminary discussion of public versus private 
morality as it relates to secrecy and moral luck, I should make it clear
that there is a third option. Politics may be potentially judgeable by
ethical standards; it may be separate from ethics and subject to no
standards other than those of success ; or politicians may actually be
indictable for actions which'would'not be immoral if committed by private 
citizens. This last possibility stands raison d*etat on its head, vbilst 
accepting the Realist separation between ethics and politics. And 
intriguingly, it suggests that one reason why politicians should eschew 
secrecy is that they should be able to foresee that it is likely to lead to 
abuse. Even more broadly, politicians should beware of policies which are 
likely to require secrecy— the foremost being nuclear deterrence (see also 
chapter eight). .
Dennis Thompson, for example, asserts that democratic leaders have a
responsibility to avoid in the first place policies that are likely to
dirty their hands and require concealment. Nuclear deterrence is
particularly likely to lead to what Thompson calls "double dirty hands",
because it creates an institutional, secret machinery of massive
proportions, and because it may engender more risks than it mitigates.
Thompson offers the most institutionally - minded and outcome-orientated
version of vÆiat I identify as the third option, but he echoes Acton*s
rejection of a Realist*s argument:
I cannot accept your canon that we are to judge Pope and King unlike 
other men with a favourable presumption that they did no wrong. If 
there is any presumption it is the other way against holders of 
power, increasing as the power increases.
Jefferson likewise held that governmental secrecy was least justifiable in 
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matters of national security. Citizens had a right to full information 
about any risk of war: *'It is their sweat \diich is to earn all the expenses 
of the war, and their blood which is to flow in expiation of the causes of
it."12 :
I have spent considerable time clearing away what was meant to be a 
preliminary objection— against equating responsibilities in; ethics and 
politics— but hope in the process to have already illustrated some 
difficult points about secrecy and moral luck, such as the one implied from 
Thompson. One other distinction also needs to be dealt with. There are two 
kinds of arguments about secrecy. One, raison d'etat, I have called 
consequentialist, and so it is for states; but it is only consequentialist 
for citizens insofar as they accept that the state must employ secrecy and 
other "dirty tricks" in order to assure its, and their, survival. In other 
respects raison d*Aat assumes a deontological morality of absolutes in the 
private^realm. Individuals must be barred from breaking the rules, if there 
is to be a contrast between their behaviour and that of a sovereign who is 
not so hampered. The second type of argument about secrecy maintains that 
the moral enterprise is consequentialist across the board. Both individuals 
and states should act with a view to outcomes, and there is no separate 
container in \diich individual morality is kept spic and span. This view 
would admit problems of medical ethics such as confidentiality to be 
weighed up with the same consequentialist scales as public policy matters.
Sidgwick,, for example, claimed that secrecy, could actually render a 
wrong action right— in the public or the private realm. "It may conceivably
Moral Luck in Medical Ethics and Practical Politics Page 153
Secrecy and Moral Luck/Chapter 6
be right to do, if it can be done with comparative secrecy, what it would 
be wrong to do in the face of t h e  w o r l d . "^2 On this ground, \diat looks 
wrong about the British Medical Association's 1986 resolution urging 
doctors to screen patients for HIV status at random and without obtaining 
informed consent (see chapter 7) is not that this practice constitutes an 
assault— which it certainly does, even under the feeble UK law on consent—  
but that someone in the BMA leaked the recommendation to the press. This 
peculiar interpretation seems to be reinforced by Sidgwick's 
characterisation of the correct utilitarian policy: "that the opinion that 
secrecy may render an action right which would not otherwise* be so should 
itself be kept comparatively, secret." This is the precise contrary of the 
second-order principle advocated by Sissela Bok: that the principles
governing secrecy should themselves always be public.
Sidgwick's "Government House utilitarianism,'' as Bernard Williams 
typifies it,^^ sits uncomfortably with his attempt to • categorise truth- 
telling as one of the values which util tar ianism advocates as producing the 
best overall state of affairs. (Justice, spontaneous affection, loyalty to 
friends, and.parental caring also fall into this category.) What Sidgwick 
is grappling with, however, is the paradox of whether utility is best 
maximised by utilitarians keeping their identity mum. Sidgwick's intention 
seems to have been to restrict carte blanche in secrecy to "enlightened 
Utilitarians",^^ to whose ranks he would perhaps not have welcomed Richard 
Nixon or the BMA. in the midst of an AIDS moral panic. What should be kept 
secret, to Sidgwick, is not politicians' dirty tricks, but the principles 
of utilitarianism themselves, in rather Masonic fashion. Utilitarianism is
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best served when such values as truth-telling become automatic and 
universal, but they cannot become widely adopted by those who lack the 
necessary calculating sophistication unless they are justified in old- 
fashioned non-utilitarian terms, as virtues. This utilitarian modification 
of the Platonic noble lie is required because utilitarianism may actually 
result in an overall lowering of moral standards if promulgated with full 
frankness to the intellectually unfit. The full quotation from Sidgwick is 
illustrative: "Thus, on Utilitarian principles, it may be right to do and 
privately recommend, under certain circumstances, what it would not be 
right to advocate openly; it may be right to teach openly to one set of 
persons what it would be wrong to teach to others ; it may conceivably be 
right to do, if it can be done with comparative secrecy, what it would be 
wrong to do in the face of the world."
, Sidgwick's position is unappealing, but far less extensive than the
raison d'etat assertion that state secrecy in the name of national security
is always justifiable. Similarly, a consequentialist line on medical
confidentiality appears rather harmless— perhaps too harmless. This is one
form of secrecy which most of us would favour— provided it were not
extended to forbid us to see our own records, which are still broadly
regarded as health authority property in Britain, despite some recent
Parliamentary changes in the direction of more .openness; So far as doctors'
obligation to respect confidences goes, the argument is generally 
17consequentialist: better diagnosis and greater trust are likely to result
from practitioners' undertaking to keep their patients' secrets. A 
deontologist would argue that these grounds were not sufficient, however.
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and that they had to be underpinned with respect for patient autonomy. This 
does appear to be essential in practice, since as many as a hundred health 
professionals and administrators at one American university hospital were 
granted access to "confidential" records on the consequentialist grounds of 
improving diagnosis and treatment.
The more relativistic consequentialist approach has been unable to 
prevent erosion of privacy in principle as well as in practice. The General 
Medical Council's "blue book" spells out eight exceptions to the principle 
of confidentiality, one of which is the example in which another health 
professional enters the case, as at the university hospital. Others include 
the doctor's judgement that a relative or friend should be given access to 
the information, and further, his view that the "best interests of the 
patient"— clearly a utilitarian concept— dictate that some third party 
other than a relative or friend should leam confidential facts. Both these 
cases would probably be disallowed by a patient-autonomy view, the more 
strongly because the GMC guidelines require that the doctor should only 
expose confidential information to outsiders and relatives if the patient 
has rejected "every reasonable effort to persuade." If the patient so 
obviously wants to maintain her privacy, a deontologist or rights theorist 
might argue, that is exactly the case in which her privacy should be most 
stringently respected.
Again, these consequentialist-inspired exceptions to a 
consequentialist-based rule of confidentiality allow private records to be 
opened in order to aid research approved by a "recognised ethics
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committee." Particularly because hospital . ethics committees themselves 
operate with very considerable secrecy, this seems very duplicitous. In 
addition research trials often rely on keeping their purpose secret from 
patients— and sometimes from on-the-spot researchers, too, in double-blind 
trials. There are all sorts of scientific and statistical arguments for and 
against this practice, but no one denies: that it overrides informed consent 
(see chapter 7). One bowel cancer patient with some predicted years to live 
was entered in such a trial without her or her daughters' knowledge, and 
died two weeks later; this project had been approved by no fewer than 
eleven hospital ethics c o m m i t t e e s . ,
Two other interesting cases are suggested by jury trials and secret 
investigation of legislative corruption. In each, consequentialism again 
normally justifies secrecy— though for the sake of what might at first 
appear a Kantian value, openness. Secret jury deliberations could be 
defended from within a consequentialist framework, however— as increasing 
the probability of a fair decision. They could likewise be attacked as 
reinforcing race bias or the sexist prejudice that rape victims deserve 
what they; get, and indeed I have written else\diere in an interpretation of 
the classic study The American Jury tbat this is exactly what jury secrecy 
does protect. ^ _
I stated at the beginning of this chapter that there was no single, 
consistent stand in consequentialism on secrecy, and this observation holds 
true in respect to consequentialist attitudes towards jury secrecy. If some 
consequentialists defend jury secrecy on the grounds that it increases the
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chances of a fair trial, it is also true that even the minimal amount of 
secrecy embodied in jury trials has been challenged from a consequentialist 
perspective when it seems to result in "too many" acquittals. A 
consequentialist might be willing to balance the extent of jury secrecy 
against the actual or even the projected rate of acquittals of dangerous 
criminals. But this would again entail serious problems about foresight and 
moral luck. How could we know whether this particular case is one in which 
secrecy should be partial, total, or missing altogether? We cannot know 
until we know the overall rate of acquittals, but that depends on the 
outcome in this case. Further, we run into all the difficulties encountered 
earlier in Nesson's example of the twenty-four guilty prisoners and the one 
innocent man. The problem here, as there, is that we have to get this 
decision right this time in an ethical sense, which will not necessarily be 
the numerical sense. Basic principles of justice are offended by the idea 
of taking a particular defendant's case as one of a statistical long run, 
in which we can be content to get the level of secrecy right over time even 
if not in the particular case.
In the ABSCAM investigation of Congressional corruption, 2^ the FBI 
used secrecy to uncover secrecy. Undercover agents induced public officials 
to accept bribes and taped the transactions with hidden recorders. This 
operation was justified in cost-benefit terms— the level of loss to the 
nation through white-collar crime, for example, which was estimated at ten 
times the loss through all street crime. Against these statistics were 
marshalled arguments that undercover agents only prove the existence of the 
crimes they generate. But whichever way the cost-benefit equations run in
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this case, it does appear paradoxically true that eventual publicity could 
be had only through initial secrecy.
As in the case of the American prisoners in Vietnam, outcome luck 
appears not to apply here, not to provide arguments against this particular 
use of secrecy. The only way in \diich Operation ABSCAM could be said to 
have failed would be the case in which a clean-living Congressman rejects a 
bribe and then discovers that the contact was an FBI agent. But it is hard 
to see why this would constitute failure for the project or the agent, why 
any remorse or regret should ensue, or what complaint the Honest Abe would 
have had against the operation. Indeed, be would probably be chuffed to 
find his own stock soaring among his constituents once his probity was 
revealed. In Kantian terms, the Categorical Imperative would prevent his 
less upright colleagues from complaining that secrecy had been used against 
them, when they had been covering their own criminal behaviour under the 
cloak of secrecy. :
Now if secrecy is to be defended, it is generally exonerated through 
consequentialist arguments. This is as much true in the obvious case of 
national security as in the more esoteric and more difficult examples 
discussed so far, medical confidentiality, . jury anonymity, and 
,investigation of legislative corruption. But consequentialism does not 
always advocate secrecy. Bentham's "On Publicity" goes so far as to deny 
that the utilitarian calculus can ever prescribe clandestine actions by 
states: "Secrecy, being an instrument of conspiracy,, ought never to be the 
system of a regular government."2^ "System" may be the operative term here:
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rule utilitarianism seems to suggest the most cogent consequentialist 
arguments against concealment, .as a bad overall principle. For example, 
secrecy is alleged to be addictive, or to produce a brutal attitude in 
leaders. Habitual truth-telling is a good keep-fit exercise for 
politicians, Hampshire claims. Indeed, in the Watergate case, Nixon's 
addiction to secrecy was linked with overall callousness, as revealed in 
his foul language and bullying on the White House tapes, though whether 
secrecy produced callousness is unclear.
But again, it is debatable whether utilitarianism even of the rule 
variety can itself produce, any other values. Going further, Hampshire also 
claims that the utilitarian calculus itself engenders a blunted moral 
sensibility. I shall not evaluate this large allegation, v&ich entails huge 
problems of proof , cause and effect. (Even more broadly, Hampshire suggests 
that "rational" is a term of reproach in ethics and politics, and that 
"rational computational morality" is a pejorative term.)2^ But the 
possibility is suggested that we need to move outside consequentialism in 
order to escape from the moral luck paradox in respect to secrecy. If 
Hampshire is right, utilitarianism raises objections of brutalisation, to 
which it correctly directs our attention, but it cannot itself satisfy 
those objections. We do hot want political leaders to become brutalised: we 
want than to retain a sense of agent-responsibility in some measure. But to 
the extent that consequentialism shifts the locus of moral value from agent 
to outcomes, it cannot explain vÆiy we should value a responsible attitude 
in our leaders. It can only explain why we value certain outcomes, or, in
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an even more limited fashion^ assert that we ^  value those outcomes and
tell us something about how best to achieve them..
Most consequentialist anti-secrecy arguments do focus on concrete
outcomes, rather than on attitudes. "The consequences of excessive secrecy
are, amongst other things, that it; makes rational debate and discussion of
national security issues almost impossible; restricts the effective
participation of the public, organised interests, anad elected politicians
in the policy-making process; violates the principle of democratic
accountability; facilitates the concentration of power; undermines
confidence in government; and encourages the abuse of power."2^ Secrecy in
strategic matters is actually said to increase the risk of nuclear
catastrophe through fatal misunderstandings; RealistsV own criterion of
success, as the sole standard of governmental policy is turned against them,
with the proposition that security is actually impeded by too little
openness. :
Greater public information and debate would not actually be harmful to 
the operations of the security and intelligence agencies. Secrecy has 
shielded these agencies from full accountability and effective 
supervision and led^to their being less effective and less efficient 
than they might be.- ^
But although these claims may well be true, the. formulations tend to
be a bit bet-hedging. The first quotation refers to "excessive" secrecy but
never spells out what that might be. The authors of the second, Jeffrey
Richelson and Desmond Ball, go on to state:
In the end the basic dilemma about how to balance the requirements of 
with those of democratic government cannot be resolved absolutely. 
Rather, it is a matter of continuous judgment about \diere to draw a 
satisfactory line.2°
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This leaves the field wide open for moral luck (and incidentally for 
executive tyranny). If a particular use of secrecy succeeds, it will be 
justified retrospectively, but if it fails, it was wrong to begin with. Of 
course this leaves no guide for judgement at all, and precious little room 
for democratic accountability. *
Although there are consequentialist arguments both for and against 
secrecy, in a deep sense it goes against the grain for consequentialism to 
do anything but condemn secrecy— at least for consequentialism of the 
modem rather than the Machiavellian sort. There is a tight bond between 
rationality and most modem utilitarianism, and rational judgement is 
usually said to demand full information, as in Brandt's first approximation 
of rationality. (The corollary sometimes drawn from this position is that 
moral and political disagreement is a function of ignorance. This does not 
actually follow; conceivably we could all consistently agree from a 
position of equal ignorance of leaders' motives and acts, but a utilitarian 
who valued democratic : accountability would probably find this 
insufficient.) Now of course there might be other barriers to voters' 
possession of full information besides state secrecy; but publicity about 
leaders' actions and decision processes is a sine qua non for democratic 
acountability.
Richard Hare, for example, maintains that perfectly prudent 
preferences rather than actual desires . are what should be maximised. 2^ 
These are the values which agents would prefer if they were both fully
informed and consistent in their thinking.- In contrast with utilitarians,
. ' .
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Rawls deliberately builds ignorance into his ethical system, and Williams 
asserts that we could not rationally desire to be fully informed —  
particularly not about the future, about the time and manner of our 
forthcoming deaths, for example. But in the extreme utilitarian position 
taken by John Harsanyi, ethics becomes a branch of the general theory of 
rational behaviour, along with decision and game theories.2^ These methods 
can of course cope with uncertainty caused by lack of information; Bayesian 
probability analysis is content to pronounce on samples of one. But 
typically Bayesians also attach great importance to revising subjective 
probabilities in the course of a decision on the basis of continually more 
complete data. Peter Hammond takes it for granted that knowledge should be 
as complete as the gods will permit. In discussing political decision­
making, he notes, "Of course one wants, the planner or observer to be as 
well informed as p o s s i b l e . "^0 With consistency, he adds that this entails 
concern when governments deliberately withhold information.
However, utilitarians such as Hammond again have to step over the 
boundary fences of consequentialism in order to argue for full disclosure. 
Hammond goes so far as to admit an individual right to know the truth, 
although he has little time for property rights or rights against the 
censor. Whilst Hammond believes that utilitarianism can acconmodate a right 
to know, it is hard to believe that Bentham would have thought that any 
less nonsensical than the other stilt-mounted fictions \diich he dismissed. 
In fact, Hammond winds up arguing for an absolute. right of access to the 
truth:
A rather extreme utilitarian might argue that.;.individuals are no 
more than the pieces in a utilitarian game, to be manipulated for 
utilitarian ends, though with their best interests in mind. Leaving
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them misinformed is part of that utilitarian game. But it is here 
vbere I must at last part company with such extreme utilitarianism, 
and recognise that individuals certainly have a right to be fully 
informed, or at least to acquire as much information as they wish to. 
One can also insist that the social welfare function respect the right 
of each individual to know as much of the truth as possible, within 
certain cost limitations.'^^ ,
This rather grandiose formulation gives us little guidance in 
practice. What would Hammond make of the patient who does not want to know 
the truth about her condition, although telling her might be required in 
order to get her consent to a possibly life-prolonging operation? Perhaps 
her right not to know might flow from the right to "acquire as much 
information as individuals want to;" but it is hard to see how, in this 
case, hot knowing would be rational or utilitarian even in a non-extreme 
sense of the latter term. Similarly, would Hammond make of the
conflicting rights of the patient who does not want his family to see his 
file, and the relatives, who presumably have a "right to know" so that they 
can make necessary arrangements? Perhaps Hammond would have to say that the 
patient has no right to own exclusive use of the information; or he might 
have to fall back on a liberal balancing of individual versus societal 
rights.
Bernard Williams makes a further distinction foreign to
utilitarianism, in clear if curt fashion:
One significant point is that while transparency is a 
natural associate of liberalism, it falls short of implying 
rationalism. It is one aspiration, that social and ethical 
relations should not essentially rest on ignorance and 
misunderstanding of \diat they are, and quite another that all 
the beliefs and principles involved should be explicitly 
stated. That these are two different things is obvious with 
personal relations, where to hope that they do not rest on 
.deceit and error is merely decent, but to think that their
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basis can be made totally explicit is idiocy.
This contains the kernel of a solution to the moral luck problem as 
embedded in issues about medical secrecy. Again, it looks as if the key is 
limiting what agents are responsible for— even though Williams himself does 
not offer this solution to the general paradox. We need to negatively 
prohibit the withholding of information or the giving of false information 
by health professionals or authorities— not by individual patients from the 
authorities or medical staff— but not to enshrine a positive right to know, 
such as Hammond posits. This limits individual agents* responsibility for 
how much they are obliged to tell others, retaining some privacy. Thus the 
patient who wants to keep his condition from his family is not responsible 
for the likely outcome, that proper arrangements will not have been made on 
his death. Nor is the medical professional at fault for not forcing 
information on a patient who ''doesn't want to know", although he is in the 
wrong if he uses this as an excuse for overlooking diffident or fearful 
requests for more information from patients lacking the requisite 
assertiveness for dealing with some doctors.
It will be seen that I have somewhat exceeded Williams's own bounds, 
and shortly it should also become clear that I am going beyond the Kantian 
requirements in respect to openness. Williams's formulation actually 
appears to parallel the Kantian distinction between lying and withholding 
information. In Kant keeping back information does not necessarily vitiate 
the Categorical Imperative, vÆiereas breaking promises and lying do 
undermine the essential structure .of a moral system. Hence the separate 
subject matters of Sissela Bok's two books, Lying^^ and Secrets, written
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from a broadly Kantian perspective and making the expected distinction in 
these terms:
The central themes of the two books--lying and secrecy— intertwine and 
overlap. Lies are part of the arsenal used to guard and to invade 
secrecy; and secrecy allows lies to go undiscovered and to build up. 
Lying and secrecy differ, however, in one important respect. Whereas 
I take lying to be prima facie wrong, with a negative presumption 
against it from the outset, secrecy need not be. Whereas every lie 
stands in need of justification, all secrets do not. Secrecy may 
accompany the most innocent as well as the most lethal acts; it is 
needed for human survival, yet it enhances every form of abuse. ■
Secrecy is then less firmly prohibited than lying, to a Kantian; but
secrecy opens up moral luck dilemmas. Does a-Kantian argument cope with
them adequately?
Whereas a Machiavellian might argue in favour of secrecy on strategic 
grounds, another sort of consequentialist could equally well argue that 
honesty is sometimes the best policy. ' (This latter was the kind of 
reasoning behind the GMC blue book's exemptions to medical confidentiality: 
sometimes openness is dictated by the "best interests of the patient," 
which demand that a third party be given access to confidential 
information. Richelson and Ball also averred that a consequentialist goal, 
greater efficiency, would be better served by less governmental secrecy.) 
But both base their claims on expected utilities or payoffs, and their 
disagreement is over the probability of success through secrecy and the 
possible severity of the losses which a clandestine policy might entail.
To Kant, honesty is better than any policy, and this dictum cannot be 
empirically proved or disproved.Although in the personal realm 
withholding information is, less heinous than lying, there is an additional
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variable in the political sphere. Tlie state uses secrecy to hide tyranny, 
and secrecy is in turn an indicator of misgovernment. Perhaps this is less 
true .to a modified Kantian like Bpk, who regards the jury system, for 
example, as a guarantee of individual justice, though justice obtained 
through, a form of secrecy in the public sphere. But Kant rejects secret 
treaties, and of course the doctrine of raison d'etat— although he retains 
the Machiavellian distinction between public and private morality insofar 
as he assigns, publicity to be the keystone of one and universalisability of 
the other. In the appendix to On Perpetual Peace Kant rejects Machiavellian 
cynicism about the sovereign's power to break treaties, as well as to draw 
up accords surreptitiously. Promise-keeping and truth-telling are as 
imperative for states as for individuals, if not more so as far as 
withholding information goes. Kant is unimpressed by the counter-argument 
that this could mean political suicide. This outcome-blind pronouncement 
can be ,summarised as "Let justice prevail though the world perish for
it."3S .
This begins to sound very much like what Williams calls "moral self- 
indulgence'."^  ^There is a very real problem about how justice can prevail 
if the human world has disappeared. Yet oddly, Kant may sometimes be a 
better strategist in his stickling for openness than Realists who are too 
doctrinaire in their loyalty to the clandestine. As I discuss at greater 
length in chapter 8, nuclear deterrence actually requires transparency, 
though the military establishment draws a veil over such matters in the 
name of national security. But each side needs to know that the other's 
Doomsday machine works, and will be used. Furthermore, bluff and secrecy.
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such as the US employed in the late 1940 ' s— when it really had only 
thirteen atomic bombs in all— produce serious risk of misjudgement by the 
enemy, escalation of the arms race, and greater likelihood of war.
Does this necessarily mean that the deontological approach to secrecy
is the right one? A modified Kantianism does avoid problems of hindsight
and epistemological absurdities of the sort highlighted by the quotation
from the Whitehall source at the start of this chapter. But Kant's own
v/ritings on state secrecy do, for once, support Hegelian charges of
Tartuffesque hypocrisy. With what has been called his "characteristic two-
sidedness, Kant glorifies both individual freedom and state power. The
law, being a priori and derived from practical reason, must be obeyed, and
only the sovereign has the authority to decide the law. It is up to him to
act in line with the general will; the subject's duty is to obey the law as
it stands. Because disobeying the law is not universalisable, it offends
against the Categorical Imperative. But Kant's abstract argument ignores
the patent non-universalisability of some actual laws on secrecy. For
example, the British Official Secrets Act of 1911 would have led to
absurdity if the very broadly worded Section 2 had been • obeyed to its
extreme. As the Franks Committee remarked wryly in its 1972 report:
We found Section 2 a mess. Its scope is enormously wide...A catch-all 
provision is saved from absurdity in operation only by the sparing 
exercise of the Attorney General's discretion to prosecute.
Further, although Kant conceives of the ideal state as republican, he makes
no provision for keeping it that way. He considers separation of powers to
be the test of a government's conformity to the original contract, and
tyrannies to be typified by amalgamation of the legislature and the
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executive, = Yet he lacks the awareness possessed in his own time by Madison 
of the ways in which the executive can emasculate the legislature— often 
through deliberately withholding or even falsifying information, as in 
Reagan's dealings with Congress over Iran and Nicaragua, and in the 
Belgrano affair.
If we are to adopt a Kantian approach to state secrecy in an effort to 
minimise the effect of moral luck, I do not think we should adopt Kant's 
own. In Kant, external liberty is equated with freedom from obeying any 
law to which the agent might not have consented. More precisely, a monarchy 
may legitimately replace a republic, for example, so long as the general 
will could conceivably have favoured this course. In respect to official 
secrecy, the government will be in the right unless I can prove that I 
could not possibly have consented to the withholding of information. This 
shifts the burden onto the individual, although it does appear to lessen 
the problems of hindsight and give chance less sway by making it less 
important how things .actually turn out. If I could not possibly have 
consented to the use of secrecy, then it was wrong even if it resulted in a 
favourable outcome.
Ivhat we need is a combination of that refusal , to let responsibility 
hinge on outcomes with a stronger line on decision-makers' responsibilities 
are. Oddly, exactly by incorporating chance and luck, Rawls is able to 
shift the burden back onto the state, where it belongs. In a further 
paradox, Rawls uses deliberate ignorance^^ to investigate allowable 
secrecy; but the intention is to enhance rationality. In Rawls there is a
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powerful meta-theoretical reason for openness. Our deliberations in the 
Original Position would be pointless if we were barred from knowing how 
well or badly things actually turned out once the Veil of Ignorance was 
lifted. It would be deeply wrong if society were so opaque that gender 
roles, to use an example from W i l l i a m s , rested on mis- or even dis­
information. If women turned out to occupy an inferior position once the 
Veil was lifted, agents should have chosen this possible outcome rationally 
from behind the Veil— rationally in the more-minimal-than-Brandt's sense 
that myths should have played no part. That is, there should be no false 
information, even if. not all true facts are known. This would rule out the 
conventional stereotypes justifying wage differentials— such as greater 
male "strength," which is inaccurate in terms of longevity if not of muscle 
power, and which bears no relation to the higher salaries for (mainly male) 
managers than for (mainly female) secretaries when both groups are non- 
manual workers. ,
Publicity is indeed central to Rawls, 2^ but his requirements fall 
short of the peremptory right to know suggested by Hammond. In Rawls the 
link between transparency and democratic accountability is properly clear, 
but this is no longer a value extrinsic to the theory, as in 
utilitarianism. It follows from the constraints of the Original Position: 
if governments are not accountable and open, how can we know whether we got 
what we decided on behind the Veil? Without publicity, whether we get what 
we wanted is entirely open to luck, and even more deeply, whether we find 
out what we got is also open to chance and the arbitrary powers of 
decision-makers.
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Rawls's liberal focus on consent makes a good link to the next area in 
which I want to explore moral luck, that of informed consent in health care 
ethics. I also intend to reiterate some of the themes which have dominated 
this chapter and which mil carry forward into the next, particularly 
rational calculation, predictability, and hindsight. Again in the following 
chapter, I will look at these issues which flow from the question of moral 
luck and see how they might be handled by competing moral traditions.
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Responsibility, Risk, Rationality and Consent
The question of informed consent has been called "the ethical issue in 
medicine today"^— less sensational than surrogate motherhood, and less 
apparently concerned with life and death than kidney allocation, but more 
likely to affect almost everyone at some point. Consent is a promising 
instance for illustrating the practical implications of moral luck, 
together with risk analysis, uncertainty, rationality and associated 
concerns, to a lesser degree. In broad terms, I have been asking whether 
"luck" and "moral" are incompatible; whether or not there is a purely 
ethical area unaffected by the uncertainty of outcomes, whether risk 
undermines ethics. The first question to ask about informed consent in 
health care ethics, then, is whether it eliminates questions about risk. If 
a patient gives her consent to a medical procedure, is the doctor free of 
moral blame if that procedure turns out badly
Clearly this is a question about moral luck, and it will be the main 
one in this chapter. Certainly in legal terms, failure to obtain the 
statutory consent proforma may lay the health professional open to a civil 
charge of assault. But even in legal terms we need to make some further 
distinctions: between negligence and consent, for example. In general, 
consent, unlike negligence, concerns a procedure which has been performed 
correctly but which has ended in an unfavourable outcome.^ For example, one
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consent case involved an optional pain-relieving operation with a .01 
probability of paralysis and a .02 probability of damage to the nerve 
roots. The surgeon was accused of not having informed the patient of the 
apparently lesser risk of paralysis, wdiich did occur. It was alleged that 
this was a failure to obtain a fully informed consent. However, no one 
alleged that the operation had been performed incompetently. Through sheer 
statistical necessity, some outcomes will be unfavourable, and the question 
raised by informed consent is who bears responsibility for those outcomes.
A simplistic but promising answer to my initial question might be that 
it is the giving of informed consent which stops the probability machine 
rolling, vMch shuts out questions about moral luck and risk for the health 
professional. If the patient has given her* consent, the ethical and legal 
requirement— if I may momentarily collapse the two— has been fulfilled. No 
matter how badly the procedure turns out, there is no cause for remorse in 
the doctor, although of course there will be grounds for regret.
To put it another way, the ethical realm is bounded by the giving of 
informed consent, and there the prudential realm begins, the area of 
decisions which we are content to get right in the long run. If the 
procedure goes badly this particular time, the health professional is still 
free of ethical or legal blame so long as he has obtained informed consent 
from the patient beforehand. The particular outcome will be a project 
rather than a personal failure for him, and moral luck will not have 
undermined his agency. Nor will he have neglected the duty of care which 
he owes to each patient— and which, as I noted in chapter 5, forbids him to
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write off a failure as a matter of "better luck next time". The duty and 
the responsibility will have been taken care of through the obtaining of 
informed consent, although of course the doctor will still be bound by the 
normal standards of medical negligence in the performance of the operation.
Even John Harris, who is extremely outcome-orientated in his 
elucidation of negative responsibility,^ views informed consent and full 
disclosure of information to patients as absolute requirements. Breach of 
the obligation to obtain consent cannot be palliated by the procedure's 
turning out well; nor is the responsibility weakened in cases which other 
writers find tricky, such as random clinical trials . or fatal conditions 
whose disclosure might induce patients to commit suicide.^ It is a blanket 
duty required by respect for persons— an oddly Kantian claim for Harris, 
although he also makes a subsidiary utilitarian assertion that honouring 
the autonomy of individual patients enhances the well-being of the 
community.^ „
But here Harris is in line with most writing on consent, which rarely
accepts a strict consequentialist line. With a few exceptions, which I
shall discuss towards the end of the chapter, U.S. law is particularly
eager to avoid any utilitarian balancing in this area, and the language is
typically rights-slanted: J:  ^r
Every human being of i adult years and soühd mind has ' 
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.'
Anglo-American law starts wdth the premise of thorough-going self- 
determination. It follows that each man is considered to be master of 
his body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit 
the performance of life-saving surgery, or other medical treatment.
A doctor might well believe that an operation or form of treatment 
is desirable or necessary, but the law does not permit him to
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substitute his own judgement for that of the patient by any form of 
artifice or deception.
Respect for the patient's right to self-determination on particular 
therapy demands a standard set by law rather than one which physicians 
may or may not impose on themselves.^
[E]very patient... shall be provided by the physician [with] the right 
to informed consent [and]...in the case of a patient suffering from 
any form of breast cancer, to complete information on all alternative 
treatments [to mastectomy] \hich are medically viable.
But the great irony here is that generally the law is brought into play
only if the procedure turns out b a d l y . H o w  else could a patient obtain
standing to sue? That the operation or treatment ended disastrously is not
sufficient proof of failure to obtain consent, of course, since negligence
may be involved. (However, an unhappy outcome is also insufficient proof of
negligence: it must also be shown that the negligence caused the injury
directly, and that the health professional was operating at a level of
competence below the average for 'his or her profession, though not
necessarily at an ideal level.) Nevertheless, outcome ill-luck is a
necessary practical requirement for launching a lawsuit. .
' There is one exceptional example of responsibility for wrongdoing 
having been claimed against a health professional even though the outcome 
of the case was favourable. This was a case involving alleged negligence, 
but its interest for consent cases as well lies in the rarity of 
prosecuting a health professional when the outcome has turned out well. A 
district health authority attempted unsuccessfully to discipline a 
consultant obstretician and lecturer, Mrs. Wendy Savage, on grounds of 
professional incompetence in five obstetrical cases. Three of these had 
n actually turned out favourably. When Mrs. Savage argued that these cases
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had clearly been dredged up by trawling through files, the opposing 
barrister retorted, '-That is also the answer of the driver who rounds a 
blind, comer on the wrong side of the . road." However, the inquiry 
subsequently found for Mrs. Savage, apparently on the grounds that her 
average level of competence was actually above that of her colleagues, who 
were not being disciplined, and that thus negligence was not proven. The 
issue of outcome luck was not the crux of the finding.
Apart from this very partial exception, both American and English law 
are generally consequentialist in practice though not in theory, insofar as 
no action for damages is possible unless the case turns out badly. In this 
sense the health professional does not need the protection which informed 
consent offers— by transferring responsibility to the patient— when outcome 
luck is favourable. But when the outcome is bad, the remedies available in 
American and English law differ fundamentally.
The American law of consent attempts to exclude moral luck by 
requiring all risks to be disclosed, very broadly speaking.In contrast 
English law tries to eliminate the paradoxes of probability and the 
vagaries of moral luck by not requiring that the patient be informed of any 
risks. American law concentrates on consumers' rights, English law on 
providers' duties. Why are the two approaches so contradictory?
American populism versus English elitism may well be part of the 
answer, but another component may be the tension between "informed" and 
"consent". I suggested earlier that the patient's consent does at first
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appear to make the morality of treatment risk-free for the health 
professional, to absolve him of blame and liberate him from remorse if the 
procedure turns out badly. "Consent" seems to get rid of risk. But the 
consent must be informed, and that means-telling the patient about the 
risks. These two components of informed consent pull different ways, and in 
a sense the discrepancy between American and English law reflects that 
difference. -
A well-known example of the more rights-centred and patient-orientated 
approach to consent in American case law is Cobbs v. G r a n t in which the 
court found that a surgeon. Grant, had failed to disclose a chain of low- 
probability events to an ulcer patient, Cobbs. The overwhelmingly unlikely 
simultaneous occurrence of all these events— injuries to the spleen, 
development of a new gastric ulcer, and premature absorption of sutures—  
catapulted the patient into hospital three more times and required the 
removal of his spleen and half his stomach. Cobbs's GP had discussed with 
him the risks inherent in general anaesthesia; and Dr. Grant had explained 
the nature of the operation. In court Grant's lawyer argued that it was not 
normal medical practice to divulge any more than this— the Bolam standard 
(see footnote 17) to \diich English courts still adhere. This argument in 
terms of how doctors define their duties rather than how patients construe 
their rights was rejected by the court. Noting that "the patient' s right of 
self-decision is the measure of the physician's duty to reveal," the court 
insisted that the surgeon should have disclosed "all information relevant 
to a meaningful decision process." This very wide construction of 
"informed" has engendered all sorts of problems about decision-making and
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rationality. Before going on to examine them, particularly in. terms of my 
earlier concern about prudential decision-making and risk, it might be 
instructive briefly to compare the English approach.
Thirteen years after the Cobbs-case, the highest English court upheld 
the argument which the Californian justices had rejected— that it is 
entirely up to the doctor to decide how much information his patient 
requires. If a doctor fails to disclose a serious risk in treatment, the 
patient's, consent is nevertheless valid in English law. In the case of 
Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital, t h e  holding 
was even more extreme. A patient \dio alleged that she would not have given
her permission if she had been told all the risks was held to have given
informed consent regardless.The High Court, Court of Appeal, and House 
of Lords all disallowed the patient's claim for damages, which Mr. Justice 
Skinner in the High Court had assessed at £67,000, for severe disability 
following an elective operation on her cervical spine to relieve pain.
Rather surprisingly,, the reason for denying Mrs. Sidaway's claim was not
that she might have been a victim of hindsight bias, people's tendency to 
assert that they had a much more certain knowledge of future outcomes at 
the time they were making a decision that tests at that time reveal they 
actually possessed. (For example, a group of subjects were asked to 
"forecast" the outcome of a historical battle with which they were 
unfamiliar. Although the average probability assigned to victory for the 
apparent underdogs was .20, subjects claimed they had assigned fifty-fifty 
odds when told that the underdogs had won.) Instead, the English courts 
phrased their finding in terms of risk and responsibility.
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Mrs. Sidaway denied that the surgeon— whom she described as a "man of 
very, very Jew words"— had revealed any possible side-effects or risks of 
the operation to her,, or indeed that he had informed her that the treatment 
was elective. Between the operation in 1974 and the judgement of the High 
Court, the neuro-surgeon had died. Ih_ stunningly circular fashion, the 
court chose to assume that he had followed standard practice— which was, of 
course, the very issue in question. Normal procedure would have been to 
inform the patient of the possible risk of damage to the nerve roots 
(p=.02) but hot of possible damage to the spinal cord (p^.01). It was the 
latter— wdLth half the likelihood but an infinitely greater loss, partial 
paralysis— which occurred in this case.
Now there are many arguments against- allowing medical personnel to 
decide• what risks they should mention to patients, the usual ones anti- 
pa t emails tic. There are also consequentialist grounds for distrusting
the "medical standard" approach in Sidaway; it becomes the profession's 
interest to narrow the scope of "normal" disclosure.But perhaps the most 
ironic and telling argument is that it is against the doctor's own interest 
in avoiding remorse and personal failure to wdeld so much apparent power as 
the Sidaway case allows. This is not a paternalistic argument against 
medical paternalism. Nor is it about what the rational course would be for 
the physician. It is an expressly ethical question, hinging on the transfer 
of responsibility through informed consent.
After the Court of Appeal had found against Mrs. Sidaway, the editor 
of the Medico-Legal Journal wrote:
[In the Court's view] [i]t is a matter for the doctor to decide
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how much or how little he should tell his patient, taking into account 
all the circumstances of which he knows, including the patient's true 
wishes. As Sir John [Donaldson, Master of the Rolls, giving: judgment] 
pointed out, though many patients may say they want to be told all, it 
is clear that some of them don't. It is for the doctor to divine which 
is the case...The doctor would seem to have to be a cross between a 
detective, a fortune teller, and an emotional and rational prop in 
some cases...The responsibility is heavy.
Just so. Doctors might be expected to prefer telling their patients as much
as possible in order to absolve themselves of responsibility if the
procedure misfires. Yet this rarely seems to be the case— perhaps because
greater openness in the American medical profession has coincided with an
increase in litigation. But perhaps both phenomena are symptoms of a third,
causative one: greater knowledgeability and assertiveness in patients.
The moral mathematics in Sidaway raises deeply problematic issues, 
and it is understandable, if not condonable, that English courts have tried 
to skirt them. Should patients be informed of all risks with a probability 
greater than .01? Why not .02? How about .05? Should it depend on how much 
time doctors have, and that in turn on how many junior doctors the 
government chooses to train? How can we know what the probabilities are 
before the disasters occur, in the case of new treatments?
Mrs. Sidaway was in severe pain before the operation, even though it 
was an elective one. If the pain is sufficiently great, is it irrational to
accept a high level of risk? Even if it imprudent for the patient to
accept a high level of risk, how does that affect the doctor's
responsibility?— bearing in mind that here, as in the case of scarce 
medical resources, it is the health care professional who is the moral 
agent, not the patient. Borrowing the idea of identity from Bernard
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Williams^^— though not the direction of his argument--could we ask xdiether 
a person in great pain is almost a different person from the "same" person 
after the pain-relieving operation? What about the institutionalised and 
the mentally ill? Can we assume rationality in those cases? Is it 
patronising to assume the reverse? Does the very fact of hospitalisation 
lessen the ability to give an "informed" and rational consent, insofar as 
hospitalisation produces dependency?
Most important of all is the question of what risks it is permissible 
for the health care professional to impose on the patient, if any. Derek 
Parfit ^ might not accept my contention in the previous paragraph that the 
ethical questions here concern the doctor's agency, not that of the 
patient. He would probably say that there is an ethical question about the 
patient as well: she is not allowed to treat her future self with any less 
respect than the doctor must show to her. As I mentioned in my discussion 
of Parfit's smoking example, that would be to collapse the distinction 
between the ethical and the prudent, and indeed this seems to be Parfit's 
intention in that instance. In contrast, I began by shrinking the realm of 
the ethical in informed consent cases to the obtaining of the consent 
itself, consistently with my view that we can only defend a notion of moral 
agency against moral luck if we limit what agents are responsible for. (I 
think we should also limit who is the agent, since this follows from 
denying that the patient's imprudence is necessarily immoral, as I do.) 
Even if the treatment turns out to have an unfavourable outcome, medical 
and nursing personnel have not acted unethically so long as they have 
obtained consent, I hypothesised. They might or might not have acted
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imprudently— not necessarily, if the unlucky outcome was the statistically 
inevitable one in 100 times a 99% successful procedure goes wrong, and if 
no better odds than 99-1 are available from other treatments
Parfit *s argument in the smoking example seemed to extend the realm of 
the ethical almost infinitely in all directions, , Is it morally wrong to 
impose any risk on either oneself or others? Parfit seemed to answer yes, 
unless, perhaps, there is a countervailing utility. Yet the smoker clearly 
believes that smoking does bring him countervailing utilities, unless we 
assume that his behaviour is deliberately self-destructive. Is he merely 
inept at calculating expected values? Clearly we are back in the grey area 
of rationality, prudence and ethics. We will need to examine what standards 
have been suggested for rationality in informed consent— along with the 
difficulties which the .operations of probability create for rational 
decision-making.
Before I go on to discuss rationality and consent, however, I want to 
consider other possible replies to the question of what risks health 
professionals are entitled to impose on patients. As I mentioned briefly in 
chapter five, some medical staff employ a consequentialist argument that 
they are under a moral obligation to administer the treatment with the 
highest probability of cure— that they are not entitled not to impose the 
risks associated with that method. This claim is least controversial, 
though still very debatable, when the procedure is presented as the minimum 
necessary for restoring a mental patient, for example, to rationality and 
autonomy, so that she can then give an informed consent or refusal to
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further treatment.More dangerously, the line about overriding autonomy 
so as to confer autonomy has been used to justify vetoing a patient's 
refusal to consent to ECT, or even psychosurgery. This reasoning may appear 
Kantian at first, but it actually makes the patient a means towards the end 
of her own autonomy. (This assumes that the mentally disturbed patient is 
still a moral being, . of course; if one equates moral personality with 
rationality, the objection disappears, but I am not very happy about doing 
that.) . j ' \ J'. . : : ' ; - /
Another sort of consequentialist reasoning tries to defend withholding 
information from the patient or administering a placebo without the 
patient's knowledge, on outcome-orientated grounds. In one case,^^ 
therapists successfully lessened a patient's drug addiction by substituting 
a placebo for the drug, without his knowledge. When informed at last, the 
patient was initially angry, but later came to judge the "treatment" with a 
placebo a success in his own terms. Because the outcome was fortunate, I 
would argue, the therapists were able to say: "We felt ethically obliged to 
use a treatment that had a high probability of success...To withhold the 
procedure may have protected some standard of openness, but may not have 
been in his best interests. But what if the procedure had failed, and 
the patient had discovered the deception? How could the therapists have 
appeased his justifiable anger unless the placebo had worked? And unless 
treatment by placebo had a 100 per cent rate of - success , how could the 
therapists have known in advance that it would work?
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In this case the therapists were simply withholding a drug, so that 
the responsibility appears negative— by contrast with another case in which 
radiography, active treatment, was performed without genuinely informed 
consent. (I think, however, that the complex issue of positive versus 
negative responsibility can be avoided: in both cases medical staff had a 
positive obligation to obtain consent, which they failed to do.) But again, 
in this second case, the medical professional argued that he was justified 
by results. This put him in the looking-glass-world position of claiming 
that he had acted in the patient's best interests when the patient had 
died. It is a compelling case, however, since to the best of the medical 
professional's knowledge, the rate of failure for the procedure was,zero.
The case involves a hospital radiologist who never warned patients
that they might have a fatal reaction during urography because he thought
it would do no good. Although he presumably obtained the required consent
proforma, demanded by statute, the consent could hardly be called
"informed" if such a serious risk remained unexplained. But the death of
one of his patients left him unmoved in his conviction that he had acted
for the ethical best:
I have done 6000 to 8000 urograms in the past thirteen 
years and no one has ever had a fatal reaction. We have been doing 
urograms at this hospital for at least 25 years and no one has ever 
had a fatal reaction...Because the indications for urography were 
great and the chances for a reaction were remote I am sure I would 
have convinced Mrs. E...to have the procedures. She would then have 
had the reaction and died, and the fact,that I warned her would 
have done Mrs. E...absolutely no good.^^
Williams suggests that the attempt to evade moral luck is so central 
to an ethical way of thinking that we may prefer to abandon the moral
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enterprise altogether if we cannot escape from moral luck. The radiographer 
is doing just that: denying that there is any ethical issue, since moral 
luck is inescapable here. How can he excuse his failure to obtain informed 
consent as having produced the best available outcome when the patient has 
died? How can he be so certain that he would have "convinced" Mrs. E. to 
have the operation? (Indeed, his use of the term "convinced" says little 
for his respect for patients * autonomy. ) Perhaps when apprised of the 
gladsome tidings that there had been no deaths during urography for 25 
years in this hospital, Mrs. E.— if she suffered from Gambler's Fallacy as 
well as her clinical condition— would have remarked that it was time for a 
death, then. Would her response necessarily have been irrational? Even if 
Mrs. E. had not died, would the radiologist have obtained the best outcome 
by treating her as a child? Not if autonomy is valued in itself; in that 
case, the best outcome needs to be considered holistically, as including 
the right way of making the decision as well as the clinically desirable 
outcome. The aim, in the cogent view of one nurse, is not to spare patients 
fear— which is impossible— but to allow them to "worry intelligently."^^
It is now time to discuss rationality and consent in greater detail. 
(For the purposes of the discussion it will be necessary to collapse 
rationality and prudence, pace Derek Parfit, since legal discussion is 
almost always in terms of reasonableness or rationality, rather than 
prudence.) Recall that in Brandt, the most basic criterion for rational 
decision-making was that all relevant information should be in view. This 
standard would rule out the possibility of a rational decision for Mrs. 
Sidaway if, as she claimed, the doctor had not provided her with two
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crucial pieces of information: the elective nature of the operation and the 
.01 probability of damage to the spinal cord as a result. It is the second 
which raises the question about balancing probabilities and utilities in 
rational decision strategies. Given that Mrs. Sidaway might reasonably 
have attached, a higher "disutility" to paralysis (p=.01) than to nerve end 
damage (p=.02), could doctors satisfy their patients' informational 
requirements for informed consent if they used an expected-value strategy 
for deciding which risks to disclose? Or does the patient need to know all 
risks? This apparently impossible demand is only the least stringent of 
Brandt's requirements for rational decision-making, remember.
It is naive to believe that all risks can be known. Whether or not 
this is true of Brandt's example of the car which turns out to be a "lemon" 
even though the purchaser has dedicatedly perused Consumer Reports, it is 
unarguable, I think, in new therapeutic or experimental medical procedures. 
This is both a practical and a theoretical caveat. If the doctrine of 
"informed" consent is construed as requiring all risks to be disclosed, it 
cannot satisfy the Kantian "ought implies can" standard. The problem is 
less severe if the doctor's duty is not to impart information about all 
possible risks, but about all the risks he knows.Provided that this does 
not become the lazy doctor's excuse for failing to keep abreast of 
research, this reformulation should satisfy a deontologist.
However, the medical doctrine of therapeutic privilege is invoked by 
some consequentialists to deny that health care personnel should reveal all 
risks even if they could. Doctors profess a fear of "information overload"
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in patients; they sometimes assert that their obligation of primum nor
nocere (first do no harm) prevails over telling the full truth if the truti
could harm, as in the earlier example of a patient who might be driven tc
suicide by being told she has an incurable disease. This principle was
stated for cases of informed consent in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr.
[There are two possible alternatives:] one is to explain to the 
patient every risk attendant upon any surgical procedure or operation, 
no matter how renote; this may well result in alarming a patient who 
is already unduly apprehensive and who as a result refuses to
undertake surgery in which there is in fact minimum risk; it may also
result in actually increasing the risks by reason of the physiological 
results of the apprehension itself. The other is to recognize that 
each patient presents a separate problem, that the patient's mental 
and emotional condition is important and in certain cases may be
crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a certain amount
of discretion must be employed.
The most extreme form of this argument actually asserts that consent 
forms constitute an iatrogenic harm to the patient. Knowing all the risks 
can damage your health, it seems— although some proponents of this viev 
often assert simultaneously that nobody reads consent forms and that nobod} 
will consent if the form lists too many risks. The claim is all the more 
presumptuous because its best-known authors, James Fries and Elizabeth
no
Loftus,^° intend it also to apply to subjects in non-therapeutic 
experiments,, who by definition are receiving no countervailing medical 
benefits. Fries and Loftus present a contradictory picture of patients' anc 
experimental subjects' rationality. On the one hand they depict those or 
the receiving end of treatment as volatile, hysterical, and suggestible; or 
the other, they suggest that even these benighted souls could understanc 
risks presented in the form of comparisons ("as dangerous as an airplane 
trip") rather than conventional probabilities. This only goes to undermine
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their previous consistent stand against disclosure, since research has 
shown that people find comparisons, if anything, less, informative than 
absolute levels of risk.29 ,
Nevertheless, there is a sizeable gap between the number of risks 
which doctors normally reveal to patients and the extent of risk 
information which patients profess to desire. A 1981 American survey 
discovered that doctors said they usually disclosed five or six out of a 
possible sixteen relevant facts about the probabilities of adverse side 
effects from seizure medication.But patients and their relatives wanted 
to know an average of thirteen or fourteen such facts. Are patients more 
rational, in Brandt's first sense of requiring canplete information, than 
health care personnel take them to be? It would be pleasant to think so, 
but other studies suggest that. they fail to make fully rational use of 
information— to measure up to Brandt's second criterion for rationality, 
the elimination of cognitive bias.^^ That is not an automatic argument for 
withholding information from patients, although some writers have fallen 
prey to the naturalistic fallacy by claiming that because people fail in 
fact to exhibit perfect understanding of information, there is no 
obligation in morality to inform them.^^
The dilemma of inefficient use of information is a genuine one for a 
consequentialist, however. A deontologist might assert that the health care 
professional's duty is only to inform, not to ensure comprehension. I find 
this a plausible way of limiting agents' responsibility. Of course, it 
could become a convenient excuse for peremptory and obfuscating
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explanations, but it does at least separate the action of informing from 
the outcome, skewed by near-ineradicable "availability" and "anchoring" 
b i a s e s . 33 The effect of these cognitive short-circuits is evident in one 
study of cardiac patients.3^
Twenty men with a previous history of hospitalisation for heart 
disease and with forthcoming operations were informed, in a taped interview 
before surgery, of the risk of death during the procedure, possible 
complications, likely benefits, probability of overall success, and 
alternative treatments. When interviewed again after the operation, only 25 
per cent remembered that the possibility of death during surgery had ever 
been mentioned. A full 90 per cent had forgotten that less serious 
complications had also been discussed. Even when the interviewers told them 
that these topics had been included, 58 per cent could not remember the 
probability of death mentioned, and 77 per cent failed to recall either the 
content or the probability of other-complications. Patients were best able 
to remember the benefits which had been predicted from a successful 
operation— indicating contamination by motivational biases, wishful 
thinking. Each of the patients was unable to recall some important 
component of the interview, and sixteen out of twenty positively denied 
that certain major items had come up. Thirteen out of twenty fabricated 
facts. One patient maintained stoutly that he had been given no information 
at all; "All he [the doctor] did was lift up my shirt, put à stethoscope on 
my.heart, and that was it." This patient had been given about half an hour 
of the surgeon's time, the normal length of interview in the study.
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As if this were not sufficient indication of irrationality, all the 
patients thought they knew more than they did; "They were frequently in 
error but never in doubt.The patient who achieved the poorest recall 
scores was adamant that he could call to mind every word of the interview. 
Now all these patients had been "educated" by previous experience of
hospitalisation; none was an emergency admission; none was a minor or a 
mental patient. All had convalesced successfully, which leads to the 
speculation that- hindsight bias was at work; they had "known all along" 
that the operation would be successful— because it had been successful. The 
converse form of hindsight bias might apply in consent cases which come to 
litigation. Since by definition these procedures have ended badly,
plaintiffs would be likely to overestimate the doubts which they had at the 
time of signing the consent form. Perhaps, too, they might blame doctors 
unfairly for not giving them more information to assuage the doubts they 
probably never had.
The doctors conducting this study concluded that patients were well 
informed before the operation, but forgot. However, there seems to have
been no test of their comprehension at the time. This is crucial, since 
"informed" consent means informed at the time of signing the consent
proforma. In the absence of actual tests, it might be safer to assume that 
the patients never fully understood the information. If so, was it a waste 
of the surgeons' time to inform them?
A utilitarian cost-benefit analysis might well conclude from this 
research that informed consent is hardly worth the cost. However, there are
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some opposing findings. It may be no coincidence that all twenty patients 
in this study recovered: other researchers have found that patients given 
more information show better rates of success in treatment.3G Another study 
indirectly explains why this should be so by confirming that patients value 
a full presentation of statistical information before signing the consent
0 7
form.-^ ' Perhaps there is some holistic correlation between being valued—  
between respect for persons, in fact— and responding well.to treatment. If 
this seems too speculative, it is nevertheless fallacious to focus too 
narrowly on patients* inferior understanding of probabilities, as compared 
with doctors’ comprehension. Practitioners writing for practitioners have 
asserted that doctors are no better calibrated in assigning probabilities 
of success than patients are.38
American law has tried to bridge the gap between patients' expressed 
desire for full information and their unimpressive track record with the 
information which they are given by developing a doctrine of "material 
risks." This is the requirement that before obtaining consent, the health 
professional must "explain the procedure to the patient and...warn him of 
any material risks of dangers inherent in or collateral to the therapy,"3^  
not of all risks. But this concept lands us back in the complexities of 
what constitutes rationality: a material risk is defined as one which "a 
reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the 
patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to."^  ^To the 
extent that an English law of informed consent exists, it also uses the 
reasonable person criterion, urging the health care professional to picture 
a person of average competence with statistics and medical facts in
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deciding how much to .disclose. This leads to particular difficulty in 
cases of consent involving the mentally ill, those with learning 
disabilities, and children. Such instances are worlds away from the typical 
"rational" individual in Brandt's examples, the Consumer Reports-reading 
university professor.
A particularly p o i g n a n t  c a s e ^ ^  involved a woman with arteriosclerosis 
of the brain vdio was alternately rational and confused. When confused, she 
was prone to wander. On, relatives' urging, she was hospitalised without her 
consent by order of a district (lower) court. The woman brought an appeal, 
with her lawyers maintaining that the burden should be on the lower court 
to suggest alternative treatments for her wandering. When ordered to 
reconsider by the court of appeals, the district court held that in her 
lucid moments, the woman would have seen that the rational decision was 
hospitalisation. The rational self would have elected to hospitalise the 
mad self, and itself as a hostage. The woman was returned to the mental 
hospital, where she died. .
This seems to be a genuine .and tragic case of being asked to treat 
one's self at another time as another person, of the sort developed in 
hypothetical instances by Parfit. In less gothic but equally Catch-22-ish 
cases, senile and otherwise confused patients are judged to be rational if 
they consent to a procedure. But refusing treatment . is proof of 
irrationality, since treatment is clearly in one's best interests.^3 The 
extreme utilitarian slant of this view is consistent with the obverse cases 
in which treatment vÆiich a mental patient has actually requested is
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withheld, often for reasons of cost and benefit. In another case centring 
on an involuntarily institutionalised mental patient, an American state 
circuit court refused to allow an experimental procedure; implanting 
electrodes and perhaps progressing to psychosurgery in order to control 
aggression and violent sexuality in a male resident.4^ By the time of this 
case, psychosurgery was coming under heavy fire, even though its originator 
had earlier been awarded the Nobel Prize. The court doubted that the 
benefits of treatment would outweigh the risks, and overruled the patient * s 
consent to the procedure proposed by the doctors.^
The "reasonable person" criterion may set unrealistic standards for 
"normal" patients, too. If the guideline is the patient of ordinary 
competence with medical facts and statistics, one would only need to recall 
one risk in three, minus a standard deviation, in order to fall within the 
normal band suggested by the cardiac patients study. This seems a very low 
standard of rationality; yet the "reasonable person" is supposed to be the 
average person. I would suggest that the "reasonable person," despite the 
concept's claim to be rooted in empirical fact, is in truth a moral 
concept, not an "is" but a "should." In this sense it is impossible to 
treat the concept as . a merely prudential one, and informed consent 
decisions as practical matters of ascertaining what risks the "average" 
"rational" person would want to know if interviewed before signing a 
consent form. "Average" is a statistical concept, "rational" a hypothetical 
or ethical onei Consent cases cannot be hived off as prudential rather than 
ethical. ■
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To summarise, it seems to me that the paradoxes of rationality and 
risk require an absolutist interpretation of consent. The doctor's 
responsibility is not to get the outcome right in all cases: it appears 
doubtful that even a very extreme consequentialist could argue that. Here 
the normal standards, of negligence apply: the doctor will not be found 
negligent if he performs at the level of average competence for a health 
professional in his circumstances, which may include extrone overwork or 
other harbingers of outcome ill-luck. Of course, if the only doctor in town 
is habitually drunk during half his operations, and tells me so beforehand, 
I can hardly be said to consent freely if I allow him to operate on me for 
a fatal condition so as to have at least a 50-50 chance of life. _ But one 
hopes he is below the normal clinical standard there, and that he would be 
liable for negligence even if I had given my consent. In effect^ his 
negligence would have changed the probabilities: they have become very much 
worse than those I could have expected. Another way of putting this point 
is to say that although the giving of informed consent does transfer 
responsibility to the patient, the doctor is still subject to the normal 
professional standards.
If a procedure turns out badly, the normally competent physician 
cannot be held ethically at fault if he has obtained informed consent; to 
put the matter in deliberately over-simplified terms, he will be unlucky 
t o  not evil, and he should experience regret but not guilt. The doctor's 
responsibility is not necessarily to get the outcome right, but to proceed 
in the correct fashion. I would argue that the second belongs to the realm 
of ethics, the first to that of prudence, probability and rationality. It
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is the consent : proforma which separates the two. A paternalist of the 
extreme sorb, by contrasty would seem to be required to regard the doctor 
as a wrongdoer if the operation turns out badly. Thus an absolutist 
interpretation of consent protects both doctor and patient: the doctor from 
moral luck, the patient from invasion of autonomy. i
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, Chapter Eight . <
The Illest Chance?
Luck, Moral Mathematics and Nuclear Deterrence » •
Nuclear deterrence is the decision which we have to "get right" this 
time. This claim may seem so obvious as to be a mere platitude. If it is, 
however, it has not been equally evident to strategists, about forty per 
cent of the adult population^, or many professional philosophers that 
deterrence fis-inadmissible because it stands a chance, of "getting it 
wrong." In order to.be credible, nuclear deterrence must maintain that the 
probability of nuclear holocaust is greater than zero. This «holds whether 
nuclear conflagration is accidental or deliberate. The decision to build up 
a nuclear arsenal itself creates the possibility of accidental disaster 
and sets the probability juggernaut rolling. Committed /advocates of 
deterrence might reply that there is absolutely no chance of accident, but 
it is hard to see how anyone could seriously defend that claim. Even if it 
were admitted— \diich I do not mean to do— deterrence rests on à publicly 
stated willingness to consider deliberate use of nuclear weapons. The 
decision deliberately to use these arms would of course require policy 
makers to entertain in their minds a probability of use greater than zero.
Because atomic holocaust is the nearest parallel in a secular age to
Pascal's idea of an infinite loss— the eternal destruction of hellfire— the
probability of that loss is intolerable if greater than zero, no matter how
minuscule. As Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill put it;
The precise probability is beside the point...This seems to us 
an important finding whose significance is understandably underrated
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in the strategic tradition,^
This Pascal's wager style of argument against the. nuclear deterrent is
linked to a reasoning based on outcome luck. Once the likelihood of tragic
loss is admitted to be greater than zero,
[r]eliance on the deterrent imports into the lives of those who 
man the deterrent, and the people in whose name they act, a deep 
and systematic reliance on luck... [T]rusting to luck 
becomes the foundation of the security on which civilised life is 
r built.
Not only is. the fate of nations allowed to depend on luck by a policy of 
nuclear deterrence: so is the policy-maker's own power of decision. It 
would be a peculiar piece of moral self-indulgence to see ethical agency as 
more important than the fate of nations; nevertheless, the evaporation of 
the power of moral choice should be profoundly troubling, and hot only to 
Kantians. As Paskins and Dockrill remark, proponents. of nuclear deterrence 
often take comfort in the assertion that deterrence rests . not on the 
conditional intention to retaliate, but on a bluff. But strictly speaking, 
bluff also involves a conditional intention— to do the opposite of what I 
proclaim I will do, to refrain from retaliating if that is what I have 
threatened to do; What prevailing nuclear strategy actually rests on is a 
conscious lack of intention, a deliberate cultivation of akrasia, a sort of 
wilful willessness. If charged with the evil intention of annihilating 
civilians, proponents of mutual assured destruction often counter that they 
have no such definite intention: those with their fingers on the button 
will make up their minds on the spur of the moment.^ Why this should be 
reassuring is hard to fathom. ' ;
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I shall return to this large and-complex dilemma at the end of this 
chapter. It represents the most profound sense in which denying the 
existence of the moral luck paradox could undermine the ethical enterprise, 
I think. Not only the outcomes of decisions would depend on chance, but 
also character; and not only agents* character, but their power of making 
ethical choices in the first place; To see this actually presented as an 
ethical argument for nuclear deterrence is profoundly ironic. If there does 
not remain even the good will, or any will at all, what does remain of 
choice and agency?
The study of nuclear weapons policy also fleshes out other points from 
my first four chapters, particularly those dealing with "moral 
mathematics", rationality and uncertainty. I shall begin with the last 
concept, drawing particularly on the work of Robert Goodin in developing a 
consequentialist defence of unilateralism. (Deontologists have no monopoly 
on opposition to nuclear deterrence; indeed, there is a sort of 
consequentialist unilateralism \diich argues that holocaust would be such an 
overwhelming loss that we should spend all our days protesting against 
governmental deterrence policy.^) Goodin states that even if we cannot 
assign particular probabilities to nuclear risks, we are not faced with 
complete uncertainty. This discussion will then lead into questions of 
moral mathematics and rationality.
Whether nuclear deterrence is a matter of prudence or of ethics will 
also have to be considered. This distinction is of course denied by those 
who believe the rational and the ethical to be synonymous, and a leading
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exponent of this school, David Gauthier, argues that deterrence is
ethical because rational. Conversely, nuclear deterrence is said by John 
Finnis and his colleagues to be profoundly irrational and deeply immoral, 
although; in their deontological framework, it is not immoral only because 
it encourages irrationality. Both camps consider intentions rather than 
actual outcomes: consequentialists in this field, such as Gauthier and
Gregory Kavka, increasingly focus on the ; aims rather than the effects of 
deterrence, even though that might appear to be deontologists* terrain. 
Holding the intention of nuclear retaliation, however, increases the
probability that nuclear war will be the actual outcome, according to
Jonathan Glover..^  Does a policy of nuclear deterrence thus impose
unjustifiable risks, or would unilateral disarmament entail more? Whether 
it is unethical to impose certain risks on domestic and **enemy**
noncombatants will be my last topic of discussion, before I return at the 
close of this chapter to the theme of moral luck.
First, uncertainty. Is deterrence an area in which ordinary rational 
calculation is impossibly flawed by lack of information about the odds of 
catastrophe? Would we want to use ordinary prudential reasoning even if we 
could? There is something obscene: about determining the probability of
nuclear holocaust through a policy of deterrence if it were the
likelihood of a car being a lemon. Nevertheless, there havè been many stabs 
at it, despite critics * sneers that no attempt can be any better than 
guesswork. Daniel Frei, for example, has assigned probability values to 
four separate categories of risk: technical failure, human error, pre­
emptive strike, and disaster through nuclear proliferation.^ He points out.
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correctly, that no matter how low the probabilities for the four categories 
separately, they must be added together to give the overall likelihood of 
disaster. Cumulative risks are what must be considered— over several 
outcomes and across the years. Although Frei assigns a probability of one 
catastrophe in 5000 years to the highest of the four single risks, the 
likelihood heightens to one in 100 years under "normal*' international 
conditions when the four separate probabilities are summed, and to one in 
20 under "crisis" circumstances. This figure for times of acute tension 
should be very worrying for those proponents of deterrence (such as Michael 
Walzer^) who rely on the existence of more or less permanent crisis since 
1945 in their arguments in favour of existing policy., It is this abiding 
state of crisis which is meant to justify overriding the normal just-war 
prohibition against harming civilians, as counter-city deterrence must 
contemplate. : :
But why should proponents or opponents of current strategic policy 
believe Frei's or any other estimates? Ordinary consumer decisions such as 
the purchase of a car can be made in a prudential fashion because the 
correct data are available or at least could be made available. Perhaps 
this statement needs qualification : no matter how carefully I pore over 
Which Car? or Consumer Reports, I may still wind up with a lemon. 
Statistical independence sees to that, even if the information in the 
reports is as accurate as statistical information can be— no matter how 
carefully calibrated I try to make my choice. But even if perfect 
forecasting of the particular outcome is impossible in ordinary prudential 
decisions, uncertainty is palpably more enormous in the case of nuclear
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policy. There is no publication called Which Deterrent? The number of 
models on the market keeps changing without warning, no sooner available 
than recalled for defects. Experts appear to be unable to forecast the 
likelihood of major design faults, such as "nuclear winter", or even to 
agree whether such a thing as that particular design fault could 
conceivably exist. ,
It might be asserted that nevertheless we ought to try to be as well
calibrated as possible, and that nuclear strategy should be the paradigm
for our efforts to put all decision-making on a rational basis. But how can
we generalise from our mercifully defective sample of holocausts? Often
scholars who have attempted to assign probabilities for nuclear disaster
have had to rely on armchair speculation about estimates from various
"experts", a sort of second-hand Delphi method.^ By this sort of method,
Douglas Lackey has calculated the probability of nuclear war over a 30,000-
year timespan, producing complicated expected value figures for numbers of
deaths.But in a review of Lackey's computational procedures, Avner Cohen
dismisses this quest for spurious numerical precision:
In his, ambition to make the case against nuclear deterrence 
objective and quantitative. Lackey appears to underestimate one of the 
most distinctive features of the nuclear predicament— its unique 
element of uncertainty...This uncertainty is not just a matter 
of contingent ignorance; the ignorance is essential...The utmost 
irrationality and uncertainty involved in the eventuality of nuclear 
war shatters everything, including those modes of thinking that made 
nuclear weapons possible in the first place.
This is a deeper qualm than the more obvious ones about calibration and 
probabilities. The nuclear case is inhospitable to "rational" calculation. 
A consequentialist argument for or against the bomb has to reckon not only 
with the lack of hard facts or even of reliable probabilities, but also
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with our contradictory intuitions about nuclear weapons. The politics of 
the nuclear age must be radically different from traditional international 
relations: how else could we have had a state of permanent crisis since 
Hiroshima, as Walzer asserts? Longstanding ententes, alliances and enmities 
are the stuff of old-fashioned international politics, but a permanent cold 
war which justifies targetting millions of "enemy" civilians is something 
abysmally new. All traditional wisdom about the management of war would 
melt away once the nuclear brink was crossed, Cohen claims. Similarly, the 
nuclear deterrent cannot be accommodated in normal prudential thinking 
about the conduct of foreign policy. "When nuclear war is at stake, 
probabilities are not enough: we need moral certainties ;
Robert Goodin can be seen as attempting to counter this criticism that 
uncertainty in the nuclear case is so massive as to render consequentialist 
reasoning inoperable. The incommensurability of nuclear tragedy can in fact 
be accommodated within prudential mechanisms, he asserts. Unexpectedly, 
whilst Cohen opts for multilateralism on the grounds that Unilateral 
disarmament introduces too many uncertainties, Goodin is Concerned to 
provide a consequentialist justification for nuclear pacifism. He applauds 
unilateralists* campaign "to produce modal changes in the possibility of a 
large-scale nuclear war rather than just marginal changes in its 
probability. That limited quest for certainties is^  I shall argue, 
eminently defensible.
Goodin agrees with Cohen that at first glance nuclear deterrence is an 
unsuitable case for utilitarian treatment. To the arguments about lack of
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data on which to base probability assessments and the possibility of
infinite loss which cancels out any probability greater than zero, he adds
useful remarks on how poorly most individuals deal with probabilities. Now
this accurate depiction, drawn from Kahneman, Tversky and Slovic*s work on
judgement,might be countered in terms of the naturalistic fallacy. Just
because leaders and voters are inept at making rational judgements about
nuclear risks does not necessarily mean that they should not try to become
better at it— quite the reverse, perhaps. The enterprise of trying to make
sound prudential decisions about nuclear deterrence, might even draw its
impetus from the need to improve sloppy thinking. But Goodin does not
believe we can do very much better: the odds are inherently unknowable.
In short, my complaint against nuclear deterrence is that it amounts 
to playing the odds without knowing the odds. That constitutes 
recklessness par excellence. It would be the height of 
irresponsibility for anyone to wager the family home on rolls of such 
radically unpredictable dice. Where millions of lives are at stake, 
that judgement must surely apply even more harshly.
After this ringing denunciation, Goodin might be expected to assert 
the impossibility of justifying or condemning deterrence policy in terms of 
risk-balancing. But although he condemns the deterrent, he does so from 
within a consequentialist framework. Goodin*s proposal that we adopt a 
"possibilistic" rather than a "probabilistic" method of calculation 
constitutes one more in a series of recent attempts to preserve the 
consequentialist structure whilst conceding to critics the non- 
quantifiability of much that classical utilitarianism proclaimed eminently 
quantifiable.^^ The aim is to shore up consequentialism against critics 
like S.I. Benn, who, Goodin says, "leaps from the observation that 
probabilities are unreliable where nuclear strategies are concerned to the
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conclusion that consequentialistic reasoning is precluded,Specifically, 
Goodin wants to retain expected-value models of decision-making under 
uncertainty, even though these normally require probability assessment. For 
reasons which I find rather unclear, Goodin seems to eschew decision- 
theoretic strategies which are independent of probability judgements, such 
as maximin. Retaining a probability weighting but substituting a three-part 
division into impossible, certain, and possible is enough to enable 
expected-value calculation to carry on with its business more as less as 
usual, Goodin feels. The revamped rule of conduct becomes that "a moral 
agent should make morally desirable outcomes possible or certain (and 
morally undesirable ones impossible or uncertain) \dierever he can;...a 
moral agent should open up as many possible paths to good outcomes (and 
close off as many possible paths to bad ones) as he can. The effect of 
this supposedly new rule r ds of course very much the same as that of
. . 19 '
maximin.-^^
Thus the moral agent acts by one set of conventional dictates of
rationality— although Goodin has spent considerable time in demonstrating
just how irrational people’s preferences sometimes seem to be. In the end,
however, rationality is assumed, and the possibility of ideologues or "evil
emperors" dismissed. Goodin’s case for unilateral disarmament rests on what
he presents as one certainty in an uncertain world:
There is simply no credible scenario by which a nuclear-armed 
superpower— provided it is at once minimally rational and governed 
by the standard goals guiding world politics— would, either by 
accident or by design, be led to launch a full-scale nuclear assault 
on an opponent armed only with conventional weapons of a merely 
defensive sort. In a war of conquest, no aggressor strives to .destroy
its spoils.
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On the balance of probabilities, this may be so, and it is, a point which 
the opponents of unilateral disarmament usually ignore. But Goodin says he 
is not dealing with probabilities and balances, although that terminology 
often slips back into his diction. To him it is an absolute certainty 
that no superpower could be so irrational as to prefer annihilating its 
enemy to enjoying the spoils of a nuclear-free victory. I doubt whether 
there is any ground for such over-confidence even as far as deliberate 
destruction goes: what of the fundamentalists, alleged to have numbered 
Ronald Reagan among their cohort, ^ o  look forward to nuclear Armageddon as 
the occasion on which the just will be "raptured" heavenward?
But even if official policy decisions were rational, a rational 
superpower can still have accidents. Goodin states complacently that the 
probability of accidents is zéro; yet during an 18-month period following 
installation of new NORAD computers there were 147 false alerts. Four days 
after a new warning station an Thule began transmissions, warning of a 
full-scale attack was received— and revealed just in time to have been a 
radar mirage caused by reflections off the moon. In the autumn of 1979 new 
American computers identified another phantom attack, supposedly by Soviet 
missiles which can reach their target in less than ten minutes. US systems 
prepared to retaliate; four minutes before the predicted impact, analysts 
discovered that a training tape had been inserted in the computer system by 
mistake.
The holocaust could occur by chance, and it is partly by chance that 
it has not yet,occurred. Once again consequentialism, even Goodin’s revised
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version, is mistaken in thinking that it can ignore moral luck. Goodin 
presents one-sided disahnament as a "sure thing", Cohen more conventionally 
as a gamble. But conversely, Goodin does remind us that deterrence, 
although the accepted strategy, is very unpredictable in its payoffs. Both 
Cohen and Goodin seem to view their opponents’ strategies as vulnerable to 
chance but to present their own prescriptions— multilateralism in the first 
case, unilateralism in the second— as fail-safe. Overall, I think Goodin 
holds the edge, insofar as a policy of deterrence actively requires the 
probability of disaster to be greater than zero, whereas unilateral 
disarmament does hot. However, neither can unilateral disarmament 
guarantee a probability of zero.
If Goodin’s unilateralism* is the right moral course, its correctness 
cannot depend oh the accuracy of his prediction that nUclèar holocaust 
cannot possibly ensue. We have already seen serious reasons to doubt the 
accuracy of that prediction, particularly so far as accidents are 
concerned, but also in terms of deliberate policy when decision-makers 
cannot be assumed to be fully rational— ideologues, trigger-happy 
travellers to Armageddon, or non-elected officials whose policies are not 
open to public scrutiny. The important point here is that we have ho way of 
knowing whether or not those who actually make the decisions are rational. 
Once again; our uncertainty is greater than we like to think. It has been 
alleged that the famous "football" which accompanies the American president 
everywhere and which supposedly contains the codes for unleashing missiles 
is an elaborate hoax, designed to reassure the public that the decision is 
centralised in the hands of one accountable official. Military imperatives
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require that the decision actually be decentralised to commanders and sub­
commanders in the field, in case the President dies in a first strike. Even 
the identity of those who will actually make the decision to retaliate is 
rarely known to the electorate; let alone their rational or .irrational 
state of mind.^^
Perhaps banishing probabilities requires Goodin to assign too many 
events to the "impossible" and "certain" categories of his scheme. Whatever 
the reason, the particular "technical fix" which he offers seems not to 
work. The action of chance cannot be weakened by rejigging consequentialism 
from a probabilistic to a "possibilistic" mode of operation. Another sort 
of technical fix in a consequentialist argument focuses on the consequences 
of the intention to retaliate rather than on those flowing from the act of 
retaliation. Specifically, a policy of deterrence is held to be both 
rational and ethical by David Gauthier because intending to retaliate is 
also rational and ethical, even though actual retaliation would be neither. 
Gauthier’s exercise in "moral mathematics" and the opposing arguments by 
John Finnis and his colleagues constitute the second major area of 
discussion in this chapter.
In a deep sense, the policy of deterrence appears to ignore the most 
basic dictates of rationality. It requires us to hold two contradictory 
beliefs simultaneously: that the bomb could be used and that it could never 
be used— precisely because it could be used. The secrecy surrounding 
nuclear weaponrybreaches the first, minimal condition for rational 
decision-making in Brandt, possession of as much relevant information as
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possible. Like Sidgwick’s "Government House utilitarianism," deterrence 
appears to be à policy which only works provided that the majority is kept 
in the dark about it. On the practical "national security" level, this is 
obvious. The number of Cruise missiles installed at Molesworth and Greenham 
Common has only been made known to the British public, the supposed 
beneficiary of protection from the missiles, now that the Soviet "enemy" 
has had to be told, too, through the 1987 INF summit.
It has also been argued that the policy of deterrence encourages the
active cultivation of irrationality in decision-makers themselves,
particularly over time. If leaders are rational, it could be disastrous for
them if their enemies get to hear of it. Applying an argument originally
made by D.H; Hodgson,Jonathan Glover points out that sanity can be bad
for the nation’s collective health. The best outcome in a cold war
confrontation is for both sides to avoid nuclear holocaust, but Hodgson
viewed this as unattainable because the sane leader will prefer as the
second-best outcome to limit niiclear devastation to one side only, even if
it is the enemy side, and will not retaliate.
...[I]n certain circumstances the sane man’s rank ordering 
will have disastrous consequences if the other side gets to know 
of it. [This] does not show that to possess the rank ordering is 
self-defeating, but it does show that, in a balance-of-terror 
situation, it may be necessary to conceal the rank ordering by making 
insincere threats of retaliation...It is hard to see how a government 
could make insincere threats of retaliation \^thout equally deceiving 
its own population.. .A further problem is that the deception and 
propaganda can work too well.. .[S]ome people, perhaps including the 
politicians of the next generation, will be convinced... [T]he 
-insincerity may disappear and a genuine threat emerge.-
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Now this prescription in favour of honesty as the best policy— or at 
least against subterfuge as encouraging irrationality in unpredictable 
ways— could be accommodated within consequentialism, if not in Glover’s 
variant. As I pointed out in chapter six, it is only Kantianism which 
asserts that honesty is better than any policy. David Gauthier can be seen 
as arguing that a consequentialist defence of the deterrent can accommodate 
Glover’s points about unpredictability and irrationality. Implicitly, 
Glover is saying that the expressed intention to retaliate, even if 
insincere, changes the probability of actual retaliation, making it 
unacceptably high. Explicitly, Gauthier incorporates the link between 
intention and action, the manner in which a policy designed. with certain 
probabilities ostensibly in mind shifts the boundaries of those outcomes’ 
likelihood. To Gauthier, the unpredictability which this introduces into 
utilitarian calculation is not insuperable; nor. does he accept that the 
policy of deterrence is ambivalent or malign towards rationality.
Game strategists such as Thomas Schelling* '^ have often claimed that it 
may indeed be meet to put an antic disposition on— that a prudent player 
might choose to negotiate from the apparent weakness of irrationality. 
Although mutual devastation is of course a disaster to any sane person, the 
calculating statesman may derive considerable advantage from appearing 
lunatic enough not to realise that. Gauthier implicitly draws on 
Schelling’s ideas, with their Orwellian parallel of ’’strength through 
weakness,’’ and on Machiavelli’s counsel to appear but not be irrational, 
from time to time. Although massive retaliation would be massively 
senseless, the intention to retaliate may be highly politic:
It may be utility maximising to form the nonsubmissive, retaliatory
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 'intention; therefore it may be rational to form such an intention; if
it is rational to form the intention it is rational to act on the 
intention; therefore a rational person can sincerely express the 
intention; therefore another rational and informed person can be 
deterred by, the expression of the intention.:
There are some large claims here, and some broad jumps between them—
particularly from "if .it is rational to form the intention" to "it is
rational to act on the intention." Schelling, for example, leaves acting
out of it. How does Gauthier justify his assertions?
In the traditional deontological condemnation of the intent to do
evil, moral opprobrium flows from the. contemplated act to the thought of
the act. It is wrong to intend what it would be wrong to do. Gauthier
reverses the direction:
It may be tempting to suppose that it is rational to form an intention 
if and only if it would be utility maximising to execute the 
intention. Instead we argue that it is rational to execute an^- 
intention if and only if it is utility maximising to form it.^^
Thus, although intention is generally more prominent in deontological
argument, Gauthier tries to incorporate it into consequentialism as a tool
of prudent policy. The possession of a good will is the standard Kantian
defence against outcome ill-luck. My intentions, at least, cannot be
fortune’s slaves. But to Gauthier, no longer is a good will the only
securely good thing in the world. The will to perform an act is to be
measured by the same ethical calculus as the act’s outcome— in Gauthier’s
formulation, by the yardstick of utility maximisation. And it is to be
measured independently: Gauthier drives a wedge between intention and
outcome. No matter how evil the actual destruction of civilian populations
might be, there is no intrinsic harm— and possibly much politic benefit— in
thinking very seriously about it.
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Thinking seriously about doomsday does of course require a doomsday 
machine. When this is set up, the odds on destruction may well slip from 
out of the makers’ control, as Frei alleges, and moral luck creep in. 
Gauthier does recognise that calculation is a continuing process rather 
than a single act in the case of deterrence, that, for example, ’’adoption 
of the intention affects one’s expected utilities by affecting the 
probability that the condition for implementation will be realised. 
Nevertheless, this is intrinsically different from a consumer decision or a 
bet, even if the probabilities there may have to be recalibrated and the 
utilities reassigned in the course of the decision. The odds which Honest 
Joe is offering will lengthen and shorten as the race approaches, 
according to the stake money put down by myself and other punters, but my 
choice of how much to bet on which horse and at what stage does not affect 
whether or not the race actually takes place. I have not set the machine 
going, so there is no question of it subsequently slipping out of my 
control. Deterrence decisions, again, are profoundly unlike ordinary 
consumer decisions, but Gauthier deals with the decision to ’’buy’’ a 
doomsday machine much as if it were any other life choice, (it is, of 
course, at least potentially a death choice.) The example \diich he offers 
as a metaphor for nuclear deterrence concerns an academic whose wife 
attempts to ’’deter’* him from leaving desirable Boston for the wastes of 
Texas.
In the end Gauthier really offers little more— despite his large
claims— than a standard expected-value analysis;
The benefits of deterrent success must always be balanced 
against the costs of deterrent failure, and only the relevant 
probabilities of being in the undesirable situation, both with
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and without a policy of deterrence, together with an interval 
measure of utility in terms of which we may calculate the minimum 
required probability for deterrent success, enables us to calculate 
the balance of benefits and costs...The cost of acting on the 
deterrent intention enters, with appropriate probability weighting, 
into determining whether it is rational to form the intention.
He merely assumes that calculation can apply to intention, though it is
hard to see how aims could be quantified in the same manner as outcomes. It
may be that Gauthier intends us to measure the consequences of intentions,
but even this poses problems. Is it by luck or design, through correlation
or random co-occurrence, that deterrence policy has coincided with forty
years of a sort of peace?
Gauthier does not so much prove that the rational is also the ethical
as assert it; "Morality, in my view, follows rationality." Whether or
not nuclear deterrence is ethical is treated ^  initio as an empirical
question, although a difficult one. But \diat makes it a particularly
insoluble mathematical conundrum— to argue for the moment in Gauthier’s
terms— are the infinity of the possible loss and the chance that it will
occur this time. The point about statistical independence does not come up
in Gauthier, but it does trouble Frei;
Statistical probabilities do not provide any information regarding 
the occurrence of specific single events. A probability of one 
unintentional nuclear war per hundred years may seem negligible; 
it looks much more menacing if one assumes that, according to this 
probability distribution, the disaster may happen tomorrow and be 
followed by 99 years of peace.
If we take the problem of future generations seriously, the occurrence of
the disaster at the end of the 99 years should trouble us just as much as
its happening tomorrow. But either way, Frei is quite correct to remind us
that it could happen anytime. Lest this seem hypothetical doom-mongering,
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the US space shuttle programme was projected to lose one vehicle in several 
hundred flights stretching up to the year 2000; the Challenger carnage took 
place on the twenty-fifth flight.: Although the American public was 
profoundly shocked by this "unlikely" event, there was nothing remotely 
surprising about it, in terms of statistical independence.
Gauthier criticises unilateralists for their alleged fixation on the
prospect of catastrophe: . , . ,
The argument of the irrationality of deterrence looks only to 
the costs of deterrent failure. Because there are such costs, it 
rejects the p o l i c y .
But what I have been arguing is not that it is because deterrence entails 
costs that a prudential argument for it must be rejected; it is because it 
entails costs of a sort which render prudential calculation impossible. It 
is impossible to provide either a prudential justification or a prudential 
rejection of deterrence. We may lose the world : it is hard to know what 
loss could be infinite if this is not. Expected-value strategy for 
decisions under uncertainty and the Parfit-Taurek debate on whether it is 
more evil to harm five people than one both deal in finite numbers. What we 
face in the nuclear holocaust is the possibility of a loss so vast as to 
wipe out probability calculations, as Pascal argues is true of the infinite 
reward of paradise and the boundless loss of hell. From a purely 
arithmetical point of view, Pascal is correct. The only query is whether we 
assign an infinite negative value to the destruction of the world. If the 
cost is infinite, a rational and prudent policy-maker will wish to avoid 
it, no matter how infinitesimally small its likelihood. This will be the 
appropriate course for prudential reasoning: to know its own limits.
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If the forfeit of the world is not viewed as a strictly infinite loss, 
it still appears to me to be of a different and incomprehensibly greater 
order of magnitude than any of the utilities which could be maximised by 
deterrence, including the prevention of Soviet tyranny. This view is 
shared, to their credit, by three writers who consider that Soviet 
domination would constitute enslavement, as I do not. It helps to explain 
their assertion, contra Gauthier, that the policy of nuclear deterrence is 
deeply wrong. As G.E.M. Anscombe condemned the Second World War from within 
the just-war tradition,, on the grounds that it would produce mass civilian 
deaths,so Finnis, Boyle and Grisez draw on Catholic theology to propound 
an equally controversial platform: "immediate and, if necessary, unilateral 
renunciation of the deterrent strategy in so far as it involves threats of 
city swapping and final retaliation."^^
Finnis and his colleagues marshal and criticise a wide range of 
consequentialist arguments .both for and against the nuclear deterrent. The 
concern appears to be not only whether the deterrent is permissible or 
evil, but whether it can be either right or wrong for consequentialist 
reasons. Against a first set of outcome-orientated claims they restate what 
Charles Fried calls the Christian challenge to consequentialism: those 
willing to sell their souls in order to gain the world may lose both their
oo
souls and the world. In the case of nuclear deterrence, the second part 
of this warning is literally true. Against those idio might appear to be 
their allies— unilateralist consequentialists like Goodin— they warn that 
you can't get there from here. : *
[Prudential analysis] works only when (a) goals are well defined;
(b) costs can be compared with some definite unit (e.g. of money);
(c) benefits can also be quantified in a way that renders them
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commensurable with one another, and (d) differences among.means, 
other than their efficiency, measurable costs, and measurable 
benefits, are not counted as significant. Moral reasoning, however,
(a) is not concerned with some definite goal, but with human well­
being or the virtuous life as a whole; (b) concerns values and 
disvalues [sic] which are diverse in kind, and usually non- 
quantifiable; (c) seeks goods which cannot be quantified in a way 
that renders them commensurable; and (d) cannot ignore differences 
in the quality of the means.■
This listing of the differences between the prudent and the right is more
sophisticated than Gauthier's blanket Assertion that the second follows
directly from the first, but it is open to challenge nonetheless.
Proposition (a), for example, would be accepted by an Aristotelian, but
there is no reason why an act utilitarian should take it on board. The same
is true of proposition (d), which is of course a Kantian claim.
Finnis, Boyle and Grisez spurn the various technical fixes suggested 
by consequentialists in both the pro- and anti-deterrence camps, always on 
the grounds that the inherent contradictions in moral mathematics are too 
vast for tinkering. Against Goodin they reiterate that the rightness or 
wrongness of deterrence cannot be settled by rejigging the boundaries of 
the probability distribtufion. Against Gauthier they. Assert that the 
direction of the wrongful-intentions principle— that it is wrong to intend 
what it would be wrong, to do— cannot simply be reversed. Now of course 
there is no intrinsic reason why a consequentialist should worry about the 
wrongful-intentions principle^ just as he or she could choose to ignore 
propositions (a) and (d) above. But having decided to incorporate intention 
into his consequentialist argument, Gauthier is open to this objection.
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But are Finnis, Boyle and Grisez right to reject moral mathematics 
altogether? Is this as blanket a claim as Gauthier' s simplistic assertion 
that the moral follows the rational? I have tended to argue along similar 
lines, at least so far as Gauthier's calculations go— presenting his 
argument as failing for reasons which a consequentialist cannot ignore, 
mistakes in ; moral mathematics concéming -statistical independence æ d  the 
nullifying effect on probabilities which is exercised by infinitely great 
losses or gains. I have tended also to assert that because the nuclear case 
involves the infinite, moral mathematics is invalid here. But before 
proceeding to my third topic in this chapter, \diab risks if any can be 
imposed on others in nuclear policy, I shall let the advocates of moral 
mathematical reasoning have one last attempt to prove their case.
In an article, "Some Paradoxes of Deterrence,"^® Gregory Kavka 
attempts what I am tempted to regard as merely another technical fix, but 
which he presents as a new decision-making mode. This method, vhich Kavka 
calls his "disaster-avoidance principle," yields a pro-deterrent result, as 
did Gauthier's. It also resembles Gauthier's later procedure in asserting 
that the morality of an intention depends on the consequences of the 
intention, not of the act which follows from it.
Considering deterrence as a policy of intentions, then, rather than 
as . a set of ; actions, Kavka arrives, at an ,interesting predicament. 
Deterrence is likely to produce a more serious loss— nuclear holocaust— but 
unilateralism entails a higher probability of the loss which it may result 
in, Soviet domination. Although Kavka seems to toy with the realisation
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that the cost of deterrence could be an infinite loss, y/hich Soviet control 
is not, he omits Pascal's wager considerations, vhich would clearly argue 
against the deterrent. Maximin, which would entail unilateralism, would 
seem the appropriate strategy, he suggests, for reasons which are less than 
clear. Expected-value strategy is made to deal with exactly such cases as 
Kavka's, in which a higher probability and lower utility for one 
alternative are to be balanced against the opposite in another, and there 
is no genuine paradox in this case.However, in an argument whose moral 
mathematical, empirical basis seems at best very doubtful, Kavka goes on to 
claim that maximin is not appropriate--because we can be quite confident 
that over the next thirty years holocaust is extremely unlikely.
: There are grounds in statistical independence for distrusting Kavka's
vanishing-trick. Unless we can be certain that holocaust is impossible over 
the next thirty years, it could happen tomorrow, as Frei correctly warns 
us. But Kavka never says that holocaust is impossible, itself an impossible 
position to defend. Nevertheless he regards it as being of a different 
level of probability from the worst outcomes entailed by the options in 
"ordinary decision theory," where, he says, the lowest-ranked consequence 
is usually quite likely. This is merely asserted, as -is. the extreme 
unlikelihood of holocaust, and illegitimatelyj, I think, in order to get the 
result which Kavka wants; that maximin is not after all the appropriate 
strategy. Apart from the dubiousness, of Kavka's confidence about the 
unlikelihood of holocaust, he is using factors extrinsic to maximin—  
probabilities, which maximin deliberately ignores— in order to reject 
maximin. . :
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What does turn out in the end to be a revised version of expected- 
value procedure is formulated by Kavka to apply specifically to situations 
such as nuclear risk— "casés of two-dimensional.uncertainty," in which one 
option entails the greater "disutility" and the other the higher 
probability of loss . In this case, says Kavka, "it is rational. to select 
the alternative that minimises the probability of disaster occurrence. 
This dictates accepting the risks of nuclear deterrence, with a lower 
probability although a greater loss. Kavka's calculation is of course open 
to the arguments about infinite loss which I havé already rehearsed, but I 
do not intend to repeat them. What I want to emphasise as I end this 
section' on moral mathematics arid deterrence is this: the possibility that 
the loss which might ensue from deterrence is infinite is matched by our 
complete ignorance about the probabilities attached to a policy of 
unilateral disarmament, a much more radical uncertainty than any that Kavka 
contemplates. : '
If we have a limited sample from which to generalise in dealing with 
use of riuclear weapons— Hiroshima and Nagasaki— we have a sample of zero in 
considering the likely consequences of unilaterally renouncing nuclear 
weapons. It has never been done, although the Soviets have come closest in 
the recent INF negotiations. Not even an extreme Bayesian is willing to 
compute probabilities from a sample of zero, although he or she might be 
content with a sample of one. Neither Kavka or anyone else can possibly 
assign a meaningful probability to the occurrence of Soviet domination 
through uriilateral disarmament by a western power— or of accidental nuclear 
war during such laying down of nuclear arms.^^ A disgruntled hard-liner in
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charge of a US missile silo about to be rendered impotent might well push 
the button rather than let the damned Russkis take over. But there is no 
branch of moral mathematics which could calibrate the probability of that 
with even the most minimal degree of confidence.
A freak disaster through disarmament could not be interpreted as 
meaning that unilateralism was wrong from the start so long as 
unilateralism was not justified only in terms of the consequences. Ihat is 
the argument from moral luck as applied to nuclear deterrence and 
disarmament. The argument from uncertainty and ignorance is linked: the 
consequences are uniquely unknowable in the nuclear case, and a
consequentialist argument either for or against utilitarianism cannot be 
made without conjuring probabilities out of a hat. For practical reasons to 
do with the limitations of moral mathematics, neither unilateralism nor 
deterrence can be justified in terms of utilities and probabilities, on a
prudential or consequential basis. For reasons to do with moral luck and
with the nature of the moral enterprise— to be considered in greater 
detail at the end of the chapter— we should actually be glad of that.
The example of the silo commander's last stand would doubtless be 
seized on by proponents of deterrence strategy as an example of the
terrible risks to \diich unilateral disarmament could expose both us and the 
"enemy." It is now important to consider some matters to do with imposing 
risks on others. Ihe deon to logical tradition on war does appear willing to 
risk terrible mass suffering for the sake of high-mindedness, opening 
itself up to the charge of moral self-indulgence. Here is an example from
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Anscombe*s pamphlet opposing the war against Hitler:
It is said that war admittedly produces a number of evil effects, 
including attacks on civilians, but that these must be balanced 
against the probable good effects of the war, and if they are 
outweighed by good, then they can be discounted. It is indeed 
true that such a balance must be made, but we cannot propose to 
sin, because that evil will be outweighed by the good effects 
of the war. That would be to commit sin, however small, for the 
sake of any good, however great, and if the choice lies between 
our total destruction and the commission of sin, then we must 
choose to be destroyed.
Similarly, Gandhi is said to have advised the Jews to commit suicide rather
than resist Hitler. If this is the sort of risk which absolutist
injunctions impose, how can they be anything but profoundly unattractive?
And if unilateralism is motivated by such a deontological ethic, how can it
claim to be any less callous towards civilian populations than deterrence
strategy?
There is an empirical sort of answer to this criticism: the actual 
choice may not in fact lie between total destruction and the commission of 
sin. (Indeed, Anscombe does not assert that it necessarily does: merely 
that if it did, we would have to choose not to sin.) Michael Walzer has 
drawn up an interesting argument regarding passive resistance, purporting 
to show that if anything, it is armed struggle vhich is more likely to 
produce both heavy destruction and the doing of wrong.The probabilities 
available to us about civil disobedience against invaders are nearly as 
inadequate as those we possess— or do not possess— about the consequences 
of unilateral disarmament, for the same reason: no one has tried it. Non­
violent resistance has always been seen as the last chance against an 
invader, to be invoked only if military defence fails. Admittedly there are 
no examples of an occupying power being ejected by civil disobedience—
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unless we count India, which, curiously enough, Walzer does not mention—
but this results from the self-fulfilling prophecy that only military
resistance will be effective.
No non-violent struggle has ever been undertaken by a people trained 
in advance in its methods and prepared (as soldiers are in case of 
war) to accept its costs. So it might be true [that passive resistance 
is as effective as military action, and much less costly in lives]; 
and if it is, we should have to^regard aggression very differently 
from the way we do at present.
The empirical rejoinder to the accusation that unilateralism would impose
massive suffering is that we cannot know this for certain. If anything, it
is deterrence strategy that willingly risks the ordeal of the innocent,
since it requires the probability of holocaust to be greater than zero. And
of course it also demands the doomsday machine to make deterrence credible;
it sets rolling the juggernaut of risks.
This leads into a second kind of reply to the charge about imposing 
risks, one based not on the empirical lack of probabilities on which to 
base a calculation, but on the moral locus of the rightness or wrongness of 
deterrence policy. Traditional deontological reasoning, of the sort still 
embodied in the work of Finnis, Boyle and Grisez, held that it was wrong to 
intend \diat it would be wrong to do. Since it would be wrong deliberately 
to kill innocent civilians, it would be evil to intend to do so, as 
counter-city deterrence policy must. Now consequentialists have tried to 
open chinks in the armour of this wrongful-intentions principle by focusing 
not on the evil of actual retaliation but on the extent to which the 
intention to retaliate if attacked maximises utility and constitutes a good 
policy. We have seen an example of this in Gauthier.
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An intriguing deontological rejoinder to this bifurcation of intention 
and action is made by Jefferson McMahon, who condemns deterrence strategy 
not on the usual wrongful-intention grounds but on the basis of risk 
imposition.^7 To McMahon deterrence is wrong not because it embraces a 
wrongful intention, but because it accepts. the risk of deliberately using 
counter-civilian weapons. Thus the deontological premise changes from "It 
is wrong to intend (even conditionally) that which it would be wrong to do" 
to "It is wrong to risk doing that which it would be wrong to do, and wrong 
to support a policy \diich carries a risk of wrongdoing.This makes 
considerable sense in terms of statistical independence, which means that 
anyone who accepts a risk of doing that which it would be wrong to do must 
also accept that that which it would be wrong to do could occur this time.
McMahon's reformulation of the traditional deontological position 
turns the charge of imposing risks against the proponents of deterrence. 
Not only do they risk holocaust— which unilateralists can also be seen to 
do, in the case of the silo commander— but they also risk doing wrong. In a 
democracy, they also risk subverting democratic accountability itself, 
since doomsday machines are almost entirely exempt from popular control.^® 
McMahon therefore supports unilateralism on the grounds "that any policy of 
nuclear deterrence which it would be possible for citizens in a democracy 
to support would involve a risk that nuclear weapons would be used without 
their authorisation."^®
This seems a particularly neat move because it incorporates an 
inherently consequentialist concept— risk and risk imposition. As I
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mentioned in discussing Finnis, Boyle and Grisez, there is no reason vdiy a 
consequentialist should accept that intent must be. part of ethics, and in 
fact many , reasons— given the trickiness of the concept and the nature of 
the utilitarian enterprise— vhy he or she should not. : But McMahon argues 
against a consequentialist espousal of deterrence on grounds native to 
consequentialism.
This concludes my examination of uncertainty, moral mathematics and 
risk imposition in the example of nuclear deterrence.. I have tried to make 
some relevant points about moral luck as I went along, but now I need to 
draw them together into a more comprehensive conclusion. Nuclear deterrence 
policy embodies the willing acceptance of moral luck in a particularly 
telling way, I think. To illustrate this, let me return to Gauthier's 
argument in favour of the deterrent. r
It is conventionally recognised that deterrence actively requires 
uncertainty— in the opponent's mind, about vdiether I will indeed retaliate 
if he attacks me. But it also demands that I be uncertain in my own mind. I 
cannot be certain that I will not return force with force, for if I am, I 
may betray my pacifism in my public pronouncements and effectively invite 
the enemy to attack me in the secure knowledge that I will turn the other 
cheek. I cannot be certain that I will definitely retaliate for equally 
politic reasons. My countrymen prefer to delude thonselves with the belief 
that I am "only bluffing," and too much hawkishness will put the wind up 
them.
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Gauthier correctly points out that I cannot know for sure how I will 
react if attacked. Will my calculation of the appropriateness of 
retaliation be less than rational?— moved by anger or panic, for example? 
The link between retaliation and intention in deterrence is thus not as 
fixed as some deontologists claim, he argues. This seems a plausible 
argument, although I think McMahon can bypass it by substituting the risk 
of doing wrong for the intention to do wrong. But leaving that aside and 
concentrating on intention for the moment, uncertainty does introduce an 
interesting quirk.. '
Gauthier therefore prefers to restate my conditional intention to 
retaliate as my situation of finding myself choosing to retaliate. This is 
of course quite a good factual representation of what may actually happen 
in politics, particularly if a segment of the leadership is killed in the 
first strike and the doomsday machine moves into semi-automatic operation. 
But as a depiction of ethical choice it raises enormous problems of moral 
luck. The agent is so alienated from his or her own decision as effectively 
to have become a mere observer of it. This relates back to Nagel's dilemma 
of "excess objectivity", and casts into doubt the whole notion of 
responsible agency. : .J *
With Sartrean "bad faith", I announce through following a policy of 
deterrence that I have no real choice— that I can neither predict nor 
control my response to enemy attack. My moral decision— and whether to 
unleash massive destruction on enemy civilians can hardly be described as 
anything but the most momentous ethical choice— is allowed to depend
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entirely on external circumstances; I adopt what Nagel.called a "radically 
external standpoint" towards my own agency and responsibility. (See chapter 
four.) ' -
There is an alternative version of Gauthier's argument, also pro­
deterrent; US strategic doctrine has been said to depend on the nation 
being seen to have no choice but to "go nuclear" once conventional war 
begins in Europe, since nuclear firepower will be in the zone of 
operations.Although Gauthier pictures the decision as radically
underdetermined and American strategy sees it as fully determined, the 
implications for moral choice are the same. There is none, and the moral 
agent becomes a cipher in both cases. One pole of the moral luck paradox 
has been pushed to the extreme; agents are no longer held responsible for 
how things turn out because those outcomes were beyond their control, and 
indeed because there is no longer any such thing as .agents' control. Yet 
what could illustrate the urgency of the other side of the moral luck 
dilemma more powerfully than nuclear destruction? Are we really willing to 
say that no one was responsible if half of humanity should die?
There are weaker versions of this argument about the effect of a 
policy of deterrence on the character of those employing it. McMahon
asserts, for example, that possessing an evil intention— to retaliate
against civilians— can corrupt, much as some consequentialists view
habitual secrecy as addictive (see chapter six). But such arguments can be 
accommodated within consequentialism; I merely need to take an extra 
variable into account, the risk to my own moral character from the various
Moral Luck in Medical Ethics and Practical Politics Page 233
The Illest Chance?/Chapter 8
courses proposed. What cannot be reconciled with consequentialism, or, I 
would argue, with: any ethical doctrine, is the profound threat to there 
being such a thing as moral choice. Accepting a policy of deterrence does 
not turn us into calculating machines; it turns us into spinning jennies 
or cotton gins, machines without the power of rational calculation. The 
policy of deterrence is hopelessly paradoxical if it is a choice to deprive 
ourselves of the power of choice— that, or fearful of freedom.
C O
Nussbaum-^^ argues that what is evil about Agamemnon's sacrifice of 
Iphigenia is not only the murder itself, but also the bad faith by which he 
persuades himself ; that killing his daughter, was a good thing. In this 
deeply repellent manner he ignores the moral ill-luck which forces him to 
cause suffering through whatever choice he makes— to the Greek fleet, 
becalmed and plague-ridden, if he abstains,; and to his child if he obeys 
the gods' command. There is an uncomfortable parallel here, I think, with 
the style of pro-deterrent argument which celebrates mutual assured 
destruction as having brought us peace for forty years.
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